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FRANCE AND EUROPE

By Robert Schuman

PUBLIC opinion everywhere is anxious to know how the question of the unification of Europe stands today. What were the original objectives? What has been done to attain them? How can the remaining obstacles be overcome? To find the answers we must begin by reviewing the progress already made, not in any mood of self-satisfaction—though it is reasonable to be gratified that such a revolutionary idea has taken shape so fast and without the violence that usually accompanies revolution—but in order to learn from the past what to do in the future.

The first question to ask ourselves is why attempts to organize Europe failed before 1948. In 1930 Aristide Briand wrote a memorandum which called for a pact to bring about a "European Association"—the first time that the question of unity was officially raised. But the Briand proposal confined itself mainly to outlining a legal structure, in particular a system of arbitration. An economic aim—the establishment of a common market—was suggested only summarily. More important still, any infringement upon national sovereignty was definitely excluded. In thus making it a matter of principle that not a particle of their sovereignty was to be relinquished the signatories would have promised to deprive themselves of the chief means of achieving their goal. It was to be accepted in advance that the proposed organization would be powerless.

The plan had no practical result. But even if the French Government had suggested limiting sovereignty, it still would have had no chance of success, for no European country was ready for the concept of a supranational authority. The idea was not acceptable to a man like Poincaré, and still less to a Mussolini; and though Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries had rallied to an international organization of the traditional type, there was no chance that they would go beyond that. The French plan was

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stillborn because it was ahead of its time, and even if it had been tried, it would not have worked.

There was also a special, in fact basic, reason for Briand's failure. He had tried to settle the Franco-German problem by signing the Locarno Pact in October 1925; but in point of fact nothing was settled. Peace had been restored by the Treaty of Versailles, but certain provisions of it held Germany in an inferior status, and the question of reparations—a thorn in the side of both debtors and creditors—seemed insoluble. What hope could there be of common action by France and Germany, when the former clung to her unsatisfied legal rights and the latter clamored for equality and revision of the Treaty? In such an atmosphere there was no possibility of coöperation.

German nationalism, nourished by incessant but futile scoldings, grew until its supporters at length felt strong enough to deny that Germany had suffered any military defeat or bore any political responsibility. Banking on the fact that the German economic and industrial plant was intact and that an alliance with Russia was possible, they moved rapidly to split Europe. Hitler completed the break when he came to power in January 1933.

At the end of the Second World War the situation was entirely different. This time there could be no doubt that Germany had suffered a crushing military defeat. Ravaged by war, fully occupied by Allied troops, the country was in a state of political collapse, without either an army or a central government. She could get back to her feet only with the aid of the Allies. Moreover, the régime imposed by the Soviets in their zone of occupation did not attract the German people as a whole; they were now thoroughly immunized against the virus of Rapallo.

In 1947 the Western Allies became aware of Russia's military threat, evidenced by the network of 27 treaties binding her satellites to her. At the same time Moscow rejected the collective aid offered to Europe under the Marshall Plan. It was plain that the Russians intended to install themselves firmly in the heart of Europe, and to retain a free hand to spread their domination over the Western part of it by propaganda and intrigue.

The three other Allies soon countered this move. To allocate and put to work the funds made available by the Marshall Plan they created, in April 1948, the first permanent pan-European organization—the O.E.E.C. Under the threat of danger, and

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prompted and encouraged by generous assistance from America, Europeans began to acquire a consciousness of "Europe." Whereas the Treaty of Dunkirk, concluded between Great Britain and France on March 4, 1947, had been directed primarily against a possible German menace, the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948, laid the basis for coöperation among five countries, and the London Agreements of June 1948 inaugurated a constructive policy toward Germany.

This change of direction called for new methods, and it was then that France played her full part in organizing Europe. Up to that time, coöperation had always been confined to agreements between governments, operating under the rule of unanimity. Since each contracting Power had the right of veto, action often became impossible. Before anything effective could be done, the dogma of national sovereignty had to be breached. The way had been cleared by private groups which had worked energetically to popularize the idea of an authority above that of any single state. This idea found expression in the preamble to the French Constitution of 1946. In August 1948 the French and Belgian Governments (the latter headed by M. Spaak) called a conference to study whether some sort of political tie among all the European countries was practicable, and this conference (consisting at first of representatives of the five countries of the Brussels Treaty) met at Brussels on October 25, 1948. Here the dispersed efforts of all the private groups were gathered together in the "European Movement."

Though differences quickly emerged, 12 governments signed the Constitution of the Council of Europe on May 5, 1949—one month after the signing of the Atlantic Pact. Here was something new. It was not a committee of foreign ministers bound to reach unanimous decisions, but for the first time a permanent assembly common to 12 countries, with parliamentary delegates who voted individually and not as members of an instructed delegation. This assembly has consultative powers only, but it draws authority from the fact that it can give free voice to the diverse opinions held in the participating nations, thus embodying a European spirit and creating a permanent relationship among the most representative men of these countries. The work done by committees provides an opportunity for thorough study of the delegates' ideas, and for preparation of recommendations to governments.

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In 1949 a German Federal Parliament was elected and formed the first government at Bonn. On April 1, 1950, West Germany was invited to join the Council of Europe, with full constitutional rights as soon as the Western Allies had restored its sovereignty over the conduct of foreign relations. Germany's entrance into the Council of Strasbourg was the first recognition of her right to join an international organization. It was in keeping with the development of the occupation régime into a contractual arrangement, negotiated between the three occupying Powers and the German Federal Government.

On the basis of this broad European policy West Germany reentered the community of free peoples. Only Europe as such could have provided the practical machinery for such a move. It could not have been done through the United Nations, where a Soviet veto would have interposed, nor under the Atlantic Pact, which presupposes the existence of an army. The integration of Germany with Europe was one of the primary aims of French foreign policy. From the beginning, the effort to organize Europe had had a double purpose: first, to strengthen the European countries, which if left to fend for themselves would be condemned to political and economic dissolution; and second, to bring Germany into the common endeavors so that she would not repeat her former errors. A democratic Germany on an equal footing with the other members of the European community will have no excuse for rebellion, aloofness and dreams of conquest and domination.

Participation in the Council of Europe was the first step in this direction, but it was not enough and France did not hesitate to take another. She envisaged the creation of such strong organic bonds among the European nations—Germany in particular included—that no German Government could break them, and the establishment of a living and permanent community that would put an end to old antagonisms and usher in an era of profitable collaboration. Such a community must be based on mutual good faith and confidence—and that is possible only if all members find it to their interest to keep faith with the others, recognizing that what promotes the common advantage will promote their individual welfare.

In a solemn declaration on May 9, 1950, France proposed to Germany and the other European countries that they put their production of coal and steel under an authority independent

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both of governments and private interests. For the first time in history there was to be an agency above national parliaments and private business which would reach its decisions in consultation with producers, workers and political bodies and which would be responsible only to an assembly representing the participating Powers. Thus we hoped that considerations of narrow national interest would be replaced by regard for the common interest, that national antagonisms would be transcended, and that, since none of the partners had control of its own coal and steel, war among them would be unthinkable. The objective was to remove the danger of war between rival nations and to develop a community spirit which would not weaken national attachments but provide a wider basis for new activities and new goals. Such a community would also be able to solve problems which arise from the uneven distribution of natural resources and technical skills.

Within ten months the treaty was drawn up and signed, and on August 10, 1952, it became effective among the six signatory Powers. Since February 10 of the present year there has been a single market for coal and iron ore in Western Europe, and after April 10 steel will also move freely among these six countries without customs duties of any kind. Their total population, incidentally, is almost exactly that of the United States. The unification of Europe is irrevocably under way. The treaty is due to run for 50 years, and though it is limited to two industries they are ones which are essential for every national economy. The territory to which it applies is also limited; yet it includes half of free Europe—the part of Europe which in the past has been most often at war. We have gone beyond the stage of talk and theory and shown what we want to do and can do.

It may be instructive, at this point, to analyze the conditions under which the plan evolved and was brought to completion. At first it created some astonishment in France, but in general the French people were pleased to see that their government had taken the lead in European affairs. The next stage was one of increasing worry about the danger of "omnipotent technocracy," that is, the fear that Germany would escape from all restrictions and dominate the other partners. A campaign, at times very violent, was unleashed against the plan. The chief manufacturers' association led the attack, while labor unions rallied to the defense. Meanwhile, lawyers dissected the text of the treaty and

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economists pointed out all the risks—all of which made a great impression on the French parliament. But public opinion looked upon the idea as a practical attempt to end the threat of war and strengthen a divided Europe; and, as a result of this public support, the treaty was ratified by an unforeseen majority: in the National Assembly by a vote of 377 to 233, and in the Senate by a vote of 177 to 31, with 87 abstentions. Once ratification was settled, hostility died down and all interested parties gave the plan their loyal support. The intractable enemies are the Communists, who cannot conceive of a European policy not dictated by Moscow.

In Germany, the plan met with a warm welcome from the governmental majority, and the Bonn parliament approved it by a vote of 232 to 143. Chancellor Adenauer had given it his support from the beginning, just as he had supported with his strong convictions and powerful personality the general trend toward solutions of individual problems on a European basis. He has set himself against the nationalism which twice led Germany to disaster; but, like every leader in a democracy, he has to reckon with public opinion, play for time and take precautions. This is something to be kept in mind whenever important negotiations are under way, as they are now in regard to the Saar. Many problems would be simplified if the parties involved would make a greater effort to understand each other's difficulties. The German Socialists are dogmatically opposed to a policy of European integration, which in their opinion bars any chance of agreement with Russia on the question of reuniting the two zones of Germany; they are under the illusion that Russia would deal frankly and on terms of mutual confidence with a unified, independent Germany. West Germany has not given up the hope of unity, and is all the more anxious for that very reason to regain its sovereignty and establish its security. Farsighted Germans know that only the integration of Europe can achieve this double objective for them in the foreseeable future.

Thus all the problems of Germany have come to a head at once. France would have liked to postpone the question of Germany's rôle in the joint military effort until European integration was in the final stage. However, faced with the plan for raising a German Army, the French Government put forward the proposal for a European Army at a meeting of the Atlantic Council in September 1950. Mr. Churchill had used the same term in ad-

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dressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg a month earlier, but with a different meaning.

On October 24, M. Pleven, who was then Premier, explained the French proposal to the National Assembly; and the Paris Conference which opened on February 15, 1951, drew up the Treaty eventually signed on May 27, 1952, by the same six nations participating in the coal and steel pool. This Treaty sets up a defense community and stipulates that the six existing armies are to be replaced by one common army. Only France is to retain additional forces of her own, for the defense of her overseas territories. No element of the common army is at the disposal of any government acting alone; all six must approve its use. The Council of six Foreign Ministers defines the general policy and gives the general directions, which are to be carried out by a nine-man executive commission. Command is integrated on the model of the Atlantic Army, of which the European Army will be one of the chief land forces. But in the European Army integration is carried still further. Not only is the high command integrated, but the same is true of all units larger than a division, as well as of the services of supply and other auxiliary services; each will be composed of officers and men of different nationalities. There will be German soldiers but no German Army; German officers at every level but no German general staff; and the same will hold true for continental France and the other signatory nations. There will be no distinction between the participating nations except that overseas territories (which France alone possesses) will come under separate jurisdiction.

The Atlantic Command has recognized the value of this system, and the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the other Atlantic Pact countries have given it their backing. Most of the criticisms come from the countries which are being asked to sign the agreement. Technical matters of language, pay, equivalence of rank and so on present obvious problems. But the main difficulty is psychological. To give up the long-standing tradition of a national army represents a real sentimental sacrifice for any people. Italy will find it hard to have no army of her own, when Jugoslavia has one next door. There will still be British soldiers both in Britain and Germany, but the only French soldiers to wear the national uniform will be stationed abroad. Will the average Frenchman wear a European uniform and follow a European flag with the same pride and en-

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thusiasm that he has always displayed in the service of his own country? Can men of several nationalities, with different temperaments, habits and discipline, fuse their activities to such an extent?

These are real objections and must not be minimized, particularly in the case of France, for though France is the cradle of revolutions, the French for that very reason distrust reforms which are so radical that they may get out of hand. They like to calculate the risks of anything new, and, in general, cling to tradition. But it also is true that most of them are good Europeans and desire Franco-German reconciliation and coöperation among all the nations of the West. The strength of this feeling was revealed at the time the Coal and Steel Community was approved.

This is a critical moment. We owe it to our fellow signatories of the European Defense Community treaty and to our allies in the Atlantic Pact, whose own action depends on ours, to reach a decision soon. We are not responding to an ultimatum, which would be wholly unacceptable; but we must recognize that there is a situation which exists whether we like it or not and which time will not improve. If we reject the treaty one of two courses is possible. Either we may give up the German contribution to the common defense, or we may admit Germany, with an army of her own, to the Atlantic Community. In the first of these cases the experts are in agreement that Western power would be glaringly insufficient. The Atlantic Pact would become a mere piece of bravado and we should have to revise our whole policy toward Germany and Russia. The second solution would involve raising up a German danger with which to counteract the Russian danger—far too dangerous a game for most Frenchmen ever to accept.

Existing doubts about the European Defense Community must, therefore, be overcome. The present French Government is calling for the discussion of protocols, or annexes, which do not necessarily change the substance of the treaty as signed but clarify the text by defining more carefully, or in some cases excluding, certain methods of applying it. The temporary commission appointed by the signatories already has such additions under consideration. There is, I repeat, no intention of bringing either the principles or the general purport of the treaty into question. In the discussions among the signatories, and also with third parties such as Great Britain, which has already assumed

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obligations toward the common defense, the French Government will state its position, taking into account the constitutional limitations and political exigencies of the others, but insisting upon the gravity of what is at stake. For whether or not the guarantees against violations or misinterpreations of the text are strengthened may decide whether it is ratified and affect the whole future of the Atlantic Community.

Our friends may be surprised that we seek so many safeguards in addition to those provided by the general nature of the text itself. It would be unjust, however, to believe that there is any contradiction between this and the need of basing the accord with Germany on mutual confidence. Confidence cannot be restored in our relations with Germany by a wave of the wand; it must come as a result of an experience of agreements faithfully fulfilled, and be based, not on individuals, but on a harmony of interests developed in a framework of common institutions. In political life, confidence is not a matter of generous sentiments, but of demonstrated facts. And when a treaty is to last for 50 years all possible defects must be foreseen.

The need for this is particularly clear when we remember that a companion treaty signed at Bonn on May 26 determines the future relationship of Germany to the three occupying Powers. The two treaties are closely linked and must be ratified together. The second, known as the "Contractual Agreements," brings Germany a number of benefits, including virtual sovereignty and release from most of the limitations imposed after the war. Without waiting for the signature of a formal peace treaty, France will recognize that her neighbor has regained the status of a Great Power. But this can be done only if the Allies guarantee that the new European community will function properly. France feels that the guarantees she requests will not only be for her own benefit but are essential to the new institution on which world peace and security depend.

The task to be done is a great one for all of us. To unite the free peoples of Europe is primarily a European responsibility, but whether it is done or not is of the utmost importance to the whole free world. The United States deserves thanks for having seen as early as 1947 that all our fates are linked together. We Europeans must realize that foreign aid will not save us by itself, and that we must put forth the maximum effort allowed by our resources. Europe cannot be saved in spite of herself; her future

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lies in her own hands. This conviction has made France take the various steps described above and will hold her on the same path. The two treaties already concluded confront us with the problems of establishing a political authority among the six participating countries—in other words, of constructing a political as well as an economic and military community. In logic, political unification should have come first. The existence of a common political authority would have facilitated the creation of the Coal and Steel Community, and would have been even more useful in carrying out the joint defense effort; for such an authority could have made concrete economic and military decisions which now have to come before the Coal and Steel Authority or the committee of Foreign Ministers (which acts only by unanimity). The "functional" approach was chosen, however, for the practical reason that it seemed wiser to begin with integration in a restricted, technical sector of national life: the important thing was to go ahead quickly so as to catch the public imagination and win over doubters and scoffers. Also, though the fields in which unification was achieved are of the first importance, they lie somewhat outside the areas of sharpest political controversy. As we have noted, the coal and steel plan has now become a symbol of European political unity. It has created an atmosphere in which integration can develop further and it also represents a concrete and lasting step in the program of Franco-German reconciliation.

Political factors enter more directly into the problem of a common defense, for this is an integral part of the field of foreign affairs. In the absence of a political unity, the Treaty specifies that all political decisions are to be turned over to the committee of six Foreign Ministers. This, however, is a makeshift arrangement that cannot hold long. In every nation decisions on questions of security—and perhaps of survival—hinge upon a parliamentary majority. In the Atlantic Pact, each country determines how it will join in the common action; but the refusal of one to act does not paralyze the others. The European Army, on the contrary, cannot be used unless there is unanimous agreement.

This procedure will have to be changed promptly so as to give a joint organ the authority to make its own decisions and impose them on all the members. The organ might be an assembly elected directly by the people of the member states. A special committee in Strasbourg is studying this question and will shortly submit its findings to the governments concerned. The

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subject is vast, involving as it does the question of the extent to which the European nations are ready to sacrifice a portion of their sovereign rights in favor of a supranational authority.

There is a tendency to underestimate the difficulty of bringing about such a sacrifice, and Switzerland, the United States and the old German Reich are cited as examples of the way it can be done. But let us remember that it took these nations years to achieve what the nations of Western Europe are trying to do in a few months. Moreover, the European countries have been sovereign for centuries and have fought wars to preserve their independence. There is no real comparison, then, between their problems and those of the thirteen former British Colonies after the American Revolution or of the Swiss cantons and the German states which grouped themselves together in nations. Our present efforts will not succeed unless we understand the difficulties and allow time to work them out.

Along with major general problems of this sort there are disagreements over troublesome specific situations—the problem of the Saar, for example. For exactly a year I negotiated with Chancellor Adenauer on this subject, and I found him possessed of thorough personal understanding and the will to find a solution. France is not striving for open or disguised political annexation of the Saar. But hardly anyone disputes the fact that France and that area have special interests in common which call for particular bonds between them. Ever since 1871, when the Saar was industrialized, it has lived in economic union with Alsace and Lorraine—first during the period when it was incorporated in the Prussian state, which lasted until 1919; then, under the Versailles Treaty, when both Alsace and Lorraine and the Saar were returned to France (which situation lasted, as far as the Saar was concerned, until 1935, when Hitler triumphed in the 1935 plebiscite by employing his familiar methods of rounding up the vote); again, beginning in 1940, when Hitler took over the two French provinces; and finally after the Allied occupation of the Saar which led to the present connections with France. Only from 1935 to 1940 was the Saar separated from the industrial basin of Lorraine, and at this time it ran into a maze of economic difficulties. Now that we are trying to unite Europe it is irrational to set up new barriers, which is why France proposes that the Saar be given a European status—that is, autonomy in internal affairs and close economic ties with France, all controlled and guaran-

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teed by a European body on which, among others, would be representatives of France, Germany and the Saar itself.

There is still disagreement over the economic aspects of this arrangement, and here the Bonn Government should be more explicit in stating its position. So far as the political régime is concerned, the German and French points of view are close together. France is willing to agree that the last word on the subject be left to the eventual peace treaty. As a matter of fact, the status of the Saar will develop according to the way the unification of Europe develops; it is there that the European idea will be tested and given, as it were, bodily form. We may reasonably hope for a satisfactory settlement in the course of the next few months; the longer the delay, the more matters will be complicated by the approaching German elections. Meanwhile, the present arrangements between the Saar and France which constitute the chief obstacle will have been modified in anticipation of the future European status of the area.

In spite of the dreadful heritage of the Nazi occupation, in spite of many disappointments, and in spite of the question of the Saar, relations between France and Germany are steadily improving. The Locarno idea, fortunately, has been left far behind. Faith in the future does not rest now on the fragile guarantees of a pact that lasted hardly eight years, but on a coöperation which, since it derives from a fusion of economic interests and the growth of common institutions, ought to be permanent. The idea of a united Europe will no longer be a theme for poets, a utopian vision; it will be a living reality, because the conscience of the European people will have recognized it as their one chance of salvation.

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GERMANY AND EUROPE

By Konrad Adenauer

THE Bundestag was the first representation of the German people freely elected since 1933, and the German Federal Government was the first one in that period brought into being by constitutional and democratic methods—which by itself shows clearly that this Bundestag and this Government had to solve problems unique in nature and scope. Normal conditions of life had to be developed out of the slowly receding chaos of the collapse; a central governmental authority had to be created and its public functions completely rebuilt.

Two circumstances above all gave hope of successful achievement to the statesmen who had the responsibility of shaping the destiny of the young state. The first was that twice in a span of 30 years the whole German people had experienced war and defeat. One could expect that after such fearful experiences there would be a new comprehension of the nature and tasks of the state, and that this would provide the foundation for a constructive democratic policy. In this expectation we have not been deceived.

The other circumstance was one which was not limited to Germany. This was the feeling that social and political progress had not kept pace with technological advances and that there must be a reconstruction of human relations in the international sphere, that is, in the relations among nations. In all the Western nations there developed a conviction that only coöperation in a larger framework could overcome the recurrent crises within the Western World and create security for the future. A good part of the ruins left from the war had already been cleared away when the Federal Government took up its work in the autumn of 1949. Constructive progress had already been accomplished in the administration of the German states, districts and communities. And once plans directed exclusively toward subjugation had proved senseless and dangerous, the occupying Powers had helped to give a new structure to the initially impotent and formless society.

The extraordinary vitality of the German people, who were determined not to sink down in ruin, and the efforts put forth in all segments and strata, made a good start possible. Who-

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ever lived through the years from 1945 onwards in Germany could not doubt the capacities of the people.

The Federal Government has set about its work in a constructive manner. It has begun the necessary legislative and administrative work in the fields assigned it in the Fundamental Law, that is, the fields of public activity requiring central regulation for the whole area of the Federal Republic. In the economic field it has, in general, furthered the free play of economic forces, in the conviction that this would achieve the most effective results and believing that despite the emergency individuals should enjoy the greatest possible personal liberty. Yet although the Federal Government restricted the free development and activity of individual citizens and private associations as little as possible through law or decree, it nevertheless was compelled to act legislatively on an unusual scale. This in turn imposed a very heavy burden of work upon the parliament. If we consider that the German Reichstag was actually forced to suspend its activities in 1933 (during the Nazi period it met only for formal sessions), and if we remember that the government apparatus had been in part corrupted before 1945 by the Nazis and had completely ceased to exist after that date, then the enormous burden of work resting on the parliament and the Federal Government becomes clear.

Many Allied soldiers saw Germany in smoke and ruins in the days immediately after the collapse. Better than anyone else, perhaps, they can best judge the progress that has been made if today their way leads them again as visitors into German towns and villages, along new roads and over new bridges. The production index (with 1936 equalling 100) rose from 50 in January 1948 to 152 in December 1952. The balance of foreign trade, which showed a deficit of 4,040,000,000 DM in 1949, showed a surplus of 170,000,000 DM at the end of 1952.

The efforts required in order that Germany should meet her material wants and ensure her existence have made great demands on the country's strength. Such extremes of effort and labor under such unfavorable conditions can be put forth only for a certain time without causing substantial damage. Many problems still remain unsolved, and in most cases their solution cannot be accomplished by the Federal Government alone.

As a result of the Second World War, Germany lost more than a third of the territory which she possessed before Hitler under-

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took his annexations. True, these losses of territory are not valid in international law, but the fact remains that for the time being they are lost. Areas in Eastern Germany which are indispensable for our food supply were cut off and their populations driven out. As a result, we have had to take into the Federal Republic no fewer than 9,000,000 refugees, forced to leave their native soil as a result of events during and since the war. The stream of these refugees has recently increased markedly because of the conditions in the Soviet Zone of Germany. At times the reception centers in West Berlin have received up to 2,000 persons a day—persons who preferred giving up their homes to bowing before the Communist terror—for the Soviet Zone is becoming a Soviet-Russian satellite state with increasing speed. More and more tightly the Iron Curtain shuts off the Germans living behind it from the life of the West.

In the middle of the Soviet Zone lies Berlin, once the political center of Germany. A part of the city is occupied by the Western Powers. The Federal Republic's connection with this outpost of freedom behind the Iron Curtain is always in danger. We shall never forget how during the siege of Berlin the provisioning of the city was maintained and Soviet plans frustrated by the air lift, flown in largest part by the American air force.

The loss of fertile agrarian areas, the separation and subjugation of 18,000,000 Germans behind the Iron Curtain and the steady stream of new refugees into the Federal Republic combine to endanger our efforts to remove the consequences of the war and to rebuild our economy. Many of our internal economic tensions are explained by these abnormal conditions.

In order to master all these and other problems, the Federal Government was compelled to levy uncommonly high taxes—even in comparison with those in other countries. They were so high, indeed, that in consequence of the shortage of capital in all economic enterprises they retarded economic and social progress. We had reason to fear a loss of initiative and of the willingness to take risks, which inevitably would have caused grave setbacks for our economic development and exports. We therefore had to decide to lower income taxes, in order to provide new incentives and eventually to increase the total tax yield. Our industry is poor in capital. Every mark that was earned, every dollar that we received from the United States, had to be devoted to the repair of war damage, the replacement of completely obsolete

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equipment, the construction of new buildings and, so far as possible, of new machinery. A financial reserve to tide over times of crisis is still lacking. But in spite of all the difficulties and problems which press down on Germany today I can say that our people are doing their best to fill the place that remains for them to live and work.

They work and struggle cheerfully in the conditions in which their own errors and an unhappy course of history have placed them. But they need a political hope. They require the certainty that through their labors they will gain not only material well-being but also freedom and security. This hope is now nearing realization. It is the best means for ensuring that the wretched heritage of National Socialism is banished forever to the past. Germany should become an equal member and partner in a European community, which will in turn be a firm component of the Atlantic community. The means for reaching this goal is the system of agreements between the Allies and Germany concluded at Bonn and Paris.

The contractual agreements signed at Bonn end the occupation régime and give the Federal Republic full power over its internal and external affairs. The reserved rights which remain to the Allies are caused by the fact that the Soviet Union refuses to consent to the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom and to conclude a peace treaty with this undivided Germany. The treaty of Paris sets up the European Defense Community, of which Germany is a full-fledged member. The EDC in turn has concluded agreements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the British Commonwealth, so that the Federal Republic will be linked with a mighty alliance serving the defense of freedom. The German-Allied Contractual Agreement was possible only because there already had been other treaties and agreements which proved that the statesmen who championed the creation of a European union as the noblest political task of our generation were on the right track. I refer to the creation of the Council of Europe and of the European Coal and Steel Community. These and the Defense Community promote, in addition to their narrower specific purposes, the pacification of Europe in a most effective manner. In particular, the supranational organizations bring together the contracting Powers so closely through the renunciation of segments of sovereignty that intra-European wars become really impossible. They also constitute the best way

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for bringing about a lasting reconciliation between my country and France.

Joint action in the field of heavy industry and of defense will certainly necessitate joint political action also. The men who designed the bold plans for the coal and steel organization and for the EDC knew this. They were and are convinced that their work would find a political culmination—and this goal, too, is now near at hand. At present, the draft of a political statute for Europe is being drawn up, with the care and caution that a work of such delicacy requires. The Federal Republic is participating in these efforts, and also is a partner and member in numerous communities and organizations. We believe that Germany will be a useful and reliable partner in the community of free nations now taking shape. We base our right to express this belief on the record of Germany's development since 1945 and on the work of the Bundestag and the Federal Government—accomplishments that would not have been possible in the absence of inner moral strength.

There is resistance to the treaties in Germany. It is of a formal and frequently legalistic nature, however, and is due to the fact that our young state lacks experience in mastering difficult formal and constitutional questions. The political decision has long been made, and against this background the formal difficulties will eventually dissolve. The overwhelming majority of the German people—including the Germans behind the Iron Curtain—stand with deep conviction for integration with the West.

Here and there doubts are expressed whether Germany is really fit and able to become a good partner. In general, three reasons are advanced for these doubts: the fear that Germany might relapse into National Socialism; the fear that she might strive to acquire hegemony in Europe; and the fear that she might be led by her territorial claims in the East to plunge the whole Western World into a third world war. These apprehensions are expressed abroad, often by serious persons. I should like to call their attention, and in particular that of political observers who follow German affairs closely, to the following:

(1) The reporting of utterances by former National Socialists stands in no relation to the effect of these utterances on the German people. Thus there arises a false picture of the reality. In Germany—as everywhere—there naturally are radical elements on the right as well as on the left. The Federal Government is

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vigilant and has not hesitated to use the laws for the protection of fundamental democratic rights with full severity. I know that the radical groups will suffer a grave defeat in the coming elections. I believe that, so far as stability of political conditions is concerned, we need not fear comparison with other countries. A libertarian order has always been an important element of the social life of our people. This sense of freedom has manifested itself again and again in significant events in our history. Even the 12 years of National Socialist despotism were not able to change this devotion to self-government fundamentally.

(2) The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community have a structure that does not permit hegemony for any of the participating states.

(3) The whole military system of the Western World is directed toward defense. Any state that belongs to this alliance and that is itself guilty of aggression loses all the rights and protection which the alliance guarantees it in case it should itself be attacked. The Federal Republic is thus in no position to plunge the free nations into a third world war.

Germany will be a useful partner to the limit of her strength and resources; she will be a reliable partner to the limit of her moral and economic powers, convictions and political aims. Suffering, working and believing, the German people have built a democratic state out of the chaos of defeat in the face of a constant and undisguised Communist threat. They will preserve and defend this state with all their power. But we want more than that. We are putting all our energies into the unification of Europe. We are proud that wherever plans are being made for Europe, the Federal Government is among the propelling forces. Germany has not only grown into the European Community, she also has given it spiritual fullness and material strength. We may be permitted to say that the nature and extent of our contribution become apparent if one imagines our standing aside from the European community. But Europe has also strengthened and enriched us, because the higher unity represents more than the sum of its parts. To unite Europe, distinguished by works of the spirit and of art, the cradle of the Western World, is the goal we serve.

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STALIN'S LAST THESIS

By Bernard Taurer

"WEAK, ruined, exhausted Russia, this backward country, has won out against all nations, against an alliance of the rich and powerful states that dominate the entire world." So said Lenin in his report on the international situation on July 19, 1920, addressing the delegates to the Second World Congress of the Communist International.

The usually sober man was in a confident mood. All major countries were represented at the Congress, many of them with handsome delegations representing "real" movements; the civil war in Russia was won; the Red Army was on the road to Warsaw, carrying the revolution west at bayonet point. And beyond Poland lay Germany, industrially the most advanced country on the European continent, the country of the strongest party within the International apart from his own. "We," he added, speaking German, "were not in a position to oppose them with forces equal to theirs, and we have won out nevertheless. Why? Because between them there was not even a semblance of unity."

This was the point he endeavored to hammer into the consciousness of his audience, explaining, in great detail, why there could be no unity among capitalist states, why they were bound to fight each other for markets, spheres of influence and imperialist super-profits, and why only a world revolution could "save the world." In other words, what he expounded on that occasion was his theory of imperialism, a theory to which he attached the greatest importance.

To make it stick in the minds of his followers, German and French translations of his book, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," had been published in time for the Congress, with a special preface written by the author on July 6, 1920. This preface makes clear beyond any doubt what the theory is designed to accomplish. Its two concluding paragraphs read:

> Not the slightest progress can be made toward the solution of the practical problems of the Communist movement and of the impending social revolution unless the economic roots of this phenomenon (imperialism) are understood and unless its political and sociological significance is appreciated.
>
> Imperialism is the eve of the proletarian social revolution. This has been confirmed since 1917 on a world-wide scale.

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Until a few months ago, this theory has been sacrosanct, subject to reverent exegesis and statistical amendment, but otherwise as inviolable as any dogma of any church. It was revised by Stalin in his article in *Bolshevik*, published on the eve of the Nineteenth Party Congress. *Pravda* confirmed the extraordinary importance of this development by calling it "the greatest event in the ideological life of the Party and the Soviet people." His successor or successors must take it as their point of departure, whether they hold to it or try to change it.

II

In order to get at the true meaning and full implications of Stalin's revision of Lenin's theory we must isolate it from the rest of Stalin's text, certain parts of which—particularly the part about the "inevitability of wars between capitalist countries"—tend to obscure rather than to illuminate the conceptual landscape. This surgical move leaves us with the three following paragraphs:

A. Can one affirm that the well-known thesis of Stalin on the relative stability of markets in a general crisis of capitalism stated before the Second World War still remains in force?

B. Can one affirm that the thesis of Lenin—stated by him in the spring of 1916, to the effect that notwithstanding the rotting of capitalism, "as a whole capitalism is growing immeasurably more rapidly than formerly"—still remains in force?

I think that it is impossible to affirm this. In view of new conditions arising in connection with the Second World War, both these theses must be considered as having lost their validity.

If we now, obeying the counsel of prudence, proceed to study the two theses referred to in their original context, we immediately make the interesting discovery that Stalin's own "well-known" thesis had actually seen the light of day not merely "before the Second World War" but actually more than 27 years ago. It is, of course, entirely possible that the peculiar phrasing of this passage was not due to guileful design. But we may wonder. For the Soviet dictator, never one to be unaware of the propaganda effect of his infrequent statements, might conceivably have thought it a good idea to throw the non-Communist world off the scent. After all, he had done so before.

Whatever his intention in this case, the fact remains that his thesis about the relative stability of capitalism was originally presented in the form of a closely reasoned—if repetitiously

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worded—theoretical analysis before the fourteenth Conference of the Soviet Communist Party in 1925, with the clear purpose of impressing upon his audience that Trotsky was wrong in putting the emphasis on revolutionary developments outside Russia. Stalin would have none of that. As he saw it, the revolutionary tide had receded, capitalism had recovered from the destructive impact of World War I, and the Soviet régime had no alternative but to adapt its policies to the new situation and to plan in long-range terms for strategic periods of unknown duration. The "epoch" of world revolution, he said, "covers a whole strategic period which may occupy years, or perhaps decades." And he added: "In the course of this period there will occur, nay, must occur, ebbs and flows in the revolutionary tide."

The Soviet Union couldn't go it alone? Socialism in one country was impossible? Nonsense! Anything was possible, provided one applied the "correct" strategy and tactics to the given situation. After all, the stabilization of capitalism was "only one aspect of the matter;" the other aspect was "that side by side with the ebb of the revolutionary tide of Europe, we have the rapid growth of the economic development of the Soviet Union and the growth of its political might."

That was the point. Again and again, Stalin would repeat it:

> In other words, we have not only the stabilization of capitalism, we have at the same time the stabilization of the Soviet system. Thus we have two stabilizations: the temporary stabilization of capitalism and the stabilization of the Soviet system. The setting in of a certain temporary equilibrium between these two stabilizations—such is the characteristic feature of the present international situation.

Did Stalin's revision of his thesis mean that the "temporary equilibrium" between the "two stabilizations" has come to an end—that the "strategic period" he was talking about in 1925 was drawing to a close? It would seem so. And the fact that Lenin's thesis is characterized along with his own as having lost validity tends to suggest exactly that.

> It would be a mistake [Lenin's thesis runs] to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the possibility of the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a more or less degree, one or the other [parasitic or decaying] of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before. But this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general; its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital.

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On this thesis Stalin superimposed his own. "Lenin," he declared, "fully proved that the growth of capitalism does not cancel, but presupposes and prepares for, the progressive decay of capitalism." And he added, returning to his main theme: "Thus we have two stabilizations. At the one pole we find capitalism stabilizing itself, consolidating the position it has reached and continuing its development. At the other pole we find the Soviet system stabilizing itself, consolidating the position it has won and marching forward on the road to victory. Who will defeat whom? That is the essence of the question."

Kto kavo?—Who whom?—that was the essence of the question for Lenin, too. He was, in fact, the first to employ these words in the sense which affected the struggle between capitalism and Communism with an inescapable either-or quality, which made peaceful coexistence of the two economic systems a proposition of tactical expediency rather than an end desirable in itself and to be worked for in the interest of humanity. And he had no patience with those who thought otherwise. "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time," he declared categorically in one of his outbursts of impatience, "is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

This prophecy—and the intellectual arrogance expressed in it—is understandable only in terms of Lenin's acceptance of Marx's "Das Kapital" as the last word of scientific analysis of capitalist economy. "Official science," as he put in, "tried, by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, which by theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism showed that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact." What was needed was merely to bring Marx up to date, to analyze the world situation from the viewpoint that makes the rise of monopolies "a general and fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism." Which he did, to his own satisfaction, in the book written in Zurich during the spring of 1916.

In the foreword of the book, dated Petrograd, April 26, 1917 (shortly after his return to Russia with the aid of the Imperial Government of Germany), Lenin put his dogmatic assurance in plain words: "I trust that this pamphlet will help the reader to

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understand the fundamental economic question, *viz.* the question of the economic essence of imperialism, for unless this is studied, it will be impossible to understand and appraise modern war and modern politics."

The economic "essence"—or, as Lenin more frequently calls it, "quintessence"—of imperialism is monopoly capitalism, that is, "parasitic or decaying capitalism." Its parasitic character is deduced from the "exploitation of an increasing number of small and weak nations by an extremely small group of the richest or most powerful nations;" the decay from the complete "division of the world" among the colonial Powers since the beginning of the century. The inevitable consequence of this was a "particularly intense struggle" for markets, imperialist "super-profits," and, finally, a "redivision of the world" by war.

The only alternative to wars resulting from imperialist conflict was world revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat. "In the pamphlet," wrote Lenin, "I proved that the war of 1914–18 was imperialist (that is, an annexionist, predatory, plunderous war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies, 'spheres of influence' of finance capital, etc. Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the war is naturally to be found, not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the *objective* position of the ruling *classes in all* belligerent countries." Consequently, the question of good or bad intentions, of defensive war or aggressive war, does not even arise. It is quite immaterial what people think they are fighting for. Objectively, they are "dupes" of monopoly capital —unless they join the revolutionary proletariat, led by "true" Marxists, who alone possess the scientific understanding of the historical process necessary to establish a society without exploitation, oppression and war.

"Whoever is not with us," as Lenin once put it with utmost frankness, "is against us."

III

Stalin, therefore, was on safe ground—so far as a dogma can be considered safe—when he promulgated his thesis of the "two stabilizations" which, by implication, denied the possibility of One World. "A single and all-embracing capitalism," he said in 1925, "no longer exists. The world is now split into two camps:

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the capitalist camp, with Anglo-American capital at the head; and the Socialist camp, with the Soviet Union at the head."

In the "temporary equilibrium" reached between the two camps, an equilibrium "slightly in favor of capitalism and, consequently, slightly disadvantageous to the revolutionary movement," the policy of the Soviet Union was to build up its economic and political strength, and to exploit for that purpose the inherent contradictions of capitalism.

This, as Stalin made clear on several occasions, is the point where "coexistence" enters the equation. In September 1927, for instance, in an interview with the first American labor delegation in Russia, he went to great pains to explain why agreements between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and individual capitalists or bourgeois states on the other, were "possible and expedient in conditions of peaceful development." He added:

> Exports and imports are the most suitable ground for such agreements. We require equipment, raw material (raw cotton, for example), semi-manufactures (metals, etc.), while the capitalists require a market for their goods. This provides a basis for agreement. The capitalists require oil, timber, grain products, and we require a market for these goods. Here is another basis for agreement. We require credits, the capitalists require good interest for their credits. Here is still another basis for agreements.

International relations? The same thing:

> We are pursuing a policy of peace and are prepared to sign a pact of non-aggression with bourgeois states. We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are prepared to come to an agreement concerning disarmament, including complete abolition of standing armies. . . . Here is a basis for agreement in the diplomatic field.

But there were certain limits for such coöperation, limits "set by the opposite characters of the two systems between which there is rivalry and conflict" according to Stalin's concept of imperialism, beyond which he would not go under any circumstances. As he put it: "Within the limits permitted by these two systems, but only within these limits, agreement is quite possible." In other words, Stalin was prepared to "peaceably coexist" with the capitalist world—but only on his terms, and only so long as the "temporary equilibrium" between the two camps remained "disadvantageous to the revolutionary movement."

The matter was put to a test in 1934, after the main pillar of the "movement," the German Communist Party, had been destroyed by Hitler, compounding the disadvantage of Stalin's

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camp. In this situation, the Soviet dictator decided to join the League of Nations, up to then denounced as an "instrument of imperialism." He would not, however, relent in regard to the fundamental issue. Coöperation with bourgeois states for the "maintenance of peace" was still no more than a temporary expedient: a tactical move, not a change of strategy.

"The old system is breaking down," he told H. G. Wells in the same year of 1934, "but it is not breaking down of its own accord." Nothing was to deflect him from his mission to "destroy imperialism," not even the threat of Nazi aggression, of a life-and-death struggle of the Soviet régime, and still less the obligations of membership in the League. The Communists, he said, could "not count on the old world voluntarily departing from the stage." They were, consequently, obliged to tell the (international) working class not to permit anybody to put manacles on its hands—"on the hands with which you will overthrow the old system." He added: "As you see, the Communists regard the substitution of one social system for another not simply as a spontaneous and peaceful process."

So it was with such reservations that the Soviets signed the Covenant of the League, and, 11 years and a world war later, the Charter of the U.N. They felt under no obligation to make their reservations explicit. "Bolshevik morality," the morality that makes right everything that helps destroy the "old society," exempted them from such expressions of good faith. But the reservations were implicit in Soviet actions and policies, particularly in the unchanging insistence that "sincerity" and "truly peaceful intentions" could not be proved by loyalty to the world peace organization, but only through signing a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union—equivalent to a declaration of non-belief in the principle of collective security.

Hitler obliged. This transformed the Nazis, automatically, into a force for peace. The Western Powers refused, and so became, just as automatically, "warmongers" and "cannibals." The classification was reversed during the time of the Grand Alliance, and once more after its breakdown following the war. Today, the Western Powers, by virtue of their unwillingness to sign nonaggression pacts with the Soviet Union and their defense of the U.N. Charter in Korea, are again in the category of "warmongers" and "cannibals."

There is a kind of logical madness about it, a madness which

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recognizes facts only to the extent they happen to fit the conceptual pattern. In his last text on capitalism and Socialism, peace and war, Stalin demonstrated this anew in a most revealing fashion. His argument was based on the following syllogism:

1. Imperialism makes war inevitable.

2. But war against the Soviet Union is "more dangerous for capitalism than a war between individual capitalist countries" because it "must put the question of the very existence of capitalism."

3. Therefore wars between capitalist countries are inevitable.

And Stalin presented as proof for the validity of his premises and conclusion a piece of history still vivid in the memory of this generation. "The Second World War," he said, "began, not with a war with the U.S.S.R., but with a war with capitalist countries;" and he found it "typical that it was none other than the United States and England which helped Germany raise herself economically and raise her military and economic potential." He added:

> Of course the United States and England, helping Germany to rise economically, had in view to direct the risen Germany against the Soviet Union, to use it against the country of Socialism. However, Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-American-French bloc, and when Hitlerite Germany declared war against the Soviet Union then the Anglo-American-French bloc not only did not unite with Hitlerite Germany but on the contrary was forced to engage in a coalition with the U.S.S.R. against Hitlerite Germany.
>
> Consequently, the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to drown their competitors were, as it turned out in practice, stronger than the contradictions between the camp of capitalism and the camp of Socialism.

There was, of course, method in this logical madness—the method of Leninized Marxian dialectics, the method that makes it possible to glean the "true character" of historical facts from their "objective tendencies," and the identity of the "main enemy" from an "objective analysis" of the "given situation." It enabled the Soviet dictator to prove, implicitly, that the Soviet-German pact had nothing whatever to do with the outbreak of World War II, and, explicitly, that the United States must be held responsible for this international catastrophe. He wrote:

> Each of the two capitalist coalitions which buried their claws in each other during the war counted on breaking the enemy and obtaining world domination. In this they sought a way out from this [general] crisis [of the capi-

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talist system]. The United States of America counted on putting out of action its most dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, and on seizing foreign markets, world resources of raw materials and obtaining world domination.

Crime doesn't pay, however; Stalin's history sees to that. The hopes of the American "imperialists" are disappointed. He continued:

It is true that Germany and Japan were put out of action as competitors of the three chief capitalist countries. But along with this there fell away from the capitalist system China and other people's democracies in Europe, forming together with the Soviet Union a united and powerful Socialist camp counterpoised to the camp of capitalism. The economic result of the coexistence of the two counterpoised camps was that the united all-embracing world market fell apart, and as a result of this we now have two parallel world markets also counterpoised one to the other.

The purpose of this simple dialectical twist was to eliminate the Soviet Union as an active factor from the analysis. The premises (or theses) then yield the theoretically foregone conclusion, and the military and political conquest by the Soviet Union of areas with more than half a billion inhabitants appears not as imperialist expansion (in the old-fashioned sense of the word) but as "the economic result" of the policy of "peaceful coexistence" of the "two camps" between which "there is rivalry and conflict."

This is by no means all, however. Stalin's dialectically-enriched logic did not apply merely to the past; it can be employed, too, for the purpose of predicting the future. And Lenin's successor was no more reluctant than his teacher to show himself in the garb of prophet. He cheerfully predicted that the sphere of application of the forces of the chief capitalist countries to the world resources will not expand but will contract, that the conditions of the world market of sale for these countries will grow worse, and idleness of enterprise in these countries will increase. "The capitalists feel this themselves, for it is difficult not to feel the loss of such markets as the U.S.S.R and China. They try to make up for these difficulties with the Marshall Plan and war in Korea, by an arms race, by militarization of industry. But this is very like a drowning man clutching at straws."

IV

"Ink will kill modern social organization," said Napoleon, whose knowledge of the power, uses and limitations of military

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means was unequaled in his time. Stalin, as the record proves, was not unaware of that. For a generation now, his epistles, spread to all corners of the globe through the medium of print by his enemies as well as by his disciples, have served as guides to action for hordes of de-individualized men—men trained to about-face at any time upon order from Moscow, orders that more often than not are stated implicitly in dialectical terminology rather than in explicit directives. And his recent discussion of the tactical rôle of the "peace movement" provided an excellent example of that technique: "The contemporary movement for peace is distinguished from the movement in the period of the First World War for the transformation of an imperialist war into a civil war, since the latter movement went further and pursued Socialist purposes."

Today, on the other hand, the movement "limits itself to the democratic purposes of struggle for the keeping of peace." But this "contemporary movement for peace" should not be regarded as being forever committed to peace. That would be "bourgeois pacifism." "It is possible that in a certain concatenation of circumstances the struggle for peace will develop in certain places into a struggle for the overthrow of capitalism."

This dialectical twist, which makes "peace" and "civil war" tactical equivalents, Siamese twins of Stalin's logic, deserves our most careful attention. For it has various uses. It can, for instance, be employed to advantage if the Kremlin feels a need to substitute the term "civil war" for the word "war" (war in the form of outright military aggression). And it was so employed in regard to Korea. All that was required was Stalin's magic wand of the theory of imperialism and two theses:

Thesis No. 1: The conflict in Korea is not a "war" but a "civil war."

Supporting argument: "As is known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier than did the U. S. Government and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states." (Note of June 27, 1950.) "At the behest of its American masters, the Syngman Rhee Government on June 25 began civil war in Korea." (Note of the North Korean Government of July 2, 1950, in Russian language, addressed to U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie.)

Thesis No. 2: Interference in a "civil war" by foreign Powers is "aggression."

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Supporting argument: "The Soviet Government holds also now to the principle of the inadmissibility of the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea." (Note of June 27, 1950.)

Conclusion: The United Nations (by failing to make this distorted version of the Korean conflict the basis of its decisions) is guilty of "interference," "intervention," "aggression" and "crimes against humanity"—all because of its defense of collective security against barefaced aggression.

For the Soviet dictator simply refused to permit any other interpretation of facts, present and past, than his own. As far as Korea is concerned, he made that clear beyond any doubt in his interview with *Pravda* on February 16, 1951, declaring that "the United Nations Organization, created as the bulwark for preserving peace, is being turned into an instrument of war, into a means of unleashing a new world war."

With this assertion, the matter was settled and the task of preventing war passed into other hands. "Peace," Stalin stipulated, "will be preserved and consolidated if the peoples will take the cause of preserving peace into their own hands and will defend it to the end. War may become inevitable if the warmongers succeed in entangling the masses of the people in lies, in deceiving them and drawing them into a new world war. That is why the wide campaign for the maintenance of peace as a means of exposing the criminal machinations of the warmongers is now of first rate importance."

Twenty months later, confronted with an undeniable decline of Communist influence in the West, he took a somewhat dimmer view of the ultimate effectiveness of that campaign. With a frankness unequalled up to then, he described the functions of the "peace movement" in illuminating detail as: 1, the prevention of a given war; 2, its temporary postponement; 3, the temporary maintenance of a given peace; 4, the retirement of a warlike government; 5, the replacement of such a government with one prepared to maintain peace temporarily.

But this neatly calculated scheme of what could perhaps be called "cold civil war" contained, according to the master in political mathematics, an important unknown quantity, or rather two. First, Stalin was not sure that the peace movement would be "successful" in the discharge of its task. And second, although what the peace movement if it is successful can achieve is "good"

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—even "very good"—that does not fill the bill. Why? Simply because all this "is insufficient in order to destroy the inevitability of wars in general between the capitalist countries. It is insufficient since, with all these successes of the movement for peace, imperialism nevertheless will continue to remain in force—consequently there remains in force the inevitability of wars."

Thus having proved what Stalin set out to prove, the conclusion is logically inescapable. He gave it to us, for a change, straight: "In order to destroy the inevitability of wars, it is necessary to destroy imperialism."

V

Thus Stalin in his last text reaffirmed the fundamental thesis of Leninist-Stalinist theory on international relations, while at the same time discarding two subsidiary theses which hitherto granted capitalism a kind of reprieve during the period of the "temporary equilibrium of the two stabilizations." In plainer words, the essence of the question, as the Soviet Führer saw it, is still: Who will defeat whom? What had been added was the conclusion that the power relationships between the two camps had changed in favor of the Soviets.

What does this mean in terms of practical policy? How would Stalin go about this business of destroying what he called imperialism? Or can we safely assume that all this amounted to was liturgical exercise, thunder without lightning?

We cannot. Theory and practice, in Bolshevik reasoning, are dialectically interlinked, influencing and determining one another, with the "actual power relationships"—the "logic of facts"—dictating the course a true Communist is to follow. If this peculiar logic—revealed by means of "objective" analysis of any given situation—is unfavorable, he is under "moral" obligation to walk with caution, to retreat whenever defeat appears inevitable, and if necessary to "crawl in the mud on your belly," as Lenin put it, to avoid annihilation and ensure the survival of the régime.

This Stalin did in the thirties, following the destruction of the Weimar Republic—which his policy of treating democracy as the "main enemy" had helped bring about, after having earlier pushed the Chinese Party into defeat and brought the Soviet Union to the brink of disaster through his forced collectivization of agriculture. Then, indeed, he demonstrated that he knew how

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to "crawl" to save the "bastion of the world proletariat." When it became clear that Hitler, far from obliging the Soviets by "playing Kerensky" as they had confidently assumed, had irretrievably smashed the strongest "mass party" outside the Soviet Union, Stalin lost no time getting to his knees and making advances to Berlin for a "better understanding." But the Führer was hard of hearing then, and replied by intensifying his anti-Communist campaign for the sake of the impression it made abroad. Only after he had been repulsed by the Nazis in his first attempt at conciliation was Stalin prepared to accept the alternative (there was no other) of coöperation with the democracies and the League of Nations.

In this period of "inevitable" retreat, Stalin developed a new, hybrid terminology, used to advantage at Yalta and Potsdam and resulting in such verbal monstrosities as "people's democracy." He became very apologetic on the question of "interference," telling Roy W. Howard in 1936, for example, that to accuse the Soviets of wanting to interfere in the lives of other nations was saying "what is untrue, and what we have never advocated." He also showed a perceptible reluctance in expatiating on fundamental theoretical matters—without, however, withdrawing his "Problems of Leninism" from circulation, since "crawling" falls under the heading of tactics and does not extend into the sacred precincts of "Bolshevik strategy" and "Leninist ideology."

But in the fateful year of 1939, when Hitler's campaign of expansion without war began to run into difficulties, Stalin saw his chance and played it for all it was worth. The era of the pact between two kindred souls saw the Soviet leader displaying feats of undisputable mastery of the art of self-abasement. He refrained from all criticism of the Hitler régime, fulfilled with alacrity the stipulations of the trade pact which the Nazis treated with nonchalant carelessness, and tolerated the violation of the "inviolable" frontiers of the Soviet Union by scores of Nazi planes with the meekness worthy of a "bourgeois pacifist."

But in the cold war, any plane daring to come even close to Soviet territorial waters has been likely to be shot down with complete disregard of civilized practices; and the uninhibited propaganda of hatred against the Western nations, especially America, has told all too clearly that the need for crawling was considered to be over.

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If there still remained doubt about what Stalin thought of the "actual power relationships" in the present situation, he dispelled it with his promise of support for the Communist parties outside the Iron Curtain "in their struggle for liberation." The phrase is a synonym for "overthrow of capitalism" and "destruction of imperialism." Even a year ago any suggestion from the West that the Soviet Union countenanced this kind of interference in the affairs of other nations was "slander;" it was something "we have never advocated." In Stalin's thesis it became official Soviet policy.

In reaffirming a thesis proclaimed during his struggle for succession to Lenin's mantle Stalin apparently decided that he could safely throw caution to the winds, and two decades of apologetics out of the window. In June 1925, in an address at Sverdlov University (included in "Problems of Leninism"), he asked the rhetorical question whether the support of the "liberation movement" in China and Germany (always the two pivots of Soviet expansionism) was "worth the risk." He replied that any other policy meant treading the "path of nationalism and degeneration." The "logic of facts" which made retreat from this policy permissible during the intervening decades now recommended "Bolshevik boldness."

There is, of course, no lack of theoretical justification for the policy of direct, unconcealed intervention in the affairs of non-Communist nations. As early as 1913, Stalin, inspired by Lenin, expounded in his "Marxism and the National Question" the thesis that, while all nations had the right to self-determination, the "interests of the proletariat" were superior to the rights of any "class society." And in 1923, bringing this theme into line with the fact of Soviet power, he said: "There are occasions when the right of self-determination conflicts with the other, the higher right—the right of a working class that has assumed power to consolidate its power. In such cases—this must be said bluntly—the right to self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working class of its right to dictatorship. The former must give way to the latter. That, for instance, was the case in 1920, when in order to defend the power of the working class we were obliged to march on Warsaw."

Nor, we may add, with the experience of three decades behind us, did it prove an obstacle to another march on Warsaw in 1939, or on Helsinki, or, finally, on Seoul. For here—in this peculiar

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"higher right"—is the fountainhead of theory that has produced Soviet aggression whenever Stalin felt that he could take the risk.

It is against this background that we should read Stalin's last thesis of the inevitability of wars between capitalist states, and the promise of support for Communist-led "liberation" movements. No one can *know* what Stalin meant, but what he seems to have meant is that the Soviet policy of expansion would be continued and strengthened. We are probably justified in assuming that he announced no change in the tactical objective of keeping the Soviet Union out of any direct military clash with the West. The obvious aversion of the Western nations to war, and the lack of unity among them, suggest that there are dividends still to be gathered without that greatest of gambles. But his minions in all countries not under the heel of the Soviets were called upon to do everything in their power to strengthen the forces of extreme nationalism, including Fascism and Nazism—which, after all, provided the means for touching off World War II as a "war between capitalist states." At the same time, Communists were to promote national fronts on the broadest possible basis, as insurance against losing control over the march of events —the true function of the People's Front in the thirties—and to intensify the preparations for "liberation," through governments willing to accept Communist support or through civil war.

What we can safely infer from what the Soviet Führer said, and the way he said it, is this: first, that the Kremlin is prepared to underwrite greater risks in the international field; and second, that Stalin was determined to spare no effort in his attempt to deceive the free world in regard to the timing, the direction and the nature of future blows against "imperialism." In 1924, in one of his major theoretical analyses, he quoted Lenin to the effect that a "decisive battle" may be deemed to have fully matured when "all the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently confused, are sufficiently at loggerheads with each other, have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle beyond their capacities."

As the world pondered the possible consequences of Stalin's death we heard again the romantic comment that he had been, after all, a force for peace. His last formal thesis was, in fact, an announcement that he had broadened his risks—the risks of war. Here is one yardstick by which to judge the intentions of his heirs.

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THE FREE WORLD AND THE UNITED NATIONS

By Sir Gladwyn Jebb

THE United Nations is something which I have now lived with for about ten years, for it was in the early days in 1942–43 that, under the inspiring direction of Mr. Eden, we began thinking, in London, about what sort of world organization there might be at the end of the war. This is my justification for attempting a kind of summing up, or appraisal, of the present position of the United Nations in world politics, and an estimate, for what it is worth, of what the United Nations may legitimately be expected to accomplish in the difficult days ahead. I know all too well that in so short a space it is not possible to do full justice to so vast a subject. I am only too conscious that much of what I say may appear to experts to be unduly dogmatic and unsubstantiated by reasoned argument. But I have some reason to believe that, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the general line, as I shall now attempt to depict it, will be one which will be generally acceptable. I am not so sure that it will find such bipartisan approval here in the United States, though I hope so. If it does not, then at any rate my article may give rise to further fruitful discussion; for if we can agree on anything it is surely on the proposition that, unless the United States and the United Kingdom are substantially at one in their basic conception of the true function of a world organization, the future for all of us will be much more difficult.

I suggest, then, and here I am sure that none will disagree, that the central political issue of our time is the so-called cold war, which may be defined as the friction created by the resistance of the free world to Stalinist plans for world domination. This is not, of course, the only problem which faces us, but it is clearly the most pervading; and I propose, therefore, to examine first the general nature of the security rôle which the United Nations can be expected to play in the political conditions which the cold war produces.

Let us at the outset ask ourselves what exactly we now mean when we use the phrase "collective security." In the early days of the League of Nations, and indeed up till about 1935, this phrase had a very definite connotation. Basically, of course, it

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meant that all nations, or as many of them as possible, should undertake not to commit any act of aggression, and further that if any one of them did nevertheless commit any aggression all the others would join together in repressing it. By such means it was hoped to achieve a situation in which aggressions would never occur, for the simple reason that it would never be worth the while of any nation to indulge in them. It was recognized, too, that, if the status quo was guaranteed to this extent, some provision ought to be made for so-called "peaceful change," but how exactly this was to be accomplished was never, I think, finally determined.

Now, in spite of the fact that the United States was never in the League of Nations and that the Russians, Germans and Japanese were in it for only part of the time, "collective security," as defined above, might quite conceivably have worked if it had been applied in the case of the Italian attack on Ethiopia and Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland. For in both these cases the states which committed, directly or indirectly, a pretty evident act or intended act of aggression did not have many friends and would almost certainly have been overcome if a general war had followed. Indeed, they would almost certainly have been deterred from making any move at all if the major Powers in the League, particularly England and France, had really been united. Once they had embarked on the aggression, the same lack of unity, due to a difference of view about the possible political consequences of an outbreak of hostilities, prevented France and the United Kingdom from agreeing to act firmly and promptly to repress the aggression—but that is another story. The fact is that the political conditions at that time were such as to make the application of the theory possible if the major Powers in the League of Nations had thought it desirable.

Now, however, the position is very different. We are confronted across an ideological gulf by the great mass of the Soviet Union and its allies. Should the Soviet Union or one of its allies commit aggression, we are not in the same happy position that the first world organization was in up till at any rate 1935. A war with the Soviet bloc, consisting of some 800,000,000 people, though it may be necessary in the event of aggression, is indeed something very different from a war with Mussolini, or even with Hitler before he could organize the German nation. (Incidentally, the Soviet bloc is now just about ten times as great numerically as the old *Gross-*

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deutsches Reich.) So long as this enormous mass is dominated by men of the mentality of the Stalinist imperialists there can, in other words, really be no "security," collective or other, United Nations or no United Nations. For however much the non-Stalinist nations may organize themselves to resist the potential menace of Stalinism—and obviously the more they organize themselves the better—they cannot be certain that the Stalinists will not commit some action which will result in a major crisis. Moreover, they cannot be in the least certain that a summons to desist from aggression will be heeded, and that consequently World War III will not break out. What therefore we mean when we talk about "collective security" in such circumstances as these is presumably "collective resistance to aggression"—and notably Stalinist aggression. And I feel we shall think more clearly about the whole problem if we get this phrase into our minds from the start.

But at this point we must take note of another feature of the international landscape. Whether we like it or not, quite a number of states, chiefly situated in Asia, are not now willing to join wholeheartedly in preparing to resist a potential Stalinist aggression. These are what might perhaps be called the "middle" states which, though their sympathies may indeed lie more with the West than with the Soviet world, tend to regard the struggle as one between two *colossi* with which they had better have as little as possible to do. Not only, in fact, are they afraid that joining with other Powers to build up a military machine for defense against Stalinist aggression would invite the very thing which it is aimed at avoiding, but they profess to believe that too great a power in opposing camps is dangerous in itself. We may think the policy of the "middle" states is mistaken. We may say that the only hope for survival of small and less powerful nations is to band together now in advance. But we must at least recognize that their policy is based on firmly held convictions.

Numerically this bloc is very large, perhaps even as large as the Soviet bloc and the Western World which is now rearming to meet the Soviet menace. Even in votes in the General Assembly—which of course frequently do not represent the real numbers or importance of the states involved—the "middle" nations can control something like one-third of the total. We should not at all despair of their eventually siding with the Western World if another flagrant Stalinist aggression should actually occur. But at the moment we must, as a matter of practical politics, realize that these

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states are not prepared, over and above their existing obligations, to take on definite commitments to that end in advance, such as those to which the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have subscribed under Article 51 of the Charter. Pressure on our part to get them to do so and thus to create a world-wide organization under Article 51 might well shake their faith in the United Nations. For rightly or wrongly (quite wrongly, as we would think), the states of the middle bloc might then come to the conclusion that the Western Powers were more interested in organizing World War III than in preventing it, and this would produce the reaction of "a plague on both your houses."

But, it may be argued, why should we be affected by this kind of thinking? Why not frankly admit that the United Nations' main purpose is to deal with aggression; that if it doesn't do this it might as well shut up shop; that the Stalinists are incorrigible aggressors; that it would therefore be better to have them outside the United Nations rather than inside; and that if some of the "middle" states went with them, it just could not be helped? This kind of reasoning has a certain specious appeal but it is based on an essential fallacy. For the United Nations, if it is to have any real future, must necessarily be something other than and different from a merely defensive alliance, organized by some of its members only. If indeed the Russians were expelled (and of course this could not be done legally), or if they withdrew, or if, consequent on this or on other circumstances, some of the "middle" states became at best sleeping partners, then the United Nations would be reduced to something not much more extensive than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the inter-American system as it resulted from the Treaty of Rio. Now these organizations happily both exist at the moment. There are one or two other organizations of a similar character, and more may well be formed in the future. They are all perfectly consonant with the Charter of the United Nations, but they are not the United Nations itself. Nevertheless they exist and it is on them and on the actual military strength which they represent that the defense of the Free World will have to be based if World War III ever breaks out. After all, it stands to reason that the United Nations itself cannot be used to prepare military plans against specified possible aggressions (and this is the only realistic form of military planning to meet aggression) because such plans would have to be directed against one or more Members.

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What, therefore, should the rôle of the United Nations itself be as regards collective resistance to aggression? As I see it, this is still a very considerable and important rôle. Of course, if aggression should take place in the area covered by, *e.g.* the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, collective self-defense obligations would immediately come into play and war would result; but the question would at once be taken up in the Security Council, and if there was any obstruction by, for instance, the Soviet representative, it would within a very short period be referred to the General Assembly which, in accordance with the admirable "Uniting for Peace" resolution, can now be summoned within 24 hours. There we should hope that any victims of aggression would be able to secure a resolution recommending all good Members of the United Nations to give them such aid and support as they could. It is quite true that this would be only a recommendation but, more especially if it were passed by a large majority, it would have a real moral value and might well have the result that states other than those covered by the obligations of the Article 51 organization concerned would enter the struggle in a physical sense. Others might at least be induced, in accordance with the "collective measures" procedures already devised by the General Assembly, to assist in ways not involving the dispatch of armed forces to the spot. And more than this, it would be perfectly in order in such circumstances for a majority of the Assembly to indicate that in its view one or more member states, already involved no doubt, should organize the campaign against the aggressor; that the United Nations High Command so established should be authorized to make use of the United Nations flag; and that the United Nations would endeavor at the proper time to take in hand such reconstruction as might be necessary for countries from whose soil an aggressor had been evicted. All this, as I say, would be valuable provided we realize that it is not possible in the United Nations to go beyond general planning for defense against aggression from any quarter and with no definite aggressor named. For (I repeat) strategic planning against specific aggressions can be done only by regional or collective self-defense organizations.

However, as we all know, the United Nations has another quite distinct rôle, namely "pacific settlement." Had there been no cold war this would no doubt have been less important than the other function of organizing genuine "collective security." As things

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are, though one may admit that collective resistance to aggression remains a "primary" function, pacific settlement seems to me, at any rate, to have become the more important from a practical point of view. For, after all, if World War III actually does break out, nobody can pretend that what the United Nations does or says, however useful it may be, will be an element of the first importance in the winning of the war. Whereas if we are to avoid World War III there must be a long period of coexistence with the Soviet world during which the United Nations might be of the greatest value. Always supposing an absence of general hostilities, it will, as I see it, be in the United Nations that negotiated settlements between the West and the Stalinist world may eventually be reached. The record of the United Nations, disappointing though it has been in some respects, has not been bad when it comes to pacific settlement. Even as regards a matter on which the West and the East have definitely fallen out and failed to agree, namely the disposal of the Italian colonies, a solution was found by the United Nations Assembly, if not to the satisfaction of all, at any rate in a fairly reasonable way which disposed of the matter. It was also as a result of the Iranian appeal to the United Nations that Soviet troops eventually evacuated Persia. We should equally remember the rôle played by the U.N. in helping to resist Communist aggression on Greece; in actually stopping the war in Palestine and in imposing a provisional settlement there; in creating the independent state of Indonesia; and finally, as regards the long dispute between India and Pakistan on the subject of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. If such achievements as these are possible in the United Nations, is it too much to hope that over the next few years even more difficult problems may be capable of at any rate partial settlement?

At this point some people will probably say this is what we suspected. The "middle" states will, of course, exercise their influence in the Assembly in the direction of what would be the equivalent of "appeasement" and settlements may therefore be forced on the Western Powers which will not be in accordance with their principles. This is really (such critics would add) what is being aimed at by suggesting that we should do everything to preserve a universal organization in which both the Stalinists and the "middle" states would always be represented. I think this is a very fearful and disastrous way of regarding the future, and I am always suspicious of any criticism which introduces the tenden-

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tious word "appeasement." Of course, the Western World will not abandon its principles, at any rate I personally hope it will not. But if there is ever to be any negotiation about anything with the Stalinists, it must, I think, be on the basis of at least some give and take. Experience has taught us that in dealing with these people the great thing is to be very firm and very patient, and at the same time very strong, and that if you are all these things, the odds are on your getting what you want. But that does not mean that occasionally, in order to get what you want, you should not yield a point here or there, and incidentally the use of the United Nations machinery may make it more easy for, *e.g.*, the Chinese Communists to make a concession which they would not make if they were simply confronted with one hostile Great Power.

Another fear which I have heard expressed as regards the general rôle of the United Nations which I have outlined above is that unless we set about organizing what in effect would be a generalized Article 51 convention under the aegis of the United Nations, members not covered by existing Article 51 conventions will feel that they are being left out in the cold and will be abandoned if they are attacked by the Stalinists. Personally I don't agree that there will be any such fears on the part of such states. Many of them, indeed, owing to their exposed position, would be rather horrified at the idea of being roped into an organization which their powerful neighbors would undoubtedly regard as aggressive in itself. Besides, it is not as if anybody is suggesting that they should not be physically assisted by other members of the United Nations if they ever were the victims of aggression. Apart from anything else, to indicate in advance that they would not be assisted would obviously be to provoke the aggression. Of course, some of them may one day of their own volition join some of the already existing Article 51 organizations, or new ones. If so, so much the better. But nothing would be gained by putting pressure on them to join any such organization, still less if it were a generalized one which could not really amount to anything tangible in advance of an actual aggression owing to the impossibility of planning defense in the United Nations against a member of the United Nations itself.

Still I believe the suspicion sometimes exists that my own country, for instance, does not always go along with the policy of "strengthening" the United Nations owing to its reluctance to

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assume any further commitments in the Far East or even to see them assumed by the United States of America. I cannot really see why such a suspicion should exist. We, and the British Commonwealth as a whole, have demonstrated, we think, our willingness and ability to contribute to the common cause in resisting aggression in Korea. Is not the presence of the British Commonwealth Division in Korea, and of considerable numbers of British aeroplanes and of ships sufficient proof of our devotion to the cause of collective resistance to aggression organized under the aegis of the United Nations? Is it disputed that practically the whole British people were enthusiastically behind the action which was taken at the end of June 1950? Surely it must be evident that we could not contemplate any further aggression in the Far East by the Chinese Communists or anybody else with anything approaching equanimity. Besides, we ourselves are conducting what amounts to a minor war in Malaya and, like the French in Indo-China, are resolutely resisting Communist aggression in that part of the world as best we can. All we question is the wisdom of trying to "strengthen" the United Nations by means which, in our own estimate, would not strengthen but rather weaken it by transforming it into some quite different kind of body.

A final argument which I know is adduced against the general conception of the rôle of the United Nations as outlined above is that if it cannot be shown to be something which is actually or potentially all-powerful and which intends within a measurable time to impose on the rest of the world settlements which the Western democracies regard as beneficent and desirable, public opinion in those democracies, and notably in the United States, may feel that it is not worth while any longer subscribing towards it, and that therefore lack of enthusiasm for its aims and objectives will result in its disruption or gradual decay. If there is anything in this fear it must rest on the assumption that unless the public is given the impression that the United Nations can do something which clearly it cannot do in the present condition of the world, the public are bound to lose heart and transfer their enthusiasm to, *e.g.* the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—unless, indeed, they lapse into defeatism, apathy, isolationism and despair. I suggest this is underrating to a serious extent the intelligence of informed public opinion in the Western democracies. If such opinion had a better idea of the respective rôles of the

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations, for instance, there is no reason whatever why they should not have an equal enthusiasm for both. For as I see it, both are equally necessary; and though the United Nations is admittedly not fulfilling the high hopes of it which many people had in 1945, it is performing a very real and necessary rôle without which the future would certainly be much blacker even than it is.

Nobody would deny that the United Nations is a young and struggling organization, or that there are elements in it which, even apart from the cold war, may eventually result in its disruption. One of the reasons, for instance, why the so-called "middle" states in Asia are not wholeheartedly at one with the Western Powers in their resistance to the Stalinist menace is because, rightly or wrongly, many of them tend to regard so-called "Western imperialism" as a menace, if not equal to Stalinism, at any rate not far removed from it so far as they are concerned. The dominant position which the European nations enjoyed in the past resulted from their flying start in the technique of industrialization. We can hope and believe that suspicion of the Western World will gradually die down as the East itself becomes more industrialized; and indeed, coöperation in the United Nations should help to demonstrate that there is now no basic clash of interest between Asia and the West and that the old emotional conflicts are becoming out of date. Perhaps, indeed, the main object of the United Nations, both in the avoidance of war and in the achievement of peaceful settlements, lies in diverting the currents of extreme nationalism into constructive channels and to this end in organizing, by way of technical assistance or by any other means, methods of speedily helping forward the industrialization of its less industrialized members. We must continually remember that the United Nations, rightly or wrongly, is not composed of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries or the Treaty of Rio countries only; it is everybody, the Stalinists included. Consequently, many of its members, though of course they are all under an obligation to resist aggression, are not really pledged to support the policy of one side or another in advance of an aggression occurring. We cannot abolish this fact by abolishing the United Nations. For, after all, the United Nations is only a mirror of the world political situation, and although the reflection may be ugly there is singularly little sense in smashing the glass.

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So, while acknowledging its due rôle in the organization of collective resistance to aggression, let us try to use the United Nations for its most useful purpose, namely a place where the thorniest of international problems may at least be debated and where, with infinite patience, a fairly satisfactory solution may sometimes be hammered out. A place, too, where, if progress is made on the really great political issues, an agreement, first on limitation and then on reduction of national armaments may eventually be achieved. A place where much can be done to promote a sounder world by encouraging better economic and social conditions in the less advanced countries. A place, finally, where the two main protagonists in the cold war may—who knows?—one day agree to a settlement which could avoid the fell arbitrament of war.

Why, indeed, lose heart in an organization which has these great possibilities? Why reproach some nations for not affording enough support in the struggle against Stalinism when the promise of it might well prejudice their internal political stability? Why not concentrate, so far as the physical anti-Stalinist struggle is concerned, on those states which are ready to give help now and not worry unduly if the others do not seem to offer all the assistance that they might? If they are given time and are not subjected to "strong-arm" methods of persuasion these others may well come to see for themselves where the real threat to world peace lies. In the meantime let us do what we can to strengthen their economies and show them that the West really means them well. This is not defeatism; this is the best way to be strong and to ensure peace. Let us above all try to think straight and shed all illusions. In the words of the old English poet: "The truth shall you deliver: it is no dread."

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AMERICA'S NEW ECONOMIC ROLE

By Frank Altschul

AN effective multilateral trade and payments system covering a wide area has long been one of the objectives of American foreign economic policy. We evidenced this desire at Bretton Woods, and later through the major participation we assumed in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. In connection with the British loan we emphasized the importance we attached to a return to sterling-dollar convertibility. Under the terms of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Acts we have negotiated agreements affording foreign exporters easier access to the American market. But beyond all this, during the postwar period from July 1, 1945, through September 30, 1952, we extended net foreign aid in an amount of $36,000,000,000, a considerable portion of which was made available on the theory and in the hope that it would bridge a transition period from wartime destruction and disorganization to the establishment of a new equilibrium in the international balance of payments.

In making this vast expenditure of funds we wished to accomplish collateral purposes of great urgency along the way. And it should be noted in passing that in these we have been notably successful. Surely the $3,443,000,000 allotted to UNRRA, post-UNRRA and interim aid was highly effective in fending off the starvation that threatened many areas and peoples in the immediate postwar period; and the $12,634,000,000 spent on European recovery through the Economic Coöperation Administration and its successor, the Mutual Security Agency, has enormously facilitated the restoration of the war-torn economies of Western Europe. By these enlightened measures chaos was averted in much of the free world, and the advance of Communism in Western Europe was brought to a halt.

Yet in spite of these accomplishments, the problem presented by the disequilibrium in the international balance of payments remains unsolved—a circumstance which profoundly influenced the deliberations of the recent Commonwealth Economic Conference in London. At the conclusion of this meeting, on December 11, 1952, a communiqué was issued setting forth one of its major objectives in terms which echo our own desires:

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The conference therefore agreed to seek the coöperation of other countries in a plan to create the conditions for expanding world production and trade. The aim is to secure international agreement on the adoption of policies, by creditor and debtor countries, which will restore balance in the world economy on the lines of "Trade not Aid" and will, by progressive stages and within reasonable time, create an effective multilateral trade and payments system covering the widest possible area.

These and related questions evidently are to be discussed with us soon by our British friends. It therefore seems imperative that we determine without delay what our future course of action should be.

Why, we must ask ourselves, are we, in spite of all our efforts, still living in a world characterized by inconvertible currencies and bilateral trading arrangements? Why do we see on so many sides an ever-growing network of restrictions upon the free movement of goods (to say nothing of persons) across national frontiers? Why is it that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development functions in low gear while the International Monetary Fund has become almost a moribund institution? Perhaps in part at least the reason is that in our postwar economic foreign policy we have been guided by a nostalgic desire to return to the patterns of the prewar world and by an unwillingness to accept the unpalatable thought that these patterns are to a great extent unsuited to the world as it exists today.

The most striking single fact with which we have to contend is what Marshal Stalin, in his much-discussed pamphlet, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," described as "the disintegration of the single all-embracing world market" which, he explained, "has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world capitalist system." It may seem strange to turn to Marshal Stalin as an authority, or to look to him for guidance. Yet we should draw from his fulmination lessons in the economic domain as far-reaching as those that we drew in the military domain from the Communist aggression in Korea.

It is impossible to say whether Stalin by intimating that the Soviet Union need only await patiently the inevitable economic collapse of the non-Soviet world was attempting to beguile us into a false sense of military security. Nor need we accept his thesis that because of "the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors . . ." the law which decrees "the inevitability of wars between capitalist coun-

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tries remains in force." This thesis, which we categorically reject, is of course highly agreeable to the masters of the U.S.S.R.

But we should not dismiss lightly Marshal Stalin's penetrating analysis of the difficulties we face. From the "disintegration of the single all-embracing world market," he concluded "that the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (U.S.A., Britain, France) will not expand, but contract; that their opportunities for sale in the world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market."

"Outwardly," according to Marshal Stalin, "everything would seem to be 'going well': the U.S.A. has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the U.S.A. and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to 'go well' for 'all eternity,' that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavor to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development." And somewhat later: "Would it not be truer to say that capitalist Britain, and, after her, capitalist France, will be compelled in the end to break from the embrace of the U.S.A. and enter into conflict with it in order to secure an independent position, and, of course, high profits? . . . What guarantee is there, then, that Germany and Japan will not rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own independent lives? I think there is no such guarantee."

Much of Stalin's argument had been anticipated in a number of short pamphlets issued in preparation for the Moscow Economic Conference. In these, emphasis was placed upon the breakdown of East-West trade, for which, needless to say, the United States is held solely responsible. The point was underscored that a healthy economic existence for Germany in particular and for much of Western Europe as well was dependent upon the reopening of trade with the East. In like manner, for Japan it was dependent upon the reopening of trade with the Chinese mainland. And this line of thought, harboring an uncomfortable element of truth, was slavishly followed in several of the speeches

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delivered at the recent meeting of the Communist Party in Moscow with a view to fomenting discord between us and the other nations of the non-Soviet world.

Few would agree in every particular with Stalin's gloomy prognosis. In the wake of wartime destruction and dislocation, the non-Soviet world has shown amazing resiliency. Instead of growing dissension there has been an increasing sense of solidarity among the free nations. We have had our differences, but these have been accompanied by no rancor, by no bitterness. A common peril has focused our energies upon an overriding objective.

Nevertheless, Marshal Stalin sounded a warning that we can ill afford to ignore. Apparently, he was supremely confident—and who is to say that we did not give him some warrant for this confidence?—that we will have neither the intelligence nor the imagination to develop a comprehensive program in the economic domain boldly calculated to ward off "the inevitable collapse." Because events have cast the United States in the unwanted rôle of leadership, it falls to us to demonstrate by our conduct in the years ahead that this confidence of his was misplaced. The grim fact that Western civilization is threatened as never before fastens upon us the responsibility of making the greatest possible contribution to its defense. We shall discharge this responsibility the more readily if we recognize that it will avail us little to have made the non-Soviet world militarily secure if we fail to make it economically secure as well.

The disintegration of the single all-embracing world market is something that we can do little about so long as the Iron Curtain remains. There is, however, another matter of vast importance with which, in conjunction with other nations of the non-Soviet world, we *can* deal, and we should prepare to do so without delay. This is the profound disequilibrium in the trading world, resulting from the changing economic geography of the twentieth century, and in particular from the impact of two world wars. It already arose to plague us in the inter-war period, but was obscured for a time by the armaments race of the late thirties and then by the outbreak and the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. There is every likelihood that before long it will reëmerge as the most troublesome single factor in the economy of the non-Soviet world—a disequilibrium now aggravated by the unnatural barriers separating the West from its Eastern markets and sources of supply.

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This imbalance finds its most obvious expression in what has come to be called the "dollar gap." In the postwar period the United States has been willing to fill this gap from governmental or quasi-governmental sources. But this is a policy that in the nature of things is bound to encounter increasing domestic resistance. As this resistance develops, other countries, notably the United Kingdom and the other members of the Commonwealth, feel impelled to impose restrictions progressively on purchases within the United States, thus moving ever further away from the hoped-for restoration of a wide area of convertible currencies and multilateral trade.

In the maze of statistical material available it is difficult to determine precisely the net amount apt to be due the United States annually from the rest of the non-Soviet world on strictly merchandise, service and investment accounts. However, on the assumption that world trade and existing restrictions continue at about the present level, an estimate of $3,000,000,000 more or less should prove not wide of the mark.

In the immediate future, the financing of government operations abroad, largely military in nature, will go a long way toward easing the situation. Offshore purchases, stockpiling, the expenditure for the construction of bases and for the maintenance of our military establishment in foreign lands—all these will furnish the stream of international payments with a not inconsiderable amount of dollars. And this stream would be materially augmented had we the imagination to envisage the enormous stimulus to our whole program for the defense of Western Europe that would ensue from a generous recognition of the great financial burden now carried by the French in Indo-China.

But a half world whose accounts as a whole are thus precariously balanced is far removed from the vision of a wide area of expanding trade, increasing prosperity, convertibility and multilateralism which we must realize if the non-Soviet world is to be made secure against the danger of that economic disintegration which Marshal Stalin so pleasurably anticipated. Military expenditures in contemplation for the fiscal year 1953–54 should afford us at the very least a breathing spell within which to develop a program for the ultimate realization of this vision. The problem we face is how, once our military expenditures abroad decrease, the international accounts are to be balanced in such a manner as to hold forth the promise of a rising standard of living

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throughout the non-Soviet world. Having regard to the growing importance of exports in maintaining full employment at home, and to the necessitous nature of much of the demand for American goods abroad, we must ask ourselves: How can the dollar gap be closed on the basis of a high level of international trade?

Clearly, we alone cannot furnish the answer to this question. The task ahead demands a high degree of coördination of economic policies within the non-Soviet world. It calls for a coöperative endeavor in which each nation will make its maximum contribution to a common purpose. After the groundwork has been sufficiently prepared, it may well prove desirable to call an economic conference of representatives of the nations most vitally concerned in order to lay the foundations for such an endeavor. Precipitate *ad hoc* decisions to meet recurrent crises lead inevitably to disappointment. The time for such improvisations has passed.

The communiqué issued at the close of the Commonwealth Economic Conference offers striking evidence of a return to economic sanity. Three principles that we can readily accept were agreed upon as governing the approach to the whole range of subjects under discussion:

> (a) Internal economic policies designed to curb inflation and rises in the cost of living should be steadily followed.
>
> (b) Sound economic development should be encouraged with the object of increasing productive strength and competitive power, providing employment, and raising the standards of life.
>
> (c) A multilateral trade and payment system should be extended over the widest possible area.

The Commonwealth nations are apparently willing to play their part, hoping that we may prove willing to play our part too.

We should do well to consider, therefore, the broad lines of the contribution we are called upon to make toward the establishment of a secure and viable economy on this side of the Iron Curtain. Stated quite simply, this would seem to require an express determination to see that dollars are made available to the stream of international payments from time to time in such amounts, in excess of military expenditures abroad, as may be necessary to balance the international accounts at a high level of trade.

Assuming this to be our express determination, how are we to implement it? It has been urged in many quarters that we should

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reduce our tariffs and simplify our customs procedures. Needless to say, in view of our position as a great creditor nation, it is highly desirable that we do both. Furthermore, it would be helpful if we could secure the repeal of the Buy America Act, and the reconsideration of legislation which requires that at least half of the shipments from the United States financed by the Mutual Security administration be carried in ships flying the American flag. The farther we proceed along these lines, the smaller will be the dollar gap that has to be closed by other means.

However, any realistic appraisal of domestic political possibilities would suggest that other means cannot safely be neglected. Unless trade in the non-Soviet world is to languish—unless we are to advance the realization of the Stalinist prophecy—we must be prepared to assure the flow of investment and risk capital from the United States in volume adequate to fill any remaining gap. Traditionally, this is the rôle that a great creditor nation is called upon to play. In the nineteenth century the international accounts were balanced by the free flow of private investment and risk capital from the creditor nations and, in particular, from Great Britain to the rest of the world. We are often reproached because, as our British friends say, we "do not behave like a creditor nation." Until we do, they assert, the development and expansion of the whole non-Soviet world will be hopelessly handicapped.

There is ample reason for accepting this fundamental thesis. While expenditures made abroad in connection with our defense effort may temporarily distort the picture, it seems safe to say that in the long run the international accounts are unlikely to be brought into balance on the basis of expanding trade unless investment and risk capital flows more freely from the United States to foreign lands than in the recent past. But there is little analogy between the position of Great Britain in the nineteenth century and our own position midway through the twentieth. In the first place, the hundred years from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of the First World War was a period of tranquillity. Secondly, during this period there were open to the creditor countries exceedingly attractive fields of profitable foreign investment—the United States, Canada and South America, to name but a few. Thirdly, this was a time when it was considered both good business and good morals to respect international obligations. And there were often ways of exerting pressure

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effectively on those who wilfully sought to evade their commitments. In these conditions, private capital moved across national boundaries freely in response to differences in interest rates and prospects of reward.

But how changed the situation is now! Instead of that tranquil world, we live in a world in turmoil. To us as the greatest creditor nation there are few fields of foreign investment as tempting as those which lay open to Great Britain in the nineteenth century. The vast oil reserves of the Middle East have attracted considerable direct investment on the part of our leading oil companies, and Canada today offers prospects of reward which have stimulated a capital flow across our northern frontier. But, in general, American private capital evidences a strong disposition to stay at home, finding the United States the most secure place for profitable employment. And, last but not least, partly as a result of the rise of an intensely nationalistic spirit in the more backward countries, neither considerations of good business nor of good morals have anything like the weight they had in an earlier period—as illustrated by the growing disposition to assert the sovereign right of nationalization, with the question of compensation left completely in the air. That this tendency which is so damaging to the cause of international investment has deep-rooted support was clearly demonstrated when on December 11 of last year the General Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee approved by a vote of 31–1 (the United States casting the only negative vote, with 19 countries abstaining) the resolution introduced by Uruguay affirming the practically unrestricted right of any country to nationalize private property. And the ability to enforce compliance with commitments willingly entered into has been undermined by the fear of playing into the hands of the Soviet propagandists who on the slightest pretext raise the bogey of capitalist imperialism.

In this atmosphere it is hardly to be expected that private capital will move from the United States to places where it is most needed year after year in requisite volume. The flow should tend to increase if a concerted effort to improve "the climate for foreign investment in friendly foreign countries" begins to produce results.[1] Meanwhile it might be stimulated through broadening and extending the nature of governmental guarantees of private

[1] The language quoted is from the interesting report, "Program for Increasing Private Investment in Foreign Countries," prepared for the Government by August Maffry.

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investment, and through tax incentives provided in a variety of ways. "Accelerated depreciation" is a suggestive example. We have become accustomed to offering this inducement to American corporations who are asked in the national interest to embark upon construction programs which they would not undertake for purely corporate reasons. In a similar manner, "accelerated depreciation" might be offered as an inducement to corporations to make capital investments abroad deemed to be in the national interest.

Yet when everything else has been done that is politically feasible there is a strong possibility that government itself will for a time have to play a part in making an adequate supply of risk capital available. With so many variables in the equation, it would be rash to hazard a guess as to the amounts that may come into play. It can be safely asserted, however, that they will be trifling in comparison with the total sum of our annual military expenditures. And if through governmental action in this domain we succeed in concert with other nations in furthering our objectives of expanding trade and increasing prosperity, convertible exchanges and multilateralism throughout the non-Soviet world, the investment will have paid handsome dividends.

Once the validity of this line of reasoning is accepted, in what manner may government best discharge the obligation involved? Either the powers of the Export-Import Bank should be materially broadened or, and possibly preferably, the formation of an international development corporation should be given more serious consideration than it has had to date. Its primary purpose would be to provide funds for desirable development projects in the non-Soviet world which neither any existing agency nor private capital is prepared to finance.

Such projects vary greatly in character, and the forms of appropriate financing will be correspondingly varied. There will be instances such as the improvement of harbor facilities or the building of roads where the return on the investment can in all likelihood be secured only through the taxing authority and will depend in the last analysis upon the growing prosperity of the area that the projects are designed to promote. There will be other instances, such as power plants, where the return on the investment may be determined primarily by the degree of its success as a commercial enterprise.

On this account the international development corporation

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should have broad powers permitting it to make loans to governments and governmental agencies, or to corporate entities with or without governmental guarantees, and to make equity investments as well. Having regard to the sensibilities of the British and of the French and the relationships that exist between them and some of the undeveloped areas, no barriers should be placed in the way of dealing through them as intermediaries where the wisdom of such a course is clearly indicated. Prospective commitments must be viewed in the light of the over-all objective of American foreign economic policy, and the most appropriate form of financing must be determined by negotiation with the agencies—governmental, corporate or both—directly concerned. As the capital of the international development corporation may be furnished entirely (and in any event will be furnished principally) by our Government, its policies would of necessity be set by us.

Could such an organization function most effectively as a national or as an international entity? Should it be affiliated with or independent of the Bank for Reconstruction and Development? These are open questions that require thoughtful exploration. Variations of this general concept have recently been publicly advocated and discussed. They have encountered a generally unfavorable reaction from the business community. The idea should not on that account be prematurely abandoned. Sober second thought may lead to a more favorable response. For while the charge will be made that such an organization would involve "putting government into business with a vengeance" it would merely put government into business in fields which business itself was not prepared to enter. In certain instances, by furnishing equity capital it might provide a sound basis for senior financing through the medium of the Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Like our own R.F.C., it could, through the purchase of securities, nurse projects until such time as the investment market is prepared to take these commitments off its hands. In the meantime its funds would be employed, consistent with our determination to establish a viable economy in the non-Soviet world, in ventures that under favorable circumstances might not only result in getting our money back, but might even offer the possibility of a profit. For us this would be a novel prospect that should make the undertaking somewhat more palatable politically.

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One should not minimize the difficulties confronting such an organization in the search for the useful employment of funds. The objective is to assist in the establishment of a viable economy in the non-Soviet world. It may be that on this account, while not losing sight of the further development of European productivity, emphasis should be placed in the first instance upon making available to the potential customers of European industry "untied" dollars, *i.e.* dollars which need not be spent in the United States, but may be spent by the recipient in the most favorable market. This means that attention should be focused on the backward and undeveloped areas where the demand for capital for desirable projects would at the outset be limited, and owing to the governmental, sociological and economic structure can only gradually be increased.[2]

When the Bank and the Fund were formed, hope ran high that we were moving toward a peaceful world in which venture capital would once again freely seek employment across national boundaries. In such a world they could readily have performed their allotted functions. This hope faded in the light of the aggressive and intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union. As a result, the anticipated flow of venture capital failed to materialize and the Bank and the Fund were hopelessly handicapped. The international development corporation would furnish the missing link in the institutional chain. Its activities, supplementing whatever flow of capital may be stimulated by government guarantees and tax incentives, should fill the gap in the balance of international payments resulting from the present hesitancy of venture capital to seek employment abroad. Its task would become urgent as soon as a material decrease in our defense expenditures overseas could be clearly foreseen.

For the sake of emphasis it seems worth underscoring the warning to be drawn from Marshal Stalin's tract: It will avail us little to have made the non-Soviet world militarily secure if we fail to make it economically secure as well. To accomplish this purpose:

(1) There must be a large measure of coördination of economic policies within the non-Soviet world. Once the groundwork has been laid, this might be sought through an economic conference of the nations principally concerned.

[2] A stimulating study on the subject of our Foreign Development Program has been prepared under the auspices of the Mutual Security Agency.

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(2) The contribution of other nations to this common endeavor should be primarily along the lines laid down in the three principles adopted at the Commonwealth Economic Conference.

(3) Our own contribution in the first instance should take the form of an express determination to make dollars available to the stream of international payments from time to time in such amounts as may be necessary to balance the international accounts at a high level of trade.

(4) This determination should then be implemented by appropriate measures, among which should be included, to the extent politically practicable, a reduction in tariff barriers, a simplification of customs procedures, the repeal of the Buy America Act, and the reconsideration of legislation restricting cargoes to American bottoms.

(5) Last of all, steps should be adopted to stimulate the flow of private risk capital, and provision should be made through some such instrumentality as an international development corporation to facilitate to whatever extent necessary an added flow of risk capital to be furnished from governmental sources.

This program covers a complex of measures which taken in their entirety will strike some thoughtful persons as far too drastic in nature. There are those who believe that at the root of the world disequilibrium lies the disposition of certain nations to live beyond their means. If we were only to make access to dollars more difficult, they say, and thus force these recalcitrants to tighten their belts, all would be well. Admittedly, there are excesses that should be curbed. But to make the dollar shortage an instrument of policy would inevitably produce a world of shrinking international trade and growing restrictions, harmful to us and involving for some of our closest associates an intolerable lowering of the standard of living with social consequences too dangerous to be contemplated with equanimity.

In an address delivered at Fordham University, October 29, 1952, the dilemma facing the non-Soviet world was brilliantly summarized by Charles Malik, the Minister of Lebanon in the United States, in the following words:

> The economic difficulties of the Western community must be honestly faced. Economic aid by this country is only a temporary expedient; it cannot be the permanent solution. The more than 200,000,000 industrialized people of Western Europe can only live and prosper if trade barriers among them are removed, if the United States and Canada lower their tariffs against

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the products of their skills, and if they apply their techniques to great schemes of development wherever they can. Which is more important—that only one part of the Western community should prosper even if that should endanger the whole, or that the whole should more or less uniformily prosper and therefore stand firm against the adversary, even if that should mean a relative curbing of desire on the part of some? Here again is a test of how much the West constitutes a real organic community in face of the common present danger, and therefore of whether it can develop the conscious human will to invalidate the forebodings of the Marxists.

To invalidate these forebodings drastic remedies are required. The establishment of a sterling dollar exchange stabilization fund or the much-discussed increase in the price of gold would provide no long-range solution. Inconvertibility is but a symptom of the underlying disease. To attack the symptom, leaving the disease untouched, will surely prove disappointing. And as far as tampering with the price of gold is concerned, this is a nostrum the use of which should be viewed with a high degree of skepticism and should be considered, if at all, only as the tag end of an overall program designed to establish a new equilibrium.

Half measures will serve no useful purpose. Enlightened self-interest demands of us a more comprehensive approach to the economic problem than we have hitherto been prepared to follow. Our determination to see that there are dollars available to balance the international accounts at a high level of trade would have a tonic effect throughout the non-Soviet world. With the specter of a chronic dollar shortage removed, confidence would revive. Instrumentalities such as the Bank and the Fund, with possibly some minor modifications of policy or statute in the latter, would take on new life. Trade restrictions would begin to give way before the coming of a new era of multilateralism. The convertibility of currencies would become an attainable aim of policy.

Such are the results likely to flow from a full recognition and acceptance of our responsibility as a great creditor nation. To deal with a situation so infinitely complicated, any program must of necessity remain highly flexible in matters of detail. Yet there seems ample justification for believing that the adoption of policies consistent in general with the line of conduct here advocated may offer the best chance of meeting successfully the challenge implicit in the economic analysis of Marshal Stalin.

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THE PROBLEM OF OUR TRADE BALANCE

By Willard L. Thorp

NO one is content with the existing international economic arrangements. Trade is restricted by quotas and embargoes; national currencies are not freely convertible into those of other nations; the flow of foreign investment is exceedingly limited; and foreign aid by the United States is still measured in billions of dollars. So far as this country is concerned, the situation is summarized in the record of our balance of payments. In 1951 and 1952, the international current transactions of the United States with the rest of the world showed "favorable" balances estimated at $5,200,000,000 and $5,000,000,000 respectively. In other words, our exports of goods and services plus our income on foreign investments were much larger than our imports plus our payments on investments. This is the familiar "dollar gap" between what foreign countries sell to us and buy from us, and indicates their problem of finding dollars to pay for their purchases.

In 1947 the gap was $11,500,000,000. But though the comparative figures can be taken to show in broad terms how greatly the situation has improved, they do not really provide a full measure either of the economic progress which has been achieved or of the problem which remains. The figures include as "exports" military assistance estimated at $1,500,000,000 in 1951, and at $2,400,000,000 in 1952. On the other side, the "import" figures include certain extraordinary purchases resulting from military expenditures abroad. The net result of the military additions is to increase the apparent size of the gap.

And the figures are an inexact measure of the lack of economic balance for another reason. To a degree that cannot be estimated, nearly all countries have reduced their demand for American goods through quota restrictions on imports, and through controls of foreign exchange. In addition to restrictions on imports, many countries have placed limitations on the withdrawal of funds arising from earnings and amortization on American foreign investment. It would be largely true to say that our exports and receipts on investments are determined today by the availability of dollars and not by the demand abroad. The United

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States really establishes the size of the gap by its own policies.

Even though we recognize—as we must—that this is a world problem which can be solved only by a common effort by all trading countries, the fact remains that the attitude of the United States is a key factor. American assistance programs which have enabled foreign countries to pay for American exports in excess of their own dollar earnings have been essential for the economic recovery and the development of security in the free world. In 1951, grants and loans made by the United States Government amounted to $4,700,000,000, and in 1952 to $5,000,000,000. But neither restrictions nor grants are desirable ways of adjusting the balance. Large programs of assistance have always been regarded as a temporary device. Postwar economic planning was directed at achieving a world economy in which trade barriers would be greatly reduced and production would be expanded, so that an increasing number of countries would be able to improve their standard of living and pay their own way in international transactions. Whether this can be done depends on decisions we make no less than on actions taken abroad.

II

The inadequacy of dollar earnings for financing the gap between American exports and American imports is not a sudden development. Between the two world wars, a substantial part of American exports was financed by private American long-term investment, bank credits or the sale of gold to the United States. The use of trade restrictions spread rapidly during the thirties in an effort to conserve financial resources and maintain employment. However, World War II enlarged the scale of the problem. American productive capacity expanded greatly during the war, while the devastated countries of Europe found much of their productive capacity disorganized or destroyed. In addition, their foreign investments, whose earnings had previously financed a considerable part of their imports, were greatly reduced, and their new obligations to the dollar area rose rapidly. Sources of income like shipping, insurance and tourist trade decreased sharply. Furthermore, as recovery proceeded in the industrial countries, it became evident that the world's capacity to produce raw materials had not expanded as rapidly as its ability to utilize them, so that raw material prices rose disproportionately with the prices of manufactured goods. This shift in the "terms of

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trade" was particularly serious for those countries whose economies were based on importing raw materials and exporting manufactured products.

The efforts to expand production and trade as part of the Marshall Plan were progressing well when the imminent danger to the whole free world, foreshadowed by the failure of the Soviet Union to disarm after the war and brought to successive climaxes by the seizure of Czechoslovakia and the unconscionable attack on South Korea, introduced a new set of problems. To the burdens of the military actions in Korea, Malaya and Indo-China had to be added the rapid build-up of defensive strength everywhere. Although today the largest single element in the American assistance program is in the form of military equipment, our contribution covers only a fraction of the total cost of defense. The remainder must be raised by our allies out of their own resources. Not only has the strain on their governmental budgets increased greatly, with important effect on savings and investment, but the rise in prices of raw material and the diversion of productive capacity from export to armament have undercut their strenuous efforts to earn their own way.

The course of events and the magnitude of the problems were foreseen to only a limited degree by those who planned for the postwar world at Bretton Woods and elsewhere. UNRRA was established to meet the expected need for relief; however, the degree of economic destruction was greatly underestimated, and an additional series of programs was developed, culminating in the Marshall Plan, to provide the coöperative effort and the resources necessary for recovery. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had been expected to meet the requirements for economic development, but additional assistance was provided later through expanded United Nations programs, Point Four, the E.C.A. programs "in the area of China," and the broader Mutual Security Agency program. The necessity for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a supporting program of military assistance was certainly not foreseen.

Neither economic nor political programs have evolved smoothly. In the economic field crisis has followed crisis—the result, in part, of the absence of well-distributed reserves. In the early years after the war, it frequently happened that countries came to the bottom of the foreign exchange barrel and found themselves threatened with the necessity of cutting off such es-

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sential imports as food, oil or coal. The drastic steps taken in the crisis of 1947, when the British tried to meet the obligations of convertibility of the Anglo-American agreement, the crisis of 1949 when American imports fell off, and the crisis of 1951 when the reserves of the sterling area melted away, all are indications of the thin margins upon which these economies have been operating. It is amazing that the free world has moved ahead as well as it has. Not only have particular crises been surmounted, but substantial progress has been made in production, standards of living and capacity for defense. But the economic goal is still far distant, and we must seek more lasting solutions.

III

By far the largest items in our balance of payments are exports and imports of merchandise. The requirements for aid could obviously be reduced, or eliminated, if either our exports were cut or our imports increased. Recorded exports of merchandise have been about $15,000,000,000 a year for the last two years—about two and one half times the prewar quantity at about double the prices. Varying examples would be the wide-open buying in the United States by Brazilians when coffee prices skyrocketed and increased their dollar earnings, and the carefully-controlled expenditure of dollars by the United Kingdom. In general, the countries which are receiving economic aid are those where imports from the dollar area are most carefully rationed and where the restrictions on dollar purchases are greatest. A program to reduce our exports would have to be directed at the countries receiving aid, and the repercussions there would be severe.

A reduction in exports would, of course, affect the American economy. The export market is essential to many agricultural commodities. In 1951 we exported nearly one out of every two bushels of wheat harvested, one of every three bales of cotton picked, one out of every four pounds of tobacco produced, and one of every seven pounds of prunes dried. Our movies and many of our manufactured items have large foreign markets. To be sure, a policy of contraction is an economic possibility; but it would not only reduce economic activity at home and abroad, but would imperil many other objectives in our foreign policy.

But if the reduction of exports is an unhappy course of adjustment, what about increasing imports? It is true that 1952 probably represents the high-water mark in the quantity of goods

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imported. However, it is significant that the figure was not higher. During the prewar years there was a clear parallel between the quantity of our imports and the level of our industrial production. Yet in 1952, when industrial production was 120 percent above prewar, imports had risen only by about 50 percent. That the gap in the balance of payments was not worse is due to the fact that the average unit value of imports was nearly three times more than before the war.

Many causes have conjoined to hold down imports. The most obvious one, of course, is that American production facilities increased mightily while our foreign suppliers were suffering from direct and indirect war damage. In addition, the efforts of other countries to earn dollars are hampered by the hazards and red tape of our customs procedure, the continuance of high tariffs on many products, the use of import quotas or embargoes of our own to enforce domestic agricultural price support programs, the "Buy American" program enforced by the government on itself, and the restriction of certain imports like cheese and buttermilk powder under the Defense Production Act of 1950.

Since 1934, the central pillar in our trade policy has been the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. In 1930 the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act had raised the tariff level to new heights. Since 1934, through a series of negotiations with other countries, tariff rates have been lowered from that high schedule by at least one-half on the average. It is only recently that the effects of these tariff reductions have begun to show themselves, since the operation of the Act has been confined to the depression period when the American market was not very attractive, the war years when goods could not move freely even if they were available, and the postwar years when foreign suppliers were still under tremendous handicaps. That these lower tariffs may be having an effect today is indicated by the number of applications filed during the last two years for the use of the "escape clause" whereby domestic producers can request increased tariff or quota protection if they believe that they are threatened with serious injury by competitive imports. The list includes such varied items as wood screws, spring clothespins, tobacco pipes, garlic, bicycles, bonito and tuna fish, dried figs, blue mold cheese, and certain types of china. Undoubtedly, as the economic recovery of other countries proceeds, and particularly as Germany and Japan increase their efforts to export, the list will rapidly grow larger and larger. Of course, if

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we adopt the practice of protecting domestic producers whenever there is an increase in imports, it is obvious that the possibility of expanding imports will be limited to those items which are not produced in this country, most of which are already on the free list or close to it.

The intention of the Congress in insisting upon the escape clause was definitely protectionist. Its supporters usually argued in terms of "I believe in liberal trade policies, but . . ." The existence of the escape clause, its actual application in several cases and threatened application in many others, have raised great difficulties for foreign countries which are trying to encourage their producers to earn dollars. Foreign producers have been given reason to fear that success in entering the American market will bring its own downfall. A few specific disbarments under the escape clause which undermine confidence in future conditions of trade can more than offset all the actions taken to lower trade barriers in the last 19 years.

Applications for escape-clause action concentrate attention on situations in specific industries, and give a myopic view of the problem. The fundamental issue in regard to imports is the question of conflicting interests within the United States. When a tariff is lowered, the domestic producer may suffer from foreign competition; and the exporter, the foreign investor, the taxpayer and the consumer may benefit. When the Dutch, in retaliation for our restriction against Edam and Gouda cheese, reduced their purchases of wheat flour in the United States, it was clear that the protection of the American producers of cheese was being achieved at the expense of the American wheat farmers, flour millers, and possibly even the taxpayer, since the domestic price-support program for wheat might be affected. If protection of industries which fear foreign competition (which conceivably might be good for some of them) appears to be a necessary part of public policy, it might be much better in the long run to provide assistance for them in shifting their resources to fields where efficient American production protects itself.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements program is inadequate in another way. The notion of reciprocity has come to mean that any steps taken to increase imports by lowering tariffs should be accompanied by equivalent concessions in foreign markets. Some feel that the concessions won abroad have often been subverted by quota and currency restrictions. However, such restrictions

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are usually related to the availability of dollars, and if increased imports to the United States bring more dollars to the foreign country, restrictions are likely to be relaxed; in that case we would benefit by an increase in exports. But exporting is only one of our interests. We also wish freedom to service, amortize, and even repatriate our foreign investments. We wish to reduce the burden of foreign aid upon our national budget. It would therefore be more realistic if steps taken to increase our imports might be justified on a broader basis, and the concept of reciprocity not be limited to benefits for those in export trade.

In addition to tariff barriers, importers have long claimed that American customs procedures and the mysteries of tariff classification are substantial obstacles to trade. We make it exceedingly difficult for commodities to cross our boundaries. The hazards take the form of delay, unexpected costs and charges, and even refusal of entry. A few such instances may not only wipe out the profit of the individual involved, but raise frightening ghosts to other potential foreign suppliers. Any objective analysis of the world economic situation, and of our own position as a creditor nation, makes difficult the justification of policies which restrict imports. This is not to say that our import barriers are solely responsible for the lack of balance in our trade with other nations, but they are important causes. They are also important symbols of our attitude. A clear-cut statement of American policy followed by appropriate action should make possible a reduction in aid, and would be the kind of economic statesmanship which speaks far louder than words.

IV

Capital goods—items to be used in increasing the ability to produce—are a substantial element in the flow of goods to other countries. Some are paid for by the foreign country's own earnings, some are financed by World Bank loans, some by United States Government grants and loans; and others are financed by private capital. The ambition for rapid economic development is a characteristic of underdeveloped countries. But they are subject to a vicious circle whereby their low levels of production and consumption make difficult very much in the way of savings or of tax collection, and therefore make it hard for them to obtain capital out of their own national income. In the past, such capital requirements, perhaps on a more limited and gradual

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scale, have been met in large part by foreign flotations of securities and by direct private investment. Today, many such countries are planning long-term development programs requiring large expenditures within the country and capital goods from abroad. Since in the present world the United States is the chief country to which they can look for capital, their progress often depends upon the amount of dollars available to them. Economic development is thus closely related to the pattern of world trade and payments. For example, if American capital could be used by underdeveloped countries to purchase machinery and equipment from Europe and Japan, these areas in turn could use the dollars thus earned to meet their payments with the United States. At the same time the expanded capacity to produce in the underdeveloped areas might increase their own ability to earn dollars. The most recent analysis by the O.E.E.C. puts particular stress on arrangements of this sort as a means of increasing the dollar earnings of Western Europe.

American policy has recognized that there are two things which can be exported to aid in economic development—technical knowledge and capital. The first is now made available by the United States Technical Assistance Administration and by various United Nations agencies. As to the second, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank make loans to governments, and government instrumentalities, in order to help in the development of basic public services—roads, railroads, power, harbor facilities, etc. They usually restrict their credits to that part of the project which requires foreign exchange. To some extent, both of these banks have developed channels for assistance to private enterprise, though maintaining in general that the industrial sectors of developing economies must look to private sources for the equity part of their foreign capital needs.

The fact is that up to now American private capital has been willing to go abroad only to certain countries and for certain purposes. The foreign demand has had to compete with highly profitable uses for capital here in the United States; and, except for Middle Eastern oil, very little has gone outside of the Western Hemisphere. In 1952, the net flow abroad of U. S. private long-term and short-term capital was $860,000,000—a sum which may be compared with net income of $1,540,000,000 for 1952 on earlier foreign investments.

The business community itself seems to feel that the present

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situation offers little promise for any considerable flow of private capital and has suggested the need of some special stimulus such as tax exemption. But even this might not meet the problem. This is not a situation of the sort described by Marx in which the "capitalist" objective would be to take surplus goods off the American market to any spot, no matter where, so long as it was foreign. Our problem is how to accelerate economic development in various countries—those which involve the greatest risk as well as our immediate neighbors. But what would prevent the flow of specially-primed private capital from going almost entirely to the safest areas?

We have a real stake in encouraging the process of economic development. Added long-term investments in these areas will help finance the immediate demand for our goods, and much of it will expand the supply of raw materials so essential to all industrial countries. In addition, progress made toward an improved standard of living, and hope engendered, may help very importantly in maintaining political stability. Up to now, many of these areas have been slow in coming forward with an effective demand. There are two reasons for this. First, few of their projects have been sufficiently worked out to permit an assessment of the financial requirements and economic justification. Second, these countries have carried over their political nationalism into a sort of economic nationalism, which makes them shy away from private foreign capital. The first of these difficulties is dissolving as a result of educational work by the World Bank and Export-Import Bank, and by Point Four; and the second seems to be losing its force, at least in some areas. However, one suspects that if we really wish to see rapid progress made in economic development, we shall have to find ways and means for obtaining a much greater flow of capital into the sector hitherto reserved for private capital. One way or another, we must substantially increase our rate of foreign investment.

V

It would be unfortunate to imply that actions by the United States alone can establish a healthy, expanding world economy. To be sure, the extraordinary recovery of the last several years would have been impossible without our aid, and there are further steps which we can take to strengthen the productive capacity and dollar-earning ability of other countries. But real

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progress depends upon their internal policies as well as ours, and upon the degree to which larger trading areas are developed.

As a result of the depression, most industrialized countries made the maintenance of full employment the prime goal of economic policy. However, financial policies designed to conserve reserves in the face of an unfavorable balance of trade may require the tightening of credit and other deflationary measures which may lead at least temporarily to an increase in unemployment. Politically, it has often been much easier to meet such a situation by placing additional limitations on imports. But there are now many signs of willingness to use financial measures again in dealing with the problem of foreign payments. This is not to argue that full employment (with an allowance for some unemployment while people are changing jobs) is not an appropriate objective, but rather that to achieve it temporarily by inflation or by the loss of reserves is really not to achieve it at all.

While the lack of dollars is of major importance to virtually every country in the world, a great volume of the world's trade is among other countries, and the wider the trading area of each, the greater is its opportunity for expanding its trade and balancing its accounts. Already, there are two trading areas where nations settle their accounts on a multilateral basis—the sterling area and the region embraced by the European Payments Union. Obviously, the opportunity for trade widens when goods can be bought from one country, sold to another, and accounts balanced through some central clearing system.

It is at this point that the desirability of currency convertibility becomes so apparent. It would permit multilateral trade—the maximum trade possible. However, three things need to be said about convertibility. First, it cannot be maintained unless the basic elements in the trade accounts are in approximate balance; a persistent debtor or a persistent creditor cannot maintain convertibility, unless, of course, there is a compensating flow of capital. Second, since there are bound to be swings of one sort or another, there must be adequate reserves to assure confidence that it will not be abandoned. Third, some way must be found to assure the appropriate coördination of national policies. At least in theory, the gold standard provided an automatic mechanism to correct disequilibrium, through the movement of gold from one country to another and consequent changes in relative price levels. Today, price levels are the result of national fiscal policies

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rather than automatic adjustments. Somehow, a force must be put to work which will bring about the results achieved by the gold standard. In other words, convertibility in today's world will require international monetary management of some sort or other, with national coöperation. It is a goal well worth striving for. When it is reached, most of the quantitative restrictions which so burden trade and payments will disappear and international accounts can be settled on a global basis. The world's resources will be distributed more according to economic requirements, with less arbitrary and fluctuating interference by governments. And the area within which competition will stimulate the search for efficiency and lower costs will be enlarged.

VI

Some of the action suggested above can be taken unilaterally by the United States. However, any basic program for the expansion of world trade needs to be a coöperative effort in which the entire free world participates. At the present time, the procedure for developing a common approach to economic problems is exceedingly unsatisfactory. Primary responsibility for matters in the monetary field lies in the International Monetary Fund, which is seriously handicapped by charter provisions limiting its operations. Since the International Trade Organization was stillborn, responsibility in the trade field has fallen to GATT—to the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This organization was to perform a holding operation until the birth of the ITO, and is still holding. The United States membership rests upon GATT's activity in the field of trade agreements and it has never received Congressional approval.

In the case of both organizations, the duties and obligations of members, and of the organizations, are spelled out in considerable detail. The argument for such detailed codes was that it would be easy to translate precise duties and obligations into precise action when the concrete problems appeared. However, the actual problems seldom turn out to be quite what was expected, and what were regarded as precise words suddenly require further interpretation. The result is that a sort of legal controversy develops around the meaning of the original obligations.

It is tremendously important that there be organizations responsible for dealing with problems rather than for administering an elaborate charter. Thus the O.E.E.C. and the International

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Materials Conference were effective because they were responsible yet escaped being legalistic. With appropriate American leadership, both the International Monetary Fund and GATT can be much more effective as centers for discussing the requirements for a healthy world economy.

Finally, the uncertain status of GATT must be clarified. It is unfortunate that, while international bodies with Congressional blessing exist for everything from stamps to ships, there is no ratified international body for trade problems. GATT should be given Congressional sanction as it is, or should be revised (in which case other countries will propose their pet changes), or should be supplanted by some new organization. So many countries are involved in these economic problems that they cannot be solved by bilateral diplomatic exchanges. Such discussions are of course essential, but the consequences of decisions are widespread, and all countries involved are entitled to participate in the decision.

It is time for a change. We need a more vigorous program, sponsored by the Administration and accepted by Congress, looking toward the ultimate balancing of our trade accounts. And we must strengthen our support for economic development in foreign lands. The matter is urgent, for trade restrictions, once imposed, tend to be self-perpetuating. Many industries in foreign countries have been sheltered from foreign competition for more than a decade. In this country, the protections of war years permitted many enterprises to establish themselves in markets previously occupied by foreign suppliers. In a number of cases, these war-babies have been the most determined seekers for more protection through the escape clause; they sought it even before imports had reached their prewar levels. Protected trade builds up vested interests, and the longer restrictionism continues, the harder it will be to break down.

Secondly, continued foreign aid is also undesirable, at least in the form of balance-of-payments grants. Aid should be constructive, providing an incentive and a promise of betterment, rather than merely an avenue of escape. Free transfers do not provide a healthy basis for continuing international relationships. Nor is aid popular with the recipients, though it may be necessary. When the United Kingdom announced in 1950 that it was ready to stand on its own feet, as did the Dutch in 1953 before the calamitous floods, one could sense not merely the pride but the

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relief that came from their ability to assert their independence.

Thirdly, the economic underpinning must be strengthened in order to avoid the disturbing and upsetting effect of repeated crises. There has been a tremendous shift in the economic positions of various countries and a consequent instability in their economic policies. One year, the United Kingdom announced that it needed no more aid. The year after, it was taking extraordinary steps to check the disappearance of the sterling-area reserves. In about two years' time, both Australia and Brazil have moved from easy to straightened circumstances. Something is wrong in a world trading system in which such instability exists.

Finally, it must be noted that a strong and expanding economic system is important not merely for itself but because it is an essential element in total foreign policy. Our international objectives are by no means all of an economic nature; in fact, our greatest expenditures since 1914 have been made in fighting the thrust of aggression. But although our general objectives are stated in terms of increased capacity for defense, political stability, freedom and international goodwill, the pursuit of these non-economic ends usually leads fairly directly to the economic field. Their achievement depends in large part on whether the United States and other nations utilize and expand their economic capacities.

The effectiveness of our economic policy depends upon the consistency with which we apply it in each specific situation. We shall gain nothing—indeed, we shall do much harm—if we issue statements of high objectives and professions of international responsibility, and then in the process of carrying them out permit them to be undercut here, there and everywhere by partisan groups and narrow economic interests. None of the economic problems is an isolated one; all must be seen in full perspective. We must present the world with such a consistent performance in the economic field, day after day and year after year, that the economic foundation of the free world will have solid strength. All other elements in our foreign policy will gain strength thereby.

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NORTH AFRICA IN ATLANTIC STRATEGY

By General de Monsabert

ON November 8, 1942, a powerful armada landed American and British forces along the African coast from Casablanca to Algiers. This famous operation, which was to mark the decisive turn of the Second World War, was by no means a picnic. Anyone who may be tempted to forget this fact because the operation was such a perfect success should reread General Eisenhower's "Crusade in Europe" or General Mark Clark's "Calculated Risk." Formidable contingencies were to be reckoned with. There might have been tenacious resistance from the French Army, bound in principle by its oath to Marshal Pétain. There was the risk that the Axis could stage a crushing counterattack. Finally, there was the threat from Spain; for though she was counted upon to maintain neutrality, the U.S. Fifth Army, deployed in the north of Morocco, had orders from the start to be ready if need be to seize Spanish Morocco.

One anxiety, however, seems never to have entered the minds of the leaders of this expedition: they seem never to have been worried about the possible attitude of the natives in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. This may be taken as an advance compliment for France's achievement in Africa. And the actual experience of the Allied leaders did in fact justify their confidence.

It is unnecessary to recall the sequel of "Operation Torch"—the blow against the "soft underbelly" of the axis, in Churchill's phrase, which was to lead the Allies to Rome and would, no doubt, have opened the way for them to Vienna had it been possible to broaden the strategic concept once it was already in process of execution. In any event, the leap into Europe from the African springboard considerably facilitated the breaking of the Atlantic Wall and the formation of a second front; nor would that front have been as effective if it had not stretched from the Adriatic to the Channel, welded together by the Allied forces coming from Africa through Provence. There could be no more vivid illustration of North Africa's strategic importance for Europe. And to complete the picture, North Africa afterwards developed into an unequalled base of manœuvre and in addition supplied valuable fighting reserves.

If tomorrow there should be another war, North Africa would

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resume its same all-important rôle, derived from the fact of its central position at the spot where the Mediterranean and African façades of the European and African continents meet. Without North Africa, Europe cannot breathe and cannot act unless it be to retreat. Far from being an obstacle to intercourse between the two continents, the Mediterranean is an element of economic and social unity. Moreover, as in the days of the thalassocracies, control of this inland sea is an essential condition to the acquisition of strategic supremacy. The real frontier of Europe, then, is the ancient Roman *limes* bordering the Sahara. From Casablanca to Berlin, from Kiel to Gabès, everything interlocks, and because it does the whole area constitutes a single and indivisible theater of war.

We must be sure that we understand our terms of reference, however, for their meaning has changed and broadened as a result of the enlarged area of modern conflicts and the development of new weapons. If another war comes there will hardly be room for neutrality. When we speak of theaters of operations, therefore, our strategic concept must take into consideration the entire globe.

II

When we look at a polar projection of the Northern Hemisphere we see that Soviet Russia and her satellites are surrounded by the free nations. Paradoxically, however, it is the besiegers who are on the defensive all around the circle, and this is true whether the war remains cold or becomes hot. This defense is divided into three *theaters of war:* the Arctic theater, where the two giants, America and Russia, face each other across the North Pole; the Pacific theater, from the Bering Strait to the Indian Ocean, with Indo-China as its approximate center; and the Atlantic theater, reaching from northern Scandinavia down through the Middle East as far as the Persian Gulf. Each of these theaters of war is divided into *theaters of operation,* requiring a common strategy and unified direction of land, sea and air power.

The unity of the Atlantic theater of war is even more sharply defined than that of the two others. Its center is the European peninsula and its Western base is the ocean—which in present-day terms (range of aircraft, naval support) really brings it to America. Its battlefront toward Asia is narrower than that of either of the two other theaters of war. Further, because of the

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variety and fighting qualities of the races living there it is the theater where the struggle will be the most intense. Finally—and this should be especially underlined—it is the theater of war where what happens in any one of the component theaters of operations would have the most immediate and decisive repercussions in the others. This is true because it is so populous, has such a great economic potential, possesses such an integrated communications system and is so well suited to the development of an infrastructure. Existing treaties have arbitrarily set the southern limits of the Atlantic theater of war at the Tropic of Cancer. In practice, however, it would necessarily include all Africa; for if Russia were permitted to extend her influence to the African continent, either before or after the start of hostilities, the besiegers of this world siege would become the besieged.

The nature of a theater of operations can be deduced easily from the foregoing. It is a sector of land, sea and air space of such size and shape that it permits offensive and defensive actions in the pursuit of a determined mission as well as the establishment of the necessary supporting services. Since it demands unity of action, it presupposes the possibility of an effective unified command of the ensemble. Obviously this concept differs from that of former times when the sea and air spaces did not have the importance which the power and range of modern weapons give them today. In land terms alone such a theater of operations would be merely a "front," like that of the Rhine (and even a "front" must be understood as requiring sufficient depth for the manœuvre of armies).

Within the third of the globe which we have allotted to the Atlantic theater of war we distinguish three theaters of operations having the characteristics described: the North Atlantic, with its front following the line of the Scandinavian countries and its center in England; Europe; and the Middle East.

The Middle Eastern theater of operations should comprise all the Islamic countries from Pakistan to Lybia. Its wealth of oil, as we know, makes it one of the highest prizes in the cold war and will in part determine the pattern of a hot war. Not to keep the unity of this theater of operations would mean to open an enormous gap in the lines surrounding Soviet Russia—a gap through which she might break out either toward the West and the Atlantic or toward the East and the Pacific. In the latter case, travelling the road of the great empires of ancient history, she would

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win the tremendous human resources of India. Some might be tempted to raise this theater of operations to the rank of a theater of war. But it would lack the strategic base which the other three threaters of war find overseas in America.

Another consideration in the elementary security of Europe is that the active part of the European theater of operations necessarily centers on the Eastern Mediterranean, where pass the shortest lines of communication from continent to continent, strategic tributaries to the Atlantic. The natural base of the Eastern Mediterranean is Egypt, with its inestimable asset, the Suez Canal; Turkey is the northern bastion, alike toward Iran and Central Europe; Greece, the fortified curtain of the Balkans, is the link with the West. Turkey, Greece and Jugoslavia form an essential turntable in the Atlantic system; and the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole cannot be separated from it.

Here in the Eastern Mediterranean the Russian and Atlantic peripheric strategies meet. The Russian strategy is to seek to reach the interior of the Atlantic front by land, thus cutting the umbilical cord which supplies Europe with life blood from the United States, and by seizing Casablanca and Dakar to threaten all the interior of Europe with its bombers. The Atlantic strategy, greatly aided by possession of the incomparable air and naval bases of Africa, is to reach the Caucasian oil fields by air directly; while from the Balkans it can launch a counteroffensive against the flanks and rear of the Soviet invasion of the European peninsula.

III

The European theater of operations is customarily divided into two parts—Central Europe, limited to the peninsula proper, and South Europe, including the Eastern Mediterranean. In the second of these areas, due to the fact that the Levantine countries and Egypt do not participate in the European system, Turkey stands at the very tip of a narrow line of sea and air communications, with Greece at the relay point and Italy in support.

To state the problem in such simplified terms accentuates the fact that a principal question remains unsettled: What is to become of North Africa, with its naval bases at Dakar, Mers el Kebir and Bizerta, its communications system from Casablanca to Gabès, its vast material and human resources? This area—as a glance at the map reveals—has a vital rôle to play in frustrat-

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ing the two sections of the Soviet "lobster claw" manœuvre.

The so-called South European theater of operations (better named the East Mediterranean theater) is actually composed of advanced positions. As for Central Europe, it is a body without lungs, arms or feet. It has none of the characteristics that make a theater of operations. According to the definitions mentioned above, it represents only a "front," as becomes obvious when one studies its dimensions: 650 miles from the Baltic to the Adriatic, 500 miles from the North Sea to the Gulf of Lions, 250



The pincers movement, or "lobster claw," of a possible Soviet offensive against the West.

miles from there to the Gulf of Gascogne (the southeast angle of the Bay of Biscay). In depth, from Berlin to Brest, at the top of the Bay of Biscay, or to Biarritz, at the bottom, is it only 875 miles. In these circumstances, it would seem ill-advised to refuse to make use of the fortress which lies at the end of this avenue—Spain. But even if Central Europe be extended to include Spain it could not be called a real theater of operations, since it still would lack the space on land, sea and in the air indispensable for offensive and defensive actions in the execution of a determined mission as well as the room required for the necessary sup-

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porting services. North Africa and Europe form one and the same body, and the Mediterranean is its circulatory system. In strategic terms, the real cover for this body is the Sahara.

The theater thus defined, with one end at Berlin and the other at Casablanca, has admirable unity. Its front stretches from Kiel to Gabès; and it can receive American reserves on the Atlantic coast from Brest to Agadir. One segment of it is ranged against the Soviet frontal manœuvre—the mass movement from the Russian steppes to the beaches of the Gulf of Gascogne, the road of the great Germanic and Mongol invasions. The other bars the way to a Soviet advance along the road of the Islamic invasions. At the intersection of the two segments lies Spain, the true bridge between the two continents. The specific connecting point is at the Columns of Hercules, on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar. The theater has two lateral lines of communication. The forward one consists of the Rhine Valley and the Italian peninsula, on either side of the mole formed by the Alps; the one at the rear runs through Spain and Morocco. As in a fan, the manœuvres can be reversed from one branch to the other.

There is no better way of indicating the degree of unity required in this ensemble than to invoke again the experience mentioned at the beginning of this article. If the remarkable results which the Allies obtained at the time of the Italian campaign could not be properly exploited, and if the manœuvre of the second front in France perhaps lacked speed once the point of application had been chosen, it was because there were two theaters where there should have been only one. The base of manœuvre for Western Europe, then, must be French North Africa, with its unequalled grouping of land, sea and air bases, all of them beyond the range of Russian medium bombers—Casablanca, on the Atlantic; La Sénia and Mers el Kébir in Oran; Algiers, Maison Carrée and Blida in Algeria; and Tunis and Bizerta in Tunisia. This convenient infrastructure can be supplemented, moreover, by logistic installations in the region of Oujda, Sidi-Bel-Abbès and Blida in Algeria and Tebourba in Tunisia.

But besides being a logistical springboard, French North Africa is also a considerable reservoir of manpower and raw materials. It contains a population of 20,000,000, the source of the African Army which so fully justified the confidence placed in it by the Allied leaders in the last war. Further, although it is traditionally a rural area given over to wheat, vineyards, vegetables and fruit,

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it also possesses important mineral resources which could be the basis for industrialization. About 60,000 tons of phosphates are extracted each year in this area. Iron is extracted in the open air in the Tunisian mines of Ouenza. Morocco and Tunisia also have lead, copper, manganese, cobalt and zinc. To supplement the insufficient coal of Kenadsa and Djerada, and pending the exploitation of the recently discovered oil, hydraulic power is being utilized to the maximum. Cement factories, canning factories, paper mills and textile mills have also been built. And, before long, it



The routes of possible Western counteroffensives against Soviet attack—via the northern plains of Germany, via the Ljubljana Gap and via the valley of the Vardar.

is expected that cast iron and steel will be made from the Ouenza iron with imported coal.

These resources may seem small compared to those of Europe. It should also be remembered, however, that the European coal and iron are dangerously situated on the northern plain which has always been a favorite route of invaders from the east. In opposition to the laws of economics, military imperatives demand that there be iron and steel plants far from the great concentrations on the Rhine and not directly vulnerable to enemy attack. North Africa provides an ideal field for this sort of deconcentra-

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tion, outside the zone of operations in which the Ruhr and Lorraine are situated. In developing a heavy industry there we would be following the example of the Russians, creating a "Urals" in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco and a "Siberia" in Central Africa. Without these adjuncts, and unless we reconcile ourselves to the possibility of a retreat across the Mediterranean, we risk having our operations stifled on the European continent. In terms of modern strategy, there no longer are three separate and distinct continents—Europe, Asia and Africa. *There are only Eurasia and Eurafrica.*

North Africa is the redoubt of Eurafrica, and it is made almost impregnable by its situation between sea and desert, regardless of whether an attack comes from the Middle East or from Europe. In the reverse sense, also, it is a strong support not only for the traditional strategic operation north of the Alps, that of Foch and Eisenhower, but also for the more audacious operation favored by Franchet d'Esperey and Churchill, who wished to turn the flank of the Central European fortress by the Ljubljana Gap or, better still, by the valleys of the Morava and Vardar.

This account of the innate strength of North Africa's position is not to be taken, however, as implying that without land, sea and air support from Europe it may not succumb eventually before Soviet attacks, either of a direct nature from the Middle East or by internal subversion.

IV

In a mass war the resources of the Maghreb (as the Arab world calls North Africa) are of special importance, since the population in addition to being numerous possesses fighting qualities esteemed throughout history. Thanks to the French, this tactical asset has a name: the African Army. It is not a force of mercenaries, to be used here or there according to need, but the natural and logical product of a civilizing program. At first it was the instrument of this program; now it has become its symbol, the property and pride of all who have taken part in its accomplishments, regardless of race.[1] Compared with the million or more Moslem soldiers and veterans of the African Army the so-called "nationalists" of French North Africa sink into insignificance.

[1] There are not separate Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian armies; units from all three often serve in one division (as happened in the Third Algero-Tunisian Division of the French Expeditionary Corps in Italy).

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There can be but one system of French national defense on the two sides of the Mediterranean, as the African Army's part in the two recent world wars demonstrated. Had it not been for the African Army the French forces would have been unable to await the arrival of British reinforcements in 1914; and without it the Allied armies would have been unable to hold out until the arrival of the American forces in 1917. In 1942, though reduced and disarmed, the African Army helped gain the necessary time for the Anglo-American deployment towards Tunisia. The quality of its action in 1944 can be best described by those who employed it, Generals Clark and Alexander. Though France was erased from the map of free countries, the French achievement survived. On both sides of the Mediterranean, then, we have the fact: France. Whether one wishes or not, it is an essential fact in the understanding of European strategy. France makes Eurafrica.

The Soviets know only too well that the Eurafrican fortress may develop into a turntable against the Middle East, and they try to capture it in advance. "Corrupt before you take," said Lenin, and we can see his admonition being followed. It already has prevented the Middle Eastern theater from being set up in its proper form. In this game Russia holds a powerful trump card: the spell of Islam, the true link between the various nationalisms which derive from a millenary anarchy. People say glibly that the religion of Mahomet is essentially opposed to Communism. But all over the world it has been proved that religious barriers, whatever their nature, are incapable of preventing the infiltration by which the Soviets achieve domination. The same invisible Soviet hands which set fire to the oil in Iran and to the European installations in Cairo now are fanning the ashes of conflict in the Maghreb—Islam's extreme western wing, and Europe's essential redoubt. Are they to be allowed to destroy the best bases of Atlantic defense?

North Africa must look to one side or the other. If it turns toward the East, then there will no longer be the desert to protect Eurafrica—a fact sufficient in itself to show that we would fall into grave psychological error if our strategic plan attached North Africa to an Eastern theater. Only the West can protect North Africa, simultaneously linking it to Western defense and disciplining the anarchic internal forces which will otherwise condemn it to new slavery. Strategy in this instance serves the democratic ideal as well as our own salvation.

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NATO CHANGES DIRECTION

By Drew Middleton

THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization is in a state of transition. The direction of its development has changed, simultaneously with a change in Europe's attitude toward all the organizations born of the cold war. The change of attitude is less pronounced in the case of NATO, however, than in regard to the European Defense Community. The reason for this is, of course, that NATO remains vital to Europe as the one international organization that specifically commits the New World to the defense of the Old. It is the West's basic physical answer to the military challenge of the Soviet Union.

The changes came into the open at the meeting of the NATO Council in Paris in December. This meeting completed in public the retreat from the ambitious goals set at the Lisbon Conference which had begun in the privacy of chancelleries months before. The new attitude has generally been described as a "slow down," a "cut back" and a "levelling off." More accurately it is a change in direction. After feverishly seeking divisions, air squadrons and destroyer flotillas for three years, NATO turned, for various reasons, to perfecting the weapons it had on hand and expanding the logistical basis on which troops, planes and ships must operate.

Several of the reasons for the shift in emphasis and direction are obvious. Some governments which had promised their people a return to normal conditions at home found that the promise could not be kept unless the rearmament schedules set at Lisbon were reduced. And the economies of some just could not stand increased diversion of civilian production to arms. But what happened in Paris was also an expression of what is happening throughout Western Europe—a change in the entire attitude toward the exigency of rearmament. This is a salient fact that must be grasped if President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles are to give new life to European defense. Europe today is not the same as it was in the summer of 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean war. It is not the troubled, uncertain Europe into which General Eisenhower infused hope and confidence early in 1951. It is not even the Europe which in May 1952 welcomed the signature of the European Defense Community Treaty.

What the United States faces in Europe is an alarming reduc-

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tion in the degree of realism in the thinking about Russia. As the sense of urgency fades, the philosophy of make-do, of muddling through, makes headway. There is a tendency to revive old quarrels. The short-term rewards of economic booms appear more important than the sacrifices necessary for united defense. Neither this changed attitude nor the reasons for it can be taken lightly by Americans. First among the reasons is the economic strain of rearmament. Britain, which has contributed more to European defense than most of the continental Powers, sent a delegation to the Paris Conference which was convinced that their country could not increase exports and thereby regain economic stability while maintaining rearmament at the rate called for by the schedules drawn up at Lisbon. Smaller nations feel the bite in different ways. In Copenhagen recently, Thorkil Christensen, Minister of Finance, pointed out that his countrymen found it difficult to reconcile American urgings for a greater defense effort with an American decision to bar Denmark's blue cheese, a dollar-earning export, from markets in the United States. Europeans repeatedly point out that although the United States has been the most generous contributor to the NATO pot, the contributions by poorer nations often represent more in terms of individual self-sacrifice. "You in America may be giving up the chance of buying a new car next year because of rearmament," a Dutch businessman said. "Our people are giving up the chance of buying a car."

Supplies of food and consumer goods are still restricted in some of the NATO nations. Until the last six months the majority of the people accepted the argument that such restrictions, many of which were first enforced during World War II, were necessary in the rearmament drive. But as the emotional climate has changed, dislike of such restrictions mounts and further sacrifice is unpopular. The attitude of Germany, which has not yet begun to rearm, is indicative. The Bundestag has passed a resolution approving rearmament only on condition that no lowering of the standard of living is involved. And, in spite of the fact that membership in the European Army is in the offing, the German budget for the next fiscal year reduces income and corporation taxes.

Europeans who attribute the change in attitude toward NATO to the economic consequences of rearmament believe that there is a real opportunity for the Eisenhower Administration to undertake constructive measures in this field. In their opinion, an

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American policy of "trade not aid" would expand the economies of the continental nations and enable them to contribute more to rearmament.

Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions to some of the other causes of the change in attitude toward NATO. Of these the most important has been the relative quiet of the Soviet Union in Europe. From the summer of 1951 the Russians have been playing a canny game. Of course they are not friendly to any NATO Power or, indeed, to any non-Stalinist Power, but it is difficult for the average European to grasp the implacability of Russian enmity toward the West when the Soviets do not supply daily proofs which affect him personally, as they did a few years ago. To the farmer in Bavaria or Provençe, the factory hand in Leeds or Milan, wars in Korea, Malaya and Indo-China are a long way off. And even though the Russians have not been inactive in Europe, the fact remains that the purges and rearming in East Germany and the steady military expansion of the satellite states do not directly affect the mass of West Europeans.

This is in striking contrast to the situation which brought NATO into existence. In 1949 and 1950 there was an awareness of present danger. The Communists had seized power in Prague, the Soviet Union had blockaded free Berlin, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea suggested ominously the possibility of a Russian eruption westwards from East Germany. People like the Danes, for example, to whom alliances have been synonymous with war and disaster, or the Norwegians, traditionally pacific and isolationist, were ready to submerge inherited prejudices in a movement for united defense. Today, hostile overt acts by the Soviet Union against the immediate national interest of these countries have decreased. As a result, there is a tendency to reëxamine armament programs in the light of domestic needs, as they are popularly understood, and to reject anything which, like the NATO Council's resolution on Indo-China, even hints at an expansion of defense responsibilities.

Some political leaders also believe that the Communist Party line, as it was proclaimed at the Nineteenth Congress in Moscow last autumn, is proof that Russian global strategy aims at dividing the West rather than attacking. They reason that to prevent this strategy from being successful the NATO Powers must pay increased attention to economic stability and, since armed attack is not imminent, proceed more cautiously toward rearmament.

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Such reasoning is bolstered by European intelligence estimates, particularly those of the British, which scout the possibility of Soviet aggression this year or next.

The American answer is that in view of the unwavering enmity of the Russian leaders toward the United States, the continuation of propaganda against the United States and its allies, the steady increase in Russian armaments, both present and potential, the reorganization of the satellite armies and air forces, the acceleration of Russian economic development and the expansion of Soviet facilities for the production of atomic weapons, it is folly to relax efforts to strengthen NATO to the point where Europe's defenses are strong enough to deter Soviet attack or, if it occurs, to offer hope of holding it short of the citadels of Western civilization and power. A number of responsible European statesmen subscribe to this view. Unfortunately, some political leaders and some peoples, impressed by exaggerated reports of defense progress and moved by the factors discussed above, have concluded that the point of receding danger has arrived.

II

A survey of what NATO has done undoubtedly reveals great progress. But though the prospects for defending Europe are better today than in 1950, we must remember that rearmament began at very close to zero. The existing forces do not seem to be sufficient to deter a Russian attack this year, were the Kremlin convinced that an attack was necessary, or to hold an invasion for any considerable period, should it come. On paper, where no battles are fought, NATO's strength is impressive. Its ground forces total approximately 60 ready divisions and it has more than 5,000 tactical aircraft. Now it is true that this is much larger than the Russian force in East Germany and the satellites. But the comparison is misleading on both sides of the line. To begin with, of those 60 divisions only 11 are manned and equipped at the moment on the scale required for war with the Soviet Union—the six divisions (or their equivalent) of the United States Seventh Army in Germany; the four and two-thirds British divisions, four of which form the Army of the Rhine; and the independent Canadian Brigade in Germany, which equals about one-third of a division. Of the remainder, no less than 21 are Turkish divisions. Much has been made, and rightly, of the stamina and bravery of the Turkish soldier, but it is doubtful if

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this stamina and bravery would compensate in war for various present deficiencies. Turkish troops have a low standard of education, there is an alarming lack of mechanized equipment, a shortage of men trained to maintain such equipment, and a dearth of trained officers and noncommissioned officers.

Further, the uneven quality of NATO's ready divisions is not merely a matter of numerical strength or equipment. By and large, the American, British, Canadian and French forces are the only troops which include a large number of officers experienced in the sort of war which Russia could fight. The experience of the Greek Army against guerrillas in Greece was useful as experience against guerrillas. But if war comes, the West will be fighting, primarily, the Soviet Army.

Moreover, Western defense depends as much on reserve divisions as on those in being. General Eisenhower, General Ridgway and Field Marshal Montgomery have all emphasized the importance of the reserve in any practical scheme of defense, yet the situation remains unsatisfactory. Back of the Soviet divisions in East Germany and the satellites stands the main Soviet Army. Russia could assign nearly 100 divisions to the initial thrusts into Europe. Yet at the end of January a tabulation showed the equivalent of only 35 reserve divisions available to SHAPE from the NATO nations—about 500,000 men at the most optimistic estimate. The West cannot hope to meet the Russian mass with mass, but it must be able to do better than that in reserve divisions. Furthermore, preparations for bringing these divisions into battle are inadequate. There are ten Territorial divisions at about 40 percent of full strength in the United Kingdom. Territorial divisions fought with valor and skill in the two world wars, but more than a month might pass after the initial mobilization order before these could be equipped, organized and transported to the battlefront. The seven reserve divisions of the French Army could, it is claimed, move to the front much faster; some of them might be in position three days after mobilization. Yet, on the whole, it is doutbful if more than half of the 35 reserve divisions would be ready for active operations 30 days after mobilization began.

Some plans also seem to pay too little attention to the question of how mobilization is to be carried out under prolonged and intensive bombing of depots and communications. The French mobilization of 1939, often held up as a model, is useless as an ex-

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ample. The Luftwaffe did not interfere with either the mobilization in France or the movement of the British Expeditionary Forces across the channel.

SHAPE is giving great attention to the quality of the reserve divisions. Gone are the days when the farmer or mechanic took his uniform from the trunk, drew his rifle, ammunition and rations and marched off, ready to fight. War is infinitely complicated today and even the infantryman has been caught up in its complexity. He must know something about the mortar, the machine gun, the recoilless rifle, the antitank gun. The initial period of training as a conscript does not make an efficient soldier of him. Retraining in new weapons and new techniques is essential, and this is also costly in man-hours lost from the national economy.

Such problems are all recognized, and gifted minds are at work on them. The problem of air cover for mobilization is also under consideration, but there seems to be a blind spot among NATO planners of all nations in regard to it. The continuous Allied air superiority during the latter years of World War II has bred a failure to understand the disorganization, delay and steady losses which are imposed by enemy air superiority. It is the reluctant conclusion of a number of officers who remember the terrible days of 1940 when, save in a few isolated areas, the Germans had almost absolute control of the air, that should a Russian attack develop in the next 18 months conditions in Western Europe would be almost as bad.

There has been an expansion of both quantity and quality in the NATO air forces, which now number about 5,100 tactical aircraft, fighters, fighter-bombers, light bombers and reconnaissance planes, but there are still a number of weaknesses. Undoubtedly the Soviet Air Force has its difficulties also, but in war it is always dangerous to underestimate your opponent. At the beginning of 1953 the Royal Air Force had 1,300 aircraft assigned to NATO—the largest force available to it apart from the United States Air Force. This famous service, however, is in the throes of development and change. Many of its squadrons are still equipped with outmoded Meteor and Vampire jets. Others will be flying United States jets for the next year or two. Eventually, the Swift, Hunter and Javelin fighters, and the Canberra light bomber, will reach the squadrons; then, according to its enthusiastic officers, the R.A.F. will be the superior, qualitatively,

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of any air force in the world. But that day is still distant. Britain saved herself and the Western World in 1940 by having the Spitfire and the Hurricane ready for the Battle of Britain, which opened a year after the war began. It would be unusual for history to accommodate her a second time.

NATO also suffers from problems of command. In war, friction among allies is inevitable. An Eisenhower or a Wellington can keep it in bounds and prevent it from interfering with operations, but in a coöperative enterprise like NATO friction between commanders is apt to break into the open. Serious criticism of General Ridgway and General Gruenther as soldiers is almost totally lacking either at SHAPE or in the NATO councils. But there is a good deal of criticism about the command of the Central Front, which runs from the Kattegat to the Alps and is presently headed by Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin of the French Army, a forceful personality who, however, has had limited experience in high command in comparison to his colleagues in other armies. His largest command during World War II was a corps which he led with distinction in Italy. France, not without reason, was insistent that a French soldier be given the Central Command because the area is vital to her security. The British, however, whose contribution to NATO in men, tanks and planes is important, feel that Field Marshal Montgomery was sidetracked for political reasons. They point out that the Field Marshal was commanding an army a decade ago, that he ended the war the successful commander of an army group, and that although he is 66, Marshal Juin is only one year younger. They also add that they do not think he would be any less easy as a subordinate to the American Supreme Commander than Marshal Juin has proved.

Members of the General Staffs of some of the smaller NATO nations have misgivings about Marshal Juin's plans, saying that these seem to concentrate on protecting France. Of course operational planning is secret, but the emphasis which Marshal Juin placed on the defense of the Rhine River in two speeches aroused alarm. Generally, the smaller NATO nations favor any plan that would concentrate large forces on the flanks of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the area of Marshal Juin's Central Command, in preparation for heavy counterattacks once the Russians had slowed down or were faced with the difficult, but not impossible, barrier of the Rhine. On the whole, however, command problems

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are minor at SHAPE at present. The real difficulties will arise with the formation of a European Army under the European Defense Community Treaty, for this army will be under SHAPE command in addition to the NATO forces.

The tendency of the public to measure the strength of NATO solely in terms of divisions and squadrons has diverted attention from the very important progress made in the development of the logistical basis for war. This phase of activity is likely to come more to the fore in 1953, and here both NATO and SHAPE can claim satisfying results. By the end of this year, the number of operational airfields in Western Europe will have risen from 60 to about 125. Thousands of miles of communications—roads and railroads as well as telephone and telegraph—have been put into operation. Dozens of new radar stations have been built and a start has been made on the vital problem of a practical air warning and defense system. The construction of a pipe line for jet fuel will begin this year. The stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, food, weapons and supplies for maintenance is being accelerated. Depots and barracks are under construction. Even if there is no startling increase in the number of divisions and squadrons available, this will add up to solid progress. The program, known as the "infrastructure" program from a word borrowed from French railroad terminology, has been allotted $955,600,000 over a three year period, and by the end of 1953 approximately $610,000,000 will have been spent. By 1954, the defense of Europe will be on a far sounder logistical basis than ever before.

III

Thus far we have been dealing with our own progress and problems. What has happened on the other side of the hill?

The first effect of NATO on the Soviet Union was to create a military problem where none existed before. Three years ago the military conquest of Western Europe would have been a relatively simple matter for the 22 Russian field divisions in East Germany. At that time, Soviet quantitative and qualitative superiority was so great that only minor adjustments of personnel and supply would have been necessary as preparation for an attack by the group of armies, or "front," as the Russians call it, in East Germany.

Today this is true no longer. The equivalent of 18 Allied divisions in Federal Germany, the strengthening of the tactical air

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forces and the creation of reserves where almost none existed before would require extensive reinforcement of the Soviet forces on the Western front before an attack was made. The NATO build-up has robbed the Russians of the chance of achieving surprise, one of the master keys to success in war. It is because of the belief that the Russians would need some time to complete their preparations for attack, and that these preparations would necessarily become known, that some NATO governments are paying so little attention to the problem of how to mobilize reserves speedily. Again one glimpses a tendency to complacency; there is danger in trusting to a preconceived picture of Russian behavior, or in betting too heavily on the efficiency of intelligence services.

Although Soviet Russia has had to face a new military problem with the growth of the NATO forces, she has effected changes and improvements in her military strength which cannot be overlooked. The satellite armies and air forces have been reorganized and reëquipped. No one can say conclusively why the Russian command has not brought new divisions into Eastern Germany to maintain its former margin of superiority over the West in Central Europe, but the improvement in the position of the satellite fighting services may well be an answer. This process began before the invasion of Korea gave the great impulse to Western rearmament. After a prolonged period of political purge and military repair, it is probable that the Polish Army, 16 divisions strong, is today the equal in number and equipment of the armies of some of our leading European allies. Considerable improvement also has been made in the Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian armies. The Czech army, wracked by purges, is slowly being remolded.

The West has not yet begun to rearm West Germany, the last great reservoir of manpower available in the important Central European area. On their side, however, the Russians—after a series of drastic purges aimed at attaining absolute political reliability—have begun the process of turning the *Bereitschaften* (or Readiness Squads) of the Peoples Police of the East German Republic into a "Peoples Army." It is expected that by June this force will amount to a corps of three divisions, one of them armored.

The Russian potential in Europe, then, cannot be estimated any longer solely by the size of the Soviet Army and Air Force

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stationed in East Germany. If the satellite divisions were thought reliable enough to be used, their strength would double the over-all Russian strength. Russian military thinking still places maximum importance upon the use of manpower in war, despite the development of atomic bombs and guided missiles. Some Allied officers believe that the Russians would not attack from East Germany without a superiority in manpower of at least five to one. They tend to believe that the Soviet command would, therefore, call on reinforcements from the Soviet Union itself before it struck, and predict that the build-up of a five-to-one force in East Germany would take the Russians not less than two months.

Against this theory the point is stressed at SHAPE that the Russians have assembled enormous quantities of matériel in Eastern Europe, and that to begin operations they would have to move only men and weapons into East Germany. After stockpiling for four years, the Russians have on the spot all the supplies required to launch a much larger army than is now stationed there. In an atomic war, such stocks would be essential to the Russians, since their conquest of the Continent would have to be completed before the effect of Allied atomic bombing on their industrial centers was felt by the Soviet armies fighting in the West. Moreover, the preparation of East Germany as a springboard for attack has not been confined to stocking supplies for the ground forces. An extensive system of airfields has been completed, and one of the best-qualified American air commanders estimates that the Soviet Air Force could fly from 4,000 to 6,000 aircraft into East Germany and Czechoslovakia and have them in operation against the West within 48 hours.

The United States correctly places the maximum emphasis upon the effect of atomic bombing in winning a war. But in the opening phase of war the effect of atomic bombing on the Russian fighting services would be relatively at its weakest. We must expect that if the Russians conquered Western Europe they would build up large stocks of all kinds of supplies there; and at home they will have dispersed their industry to the greatest extent possible and will defend primary targets with utter ruthlessness. Atomic bombing may, indeed, prove to be the decisive weapon in any war between Russia and the West, but it may not influence the opening operations in Europe to the degree sometimes supposed.

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IV

The military strength of NATO has reached a point where, in the words of a prominent French soldier, the West must "return to first principles." One of the most important of these principles is standardization. This means not simply standardization of arms and other equipment, in itself a protracted and difficult process, but ultimately the standardization of organization and of tactical concepts. Obviously no approach to the latter can be made until arms, equipment and organization have been standardized. Equipment, especially in weapons, is the key. This was demonstrated in a striking fashion in the manœuvres of September 1952 in Germany when two armored divisions, one French and the other American, attacked together. It was impossible for the older French tanks to keep up with the new United States armor, and the gap which appeared between the two divisions grew as the difference in the rate of their advance increased. Standardization should reach down into the reserve divisions as well. Naturally, the ready divisions must be served first with new Centurion or American tanks. But it is manifestly impossible to expect adequate battle performance from a British Territorial division that has been trained with obsolete tanks.

The extreme complexity of the weapons and techniques of modern war, mentioned before, substantiate the arguments advanced by military leaders for a longer conscription period. Eighteen months, the period adopted by most of the continental nations, do not provide adequate time for training. Those who have had a chance to compare the bearing in manœuvres of conscripts serving 18 months with those serving two years are aware of the superiority in morale, keenness, adaptability and even physical fitness which the longer period imparts.

Differences exist concerning the strategic and tactical concepts which will govern the NATO forces if war comes. The lack of standardization forbids for the moment the adoption of general tactical planning, but it is essential that a single over-all strategic plan for the defense of Europe be framed and adopted. The insistent demand by officers of the smaller NATO nations for what they call the "German plan," which calls for the concentration of strong forces on the flanks of the position in Central Europe, indicates that if a general plan exists at present it is not favored by all of the participating countries. One answer is that until the Federal Republic of West Germany is armed, the NATO forces

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must, because of a shortage of resources, confine themselves to defensive planning based on the Rhine River. In the summer of 1951, General Eisenhower told the writer that the most striking result of the addition of the 12 German divisions to the NATO forces would be the extension of the field of practical operations eastward from the Rhine. At the moment, that river is the eastern limit of any serious defense of Europe. Actions east of the river under present conditions could be merely counter-punches to throw an enemy off balance. They could not stop him. But with the addition of 360,000 German soldiers and a German tactical air force the NATO shield can be edged eastward, and defensive planning can be enlarged to account for areas which now are directly threatened by the Russian front in East Germany. One of these is the entrance through Schleswig into the Jutland peninsula. Another is the huge industrial complex which we call the Ruhr; it could not be defended now by the British, Dutch and Belgian divisions which, with Canadian, Norwegian and Danish forces, make up the Northern Group under the command of General Sir Richard Gale. Still a third is the Netherlands north of the Rhine, which would be left almost undefended by a strategy based on holding the line of that river.

Once the European Defense Community Treaty is ratified, the rearmament of Germany will take a somewhat longer time than enthusiasts in the Pentagon believe. The Germans, it must be remembered, are starting from scratch. Their own military planners believe it will be 18 months, at least, before German forces are in the field, and two years before the 12 divisions and the tactical air force are completely organized, equipped and trained.

Two other factors will influence the quality of the new German Army. One is geographical; this army will not be drawn from the great military recruiting areas of Imperial and Hitlerite Germany like Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, but from areas whose troops have had an "uneven" record in the past. Another is financial. The German politicians apparently believe that rearmament can be accomplished without any reduction of living standards and without disturbing the economic prosperity of the Federal Republic; as noted above, income and corporation taxes have been cut at a time when other potential members of E.D.C. are tightening the screws to raise money.

So much has been made of the difficulties of obtaining legislative sanction by the E.D.C. nations for German rearmament that

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further comment may be redundant. It should be understood, however, that part of the reluctance springs from the old fears and dislike of Germany. When they were frightened by the approaching shadow of the Red Army, France and the other Western nations contemplated German rearmament with something approaching equanimity. The Russian policy of relative quiet in Europe, plus the vigorous approach of the Germans to their new position, have created doubts.

NATO's responsibilities are not limited to the Central Front, although that is where the bulk of planning and resources have been concentrated. As the organization has developed, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey has raised new military problems for its commanders in southeastern Europe—and new problems for the Soviets as well. There is pressure within NATO for greater emphasis on the rearmament of the Turkish, Greek and, eventually, Jugoslav forces. It is argued that once they have been given modern weapons, their units reorganized, and sufficient officers and noncommissioned officers trained in modern weapons, their favorable strategic position on the left flank of any Russian advance into Western Europe will help deter the Russians from attacking.

Such reasoning has been called academic in some quarters. The Russians, it is stressed, have revitalized the fighting services of the satellite nations which face these states. It will be some time before the Turkish Army can be considered fit for active operations against a mechanized enemy; and the Jugoslavs, who have about 30 divisions, organized on the Russian Table of Organization, are only now beginning active coöperation with their neighbors. Yet the movement toward creating a common strategy in this area is growing. The forces available there, combined with the tactical air power exercised by United States and British carriers in the Mediterranean and the strategic air power represented by Allied bases in Africa, do raise NATO's prospects considerably. Eventually the change in the whole aspect of the strategic situation in southeastern Europe might have as important an effect on Soviet plans as German rearmament.

V

Where does NATO go from here? Europe is changing fast and prophecy is difficult, but it seems safe to say that there will be only slight expansion this year of the number of ready and re-

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serve divisions available to the NATO command. Ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty would promise strong German reinforcements within the next two years. There will be, however, a steady increase in the efficiency of the ready and reserve divisions in 1953, a result of the flow of new ground weapons, such as the Centurion tanks ordered by the United States, and new aircraft. New weapons, plus better training, plus the extension of standardization bit by bit promise a much greater efficiency than exists today.

Finally, NATO's defense of Europe will rest on a much more solid logistical foundation by the end of this year. The redisposition of airfields and supply bases and completion of the present construction program for all "infrastructure" items promise to give the forces now under arms much greater staying power than heretofore. Much must still be done, however, on the problem of preparing reserve divisions for swift intervention in the battle.

It is all too clear that the NATO states, with their economies based primarily on industry, cannot match Russian mass with mass and simultaneously maintain industrial superiority. The alternative is greater efficiency in the use of men and matériel—especially armor and tactical aircraft—so that superiority of quality will compensate for inferiority in numbers. To the extent that this is practised, the West can be considered to be moving—despite the loss of a sense of urgency—toward a position where the defense of Europe will be practicable. But time is needed for the construction of an efficient defense based on highly trained and formidably equipped ready divisions and reserves. Can we count on having time to construct forces of this type? If not, then there must be a return to the mass goals set at Lisbon.

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INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

By Mohammad Hatta

THE Republic of Indonesia, born immediately after World War II when a colony became a free country, strongly desires peace. Only in a peaceful atmosphere can it rehabilitate its war-damaged economy and lift its citizens out of the poverty in which they have lived so long. Even when Indonesians were struggling to free themselves from the control of the Netherlands, freedom was not their only objective. Leaders of the national movement always insisted that an independent and sovereign Indonesia was simply a prerequisite to the achievement of a pattern of living that would guarantee the prosperity of the people. Their slogan was "A sovereign, independent, just and prosperous Indonesia." Now that the country has sovereign and independent status, its citizens—of whom there are more than 75,000,000—demand that their government carry out the twin ideals of social justice and prosperity.

The Republic of Indonesia realizes that coöperation with other countries is essential if these ideals are to become a reality. It has made the United Nations the focal point of its over-all policy of seeking good relations with all other nations. More specifically, its objectives in foreign policy are: 1, to defend the freedom of the people and guard the safety of the state; 2, to obtain from overseas those articles of daily necessity required for increasing the standard of living of the population—food, especially rice, consumer goods of various kinds, medicines, and so on; 3, to obtain capital equipment to rebuild what had been destroyed or damaged, and capital for industrialization, new construction and the partial mechanization of agriculture; 4, to strengthen principles of international law and to aid in achieving social justice on an international scale, in line with the U.N. Charter, with special reference to Articles 1, 2 and 55, in particular by endeavoring within the U.N. framework to help people still living within the colonial system to achieve freedom; 5, to place special emphasis on initiating good relations with neighboring countries, the majority of which have in the past occupied a position similar to Indonesia; and 6, to seek fraternity among nations through the realization of the ideals enshrined in the *Panchasila* (Five Postulates) which constitute the basic Indonesian philosophy. In short,

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Indonesia will pursue a policy of peace and of friendship with all nations on a basis of mutual respect and noninterference with each other's structure of government.

As a people just become free from colonialism, Indonesians are jealous of their country's independence. Slogans such as "liberty," "humanity," "social justice," "the brotherhood of nations" and "lasting peace," which were a sustaining force in the Indonesian national movement, are looked upon as ideals to be translated into practice. The Indonesian people, therefore, place a high value on international intercourse and are confident that what they long for in this respect will eventually become a reality. All these feelings help determine the country's foreign policy and the means employed to carry it out.

It is possible that, viewed from the angle of *Realpolitik*, some of these aims seem to lie outside the realm of "real and practical policy." The student of history, however, is conscious that much which was previously considered utopian or impossible has come to pass. Who would have believed 15 years ago that India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan and Indonesia would become independent and sovereign? Who would then have thought it possible that Indonesia, assisted by the Netherlands itself, would be accepted as a member of an international organization such as the United Nations? Many ideas tabu to classical economists and put down as pure Socialist dreams have today become accepted in capitalist countries as a means of achieving "industrial peace." The development and acceptance of what is called "social security" is an instance. The influence of such ideas is to be found in the Charter of the United Nations and in the work of the I.L.O. The goals of "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development" are set down in Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations. Most of the nations of the world assume today that the attainment of these ideals should be stimulated by government and not handed over, as previously, to the "free play of economic forces."

The objectives which the Republic of Indonesia seeks to achieve through its foreign policy should therefore not be considered merely utopian. But while some are of topical importance, others are ideals for future realization. For this reason the foreign policy of the Republic has short-term and long-term aspects. The short-term policy relates to matters which must be translated into practice now or in the near future—those affecting Indo-

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nesia's particular interests or those connected with international tensions capable of affecting the peace of the world. But long-term objectives, which require a change in the spirit of international thinking and morality, must also be emphasized in order that they will receive attention. Thus the long-term policy is intimately bound up with the short-term policy.

II

Talk of the brotherhood of man in a world in which racial discrimination makes possible the existence of such a policy as "apartheid," or talk of everlasting peace in the atmosphere of the cold war, indeed seems incongruous. Be that as it may, the Republic of Indonesia feels it its duty to strengthen the ideals of peace, however weak its voice or feeble its power. It believes that these ideals will become reality in the long run. It believes in the common sense of mankind. The peoples' desire for peace, as opposed to their lust for war, becomes stronger from century to century. Evil often prevails over the forces for good and destroys what civilization has built up over the ages. But man, rational by nature, will eventually make a positive and definite choice of good over evil, peace over war. The discovery of weapons of war which become progressively more terrifying and destructive will strengthen men's love of peace and arouse hatred of war. It is this conviction that leads the Republic of Indonesia to believe that the struggle for world peace is today a policy based on reality.

This explains why the Republic of Indonesia has not aligned itself with either the American bloc or the Russian bloc in the existing conflict, and why it is not prepared to participate in any third bloc designed to act as a counterpoise to the two giant blocs. To do that would merely create new suspicions and new enmities. And though Indonesia's policy has often been termed one of neutrality, it is not that either. "Neutrality" has a precise meaning in international law, defining a condition of impartiality toward belligerent states. Writing in the "Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences," Philip C. Jessup states that "the modern legal status of neutrality implies the impartiality of one state towards two or more belligerent states." And he says truly that "it may well be argued that in the present or future conditions of world solidarity, neutrality is an antisocial status." As a member of the United Nations, the Republic of Indonesia cannot adopt an attitude of neutrality. It is committed to international solidarity. Articles 41

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and 43 of the U. N. Charter do not give any option to the course of action open to a member when the Security Council has declared the behavior of another state to be unlawful.

But in practice, of course, international solidarity has not been achieved; world solidarity has cracked into two pieces. Under present conditions it would not be possible for Indonesia to be other than neutral if a war broke out. The existence of war is a special case in the life of nations.

Unfortunately, Indonesia has to face a situation entirely different from the one forecast during the years of World War II. The world envisaged then is reflected in the ideology of the Charter, but the postwar world is characterized by the conflict between the American and the Soviet blocs. The opposition between the two, due to different economic systems, has been heightened by a conflict of ideologies in every particular. The cold war is an ideological war—the "free world" versus "the peoples' democracies." The Western countries with similar culture and political concepts seek safety alongside the United States, which possesses great economic and industrial power. The Communist states behind the Iron Curtain form a compact bloc stretching from Middle Europe to the Pacific Ocean and covering a large portion of Asia, with a total population of not less than 800,000,000 souls—an almost limitless reserve of manpower for their armed forces. In such a situation, international life is dominated by power politics.

Western nations tend to hold that there is no middle position for the weaker countries, and that they must choose between the one bloc or the other. It seems logical to them that nations which desire to enjoy independence should choose the free world, and they remind neutral countries of the fate of Belgium and the Netherlands in the Second World War. As already stated, however, the policy of the Republic of Indonesia is not one of neutrality, because it is not constructed in reference to belligerent states but for the purpose of strengthening and upholding peace. Indonesia plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various international problems. It terms this policy "independent," and further characterizes it by describing it as independent and "active." By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension generated by the two blocs, through endeavors supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations. As an illustration of this policy may be

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cited the efforts made by Indonesia, in concert with the Arab and Asian countries, to put an end to the war in Korea.

This island archipelago is in a very different kind of position from that in which the Netherlands and Belgium found themselves at the beginning of World War II. It does not share a common boundary with any of the possible belligerents. Indonesia, it may be said, is bounded by the British Navy and the American Navy, which control the Indian and Pacific Oceans. But no one can say that Britain and the United States have evil designs on Indonesia. On the contrary, they are desirous of seeing Indonesia remain independent and become prosperous. Are they not the very people who hold that the infiltration of Communism can be prevented only by raising the economic level of the masses?

Further, Indonesia does not have common frontiers with Soviet Russia or China. A direct threat from that direction to Indonesian independence neither exists nor is possible. Only the domestic Communist movement is a political factor in Indonesia, but in this regard Indonesia's position is no different from that of the other democratic countries. Consequently, there is no pressing need for her to make a choice between the two big blocs. Her independent policy keeps her from enmity with either party, preserves her from the damage to her own interests that would follow from taking sides, and permits her to be friends with all nations on a basis of mutual respect. The desire to put political relations with other nations on a footing of mutual respect, despite differences in the governmental structure and ideology, is a primary factor in this approach to international relations. Nations recently become independent are strongly influenced by national sentiment and feel the need to maintain their self-respect. The memory of the colonial status that bound them for centuries makes them resist anything they consider an attempt to colonize them again, whether by economic or ideological domination. This psychological factor profoundly influences Indonesia in her insistence upon an independent policy.

III

The foundation of this policy was laid by the Indonesian Government in 1948, while it was still engaged in a struggle against the Netherlands to maintain its new independence and at the same time to free the whole of the Indonesian people from foreign rule. (As a consequence of the first Netherlands' military action

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and steady whittling away of its territories, the Republic of Indonesia found itself at that time confined to extreme West and Middle Java and North and Central Sumatra.) While the leftist parties under the leadership of the Communist Party of Indonesia were ranged in opposition, the Indonesian Government made the following policy statement to the Working Committee of the Provisional Parliament on September 2, 1948:

> Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The Indonesian Government is of opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a *passive* party in the area of international politics but that it should be an *active* agent entitled to decide its own standpoint. . . . The policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face. . . . The lines of Indonesia's policy cannot be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has *its* own interests to service.

Prime Minister Wilopo, who assumed office on May 22, 1952, redefined the Government's independent policy in the following significant words:

> When the Government stated that its conduct of foreign affairs would be in an "independent" manner, the underlying idea was to make it clear that, in face of the fact that there are two opposed trends in international circles which have given rise to two blocs—the Western bloc with the United States and its allies, and the Eastern bloc with its adherents—the Republic of Indonesia has decided to adopt an independent attitude in the sense that:
>
> (a) it does not permanently take sides by pledging itself to either of the two blocs which are in controversy with each other;
>
> (b) it does not pledge itself permanently to keep aloof or to remain neutral in every incident which may arise out of controversy between the two blocs.
>
> On the other hand, as it has subsequently turned out that the statement regarding an "independent attitude"—the nature of which is wholly negative—has given rise to misunderstanding, or at least some doubt, among political parties in our own country or between one or both of the opposed blocs, the Government has given the additional clarification that its "independent attitude" is of a positive nature in the sense that, when a problem or incident arises due to the controversy between the two blocs—or which more or less has a bearing on such a controversy—the Republic of Indonesia will continue to base its attitude on its independence of action, taking into consideration:
>
> (a) its own conception of its aim and purpose as a sincere, loyal and serious member of the United Nations, and
>
> (b) its belief in the importance of this state and nation as a factor of great influence in the immediate as well as remote future.

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In view of its purpose and aim as a member of the United Nations, our Republic will rally to or support every effort within the framework of the United Nations to do away with, or at least grind off, the sharpness of the controversy between the two trends or blocs, so as to ward off as much as possible the cropping up of a large-scale conflict that may set off a third world war.

As regards its belief in the importance of this state and nation, the Republic of Indonesia will adopt a definite standpoint and strive for a decision or settlement of every problem and incident in order to preserve, protect and, wherever possible, enhance and strengthen the interests of the state and its people in keeping with the conditions or pledges which it may have to accept when arriving at the decision or settlement indicated above.

First and foremost, we must see that the independence, sovereignty and territory of the state will not be infringed upon or threatened, and that the Republic of Indonesia does not become involved in any armed conflict except for the defense of its independence and sovereignty against a direct attack launched from without or within.

It will be seen from the above statement that the independent policy is only one aspect of the Indonesian foreign policy, which as a whole centers around a policy of peace that will guarantee the country's freedom. As a young state not possessed of sufficient military strength to defend the multitude of islands, large and small, which compose its territory, the Republic thus seeks to safeguard its independence. Its armed forces are wholly defensive; its foreign policy aims to prevent the country from being attacked. Indonesians believe that the possibility of attack will be minimized so long as the country adheres to its independent policy and actively tries to prevent the outbreak of World War III.

Inherent in this independent policy is an endeavor to seek friendship with peoples belonging to either bloc, or to none, on a basis of respect for each other's independence. In the process of strengthening such friendships, Indonesia is prepared to receive intellectual, material and moral assistance from any country whatsoever, provided there is no lessening of, or threat to, her independence and sovereignty. Indeed, we are aware that at present, when the task of national construction is just beginning to be tackled, we are receiving more from the international world than we can give to it. But the time will come when we shall make a real contribution to world progress and to the strengthening of international organizations.

Of course, foreign policy is not determined just by hopes and desires, nor by the likes and dislikes of statesmen and national

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leaders. Objective factors play a great part in determining its nature and keeping it on a given course despite changes in the complexion of political parties or of the group that holds power at a given moment. Postwar conditions have supplied one such set of factors for Indonesia. When the Kingdom of the Netherlands transferred sovereignty on December 27, 1949, the new régime inherited a devastated land. Furthermore, it found itself with an empty treasury; the budget for 1950 envisaged a deficit of 1.5 billion guilders, approximately 17 percent of the total—a huge sum for a poor nation that had no facilities for raising capital within the country. The Government marshalled all its energies to increase domestic production, but, as could have been guessed, the transfer of sovereignty had a strong influence on the labor movement in Indonesia, for workers had never been permitted to organize freely and had had to subsist on extremely low wages. Labor hoped that the changed political situation would bring about immediate economic benefit, and the stringent circumstances in which the whole country was placed by continuously rising prices fanned discontent. Along with claims for increased wages which were reasonable enough in the circumstances, there were demands for nationalization of industries and for a change in the management of various businesses which, labor felt, were refusing to abandon the old colonial attitude. This feeling was exploited by radical leaders bent on creating turmoil, and there were political strikes along with those prompted by understandable economic motives.

The task of creating order was a difficult one. While the Netherlands troops were still in Indonesia, there was an uprising calling itself the "Army of the Just King" under the leadership of a man named Westerling, an ex-captain of the Netherlands Army, who hoped to seize Bandung. This *comitadji* was supported by other former members of the Netherlands Army, and there was a mutiny in Makassar, capital city of the Celebes, led by an Indonesian captain of the Netherlands forces there,[1] evidently coördinated with Westerling's activities around Bandung. Not long after that, a unit of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army in the island of Ambon carried out a coup d'état for the purpose of

[1] The Netherlands army of more than 100,000 men was constituted in two sections, one made up entirely of Netherlanders called the Royal Netherlands Army, and another known as the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army composed largely of Indonesians with Netherlands officers in the upper echelons. By the terms of the Round Table Agreement, Indonesians serving in the latter were permitted to opt for integration into the army of the Republic.

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setting up a "Republic of the South Moluccas." All these difficulties were overcome, but at the cost of much effort.

In addition to these uprisings, there has been an insurrectionary movement termed the *Darul Islam* which has been especially active in West Java, Middle Java and South Celebes. The objective of its members is the overthrow of the Republic and the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state according to their special conceptions. Remnants of the former "Army of the Just King," under the leadership of a Netherlander named Van Kleef, united themselves with this movement. It has done much damage, terrorizing the people and showing no respect for human life. The Indonesian Government has been doing its best to put an end to it and successive Cabinets have given the question of security priority.

Although Indonesia had been administered as one unit up to the Japanese occupation, the rise of nationalism led the Netherlands Government to believe that cutting up the archipelago would help in perpetuating its rule. Following two military actions in 1947 and 1948, therefore, it split Indonesia into 16 separate units, linked administratively on a federal basis. The mutinies in Bandung and Makassar prompted a strong demand by the people, first in West Java and East Indonesia and then throughout the whole country, that the Indonesian Government put an end to this arrangement to divide and rule. Although a federal system is, in fact, suitable for such a far-flung archipelago as Indonesia, and might be expected to strengthen the feeling of unity, the manner and timing of the move by the Netherlands Indies Government had aroused such antipathy toward ideas of federation that it was found necessary to make the change from a federal to a unitary state before a constituent assembly could be formed to draw up a definitive constitution.

These are instances of the problems that beset the young Republic. Internal consolidation is the primary task. The Government must concentrate on the task of building up the nation, and it must show evidence of economic and social betterment if it is to offset the influence of agitation by radical circles. A foreign policy that aligned the country with either bloc of the Great Powers would render this internal task infinitely more difficult.

Influencing this decision to pursue an independent policy is, again, the historic ideal of peace and friendship with all races which is so deeply imbedded in the Indonesian people. And it is

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reinforced by the objective facts of Indonesia's geographical situation. Nature has ordained that Indonesia, lying between two continents—the Asian mainland and Australia—and washed by the waters of two vast oceans—the Indian and the Pacific—must maintain intercourse with lands stretching in a great circle around it. From time immemorial, it has had relationships with all of them, varied as they are. Its position at the very heart of a network of communications has for centuries made the archipelago a halting place for all races and a staging base in international travel. When one considers that the territory of Indonesia extends for more than 3,000 miles and is composed of thousands of islands, large and small, the magnitude of the problem of maintaining the security of the country is apparent. So extensive an area cannot be defended purely by military strength.

For economic reasons also, Indonesia must have relationships with diverse countries. The land is rich in natural resources and raw materials, but the country has not reached the stage where it can convert its raw materials into finished industrial goods. A large portion of its economy is still dependent on export. Indonesia cannot possibly reconcile herself to being tied to the economies of a few nations, all the more so because certain articles of export such as rubber are subject to much fluctuation in price. Only by adhering to a peaceful yet independent policy can Indonesia adequately safeguard its economic interests.

IV

Last but not least of the factors which shape the foreign policy of the Indonesian Republic is the *Panchasila,* the Five Postulates that constitute the basic national philosophy, referred to at the beginning of this article. No group that holds the reins of government in the Republic, no matter what its political affiliations, will be able to carry on the affairs of state if it does not strive to act in harmony with these principles.

This is not the place to elaborate the state philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia, but a few of its aspects must be mentioned, for our friends abroad will never really understand our policies unless they realize how important these principles are to us. The *Panchasila,* contained in the preamble to the Constitution, carries the acknowledgment that the Indonesian Republic is based upon belief in Divine Omnipotence, humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. Acknowledgment of Divine

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Omnipotence does not mean that Indonesia is a theocratic state. It should be construed as a declaration by the Indonesian people to the effect that the majority of them believe in God, and, as a corollary, acknowledge the existence of certain basic moral values. Thereby the Indonesian nation acknowledges the existence of a Hidden Power that guides mankind in its actions toward the path of truth, justice, goodness and honesty. By making belief in Divine Omnipotence the first of the Five Postulates, the Indonesian people have placed national policy on a strong moral base.

The other Postulates—humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice— derive from the ideals that animated the Indonesian national movement and gave content and spirit to its struggle. All who took part in that struggle pledged themselves to put these ideals into practice as soon as a free Indonesia had been achieved. The *Panchasila* was accepted "in order to enjoy prosperity, peace and freedom in society and in the completely sovereign and constitutional State of Free Indonesia which shall be governed by justice." The objectives were embodied in the Constitution, to give continuous guidance to the administration and be incorporated in governmental programs. The ideal of "prosperity" cannot be realized to the full without international coöperation, but our own domestic efforts can take us toward it. Realization of the ideals of "peace" and of a "free Indonesia" depend partially on our relations with the outside world.

The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, devised in harmony with the ideals of the *Panchasila,* has provided that the foreign policy of the country will be worked out in a democratic manner through partnership between the executive and legislative branches of the government. Governmental action looking to treaties and agreements with foreign countries is carefully scrutinized by Parliament. Unless otherwise specified by legislation, agreements and treaties are invalid until ratified by Parliament. Similarly Indonesian participation in an existing international agreement, or abrogation of any agreement or treaty, will have to be carried out under constitutional forms. There is almost no possibility that the government could enter into a secret treaty or agreement without the awareness of Parliament. In order to strengthen the ideals of peace and international solidarity, the Constitution provides that the "Government shall work for the inclusion of the Republic of Indonesia in international organiza-

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tions," and shall "endeavor to solve its differences with other states in a peaceful manner, and in that connection to ask for and accept international arbitration or the jurisdiction of international courts."

The provisions of the Constitution show clearly that the aim of Indonesian foreign policy is to strengthen the ideals of peace and international solidarity as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. The country's "independent and active" policy is an expression of these aims. Internal consolidation is, to some extent, dependent upon the success of this independent policy; and, conversely, Indonesia will assume international significance, morally and materially, only when internal consolidation has been achieved. The Republic of Indonesia is aware that it is too weak a state to exert an effective influence on the relationships of the two opposed blocs in international politics, but it believes in the moral strength of its policy of conciliation.

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RICE POLITICS

By John Kerry King

RICE is the basic food of more than half the population of the world. South from Korea to Indonesia, and westward to Iran, including the vast populations of India, China and Japan, rice is the staple upon which the diet of a billion and a half people is based. Linguistic terms indicate its fundamental significance. In the Thai language, for example, food may be divided into two categories, *khaw* meaning "rice," and *kab khaw* meaning, literally, "with rice." Food is either rice or something eaten with it.

In a restless Asia, revolutionary in mood, caught between two opposing ideological and political forces, the question of the supply of this commodity upon which life itself is based has far-reaching political implications. The major problem in the struggle to keep south and southeast Asia free of Communist domination is the standard of living of their peoples and the development of their economic resources. In 1952 Communist China emerged as an exporter of rice—a dramatic change after so many years of scarcity; and the Communists have made much of the fact in their propaganda in Asia, offering "New China" as an example of the productive superiority of the Communist system. There is urgent need for efforts to help the peoples of south and southeast Asia understand that the pretense of plenty and prosperity in China is a myth. And it is even more urgent that they be made to realize that increased production and a higher standard of living are possible in their own countries without the adoption of totalitarian methods. The struggle of the "East" versus the "West" in Asia is, in part, a race for production, and rice is the symbol and substance of it.

II

Rice has been scarce in the Far East throughout modern history, but the shortage has become even more acute since the Second World War. Wartime damage and postwar political disturbances caused a sharp decline in production and shipments. In 1934 international shipments of rice totaled 9,000,000 tons, but by 1948 they had dropped to 3,330,000. By the end of 1952 shipments had increased only to 5,000,000, a little over half the figure

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for the peak year 1934. Meanwhile the population explosion in Asia has continued unabated.

The prewar surplus producers of rice were Burma, Indo-China and Thailand, in that order. Philippine and Indonesian rice production was approximately equal to local needs. The main deficit areas were India and Ceylon, China, Japan and Malaya. The bulk of Indo-China's surplus moved within the French Union. Japan's needs were formerly met by "internal shipments" from the captive economies of Korea and Formosa, leaving Thailand and Burma as the primary exporters to meet the requirements of Malaya, of India and Ceylon, and of China. Burma was then a British colony and her trade in rice, as well as the brokerage, financing and transport of rice for Thailand, was firmly in the hands of British dealers. Trade was oriented to European market conditions, and international and domestic prices were dominated by London brokers. In the prewar era, considerable amounts of Asian rice were shipped to Europe and Africa.

The picture has been completely altered in the postwar period. Although the export surplus of Viet-Nam and Cambodia (small by prewar figures) continues to move within the French Union, all of Thailand's and Burma's rice now remains in the Far East. Today export sales and distribution are almost entirely in Asian hands, and the major part of the trade is carried on by contracts between governments.

Both production and movement of rice were badly dislocated by the war. Burma's 1946 crop was about half that of 1934, and her exports of rice dropped from 3,500,000 tons to 500,000. Years of war in Indo-China have cut exports in this commodity from 1,500,000 tons in 1940 to 9,000 tons in 1947. At the end of the war, abandoned rice land in southeast Asia totaled nearly 12,000,000 acres. Reclamation is not yet complete, and is not a task to be accomplished by bringing in a few bulldozers, for they toboggan over the tough, deep-rooted jungle grasses which have filled the paddy land. Moreover, thousands of agricultural laborers have sought the greater safety and higher wages of urban areas, and farmers are often short of help.

A further obstacle to production is the lack of transport facilities, not yet reëstablished after wartime dislocation. Thus, the movement of rice to markets, and of consumer goods to the farmer, is slow and costly; and lack of consumer goods has caused many rice farmers to produce only subsistence crops. Through-

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out south and southeast Asia, thousands of draft animals died of disease or have been killed for food by roving bandit gangs or, during the war, by Japanese army units living off the land. In some areas, a wartime legacy of disputed land titles, back taxes and rent remains to be settled.

Thailand provides the only exception to the general picture of postwar chaos. Although the country suffered a certain amount of damage to its bridges and railways as a result of Allied bombings, its agricultural economy remained intact. No statistics are available on Thai rice production during the war, but there is little reason to believe that any appreciable drop took place. Stocks on hand at the end of the war amounted to about 800,000 tons. It is clear enough that Thai rice helped feed the Japanese armies and make up deficits in southeast areas under Japanese occupation. There was a remarkable expansion of rice cultivation during and immediately after the war, but though this injects new political and economic factors into the picture, it does not solve the problem of shortage in Asia. Western rice is more expensive, and has to be paid for with hard currency, and the fact remains that 90 percent of the world's production is in east Asia. Increases or decreases elsewhere have but marginal effect on the basic problems.

At the end of the war, United States policy was directed toward the general objective of supporting the Nationalist Government in China and helping it develop as the leading Asiatic Power. Up to the time the Communists captured Shanghai in 1950, the United States provided China with large amounts of rice purchased in Thailand for emergency distribution under the auspices of UNRRA and the Chinese officials. Britain concluded a treaty with Thailand on January 1, 1946, which called for deliveries of 1,500,000 tons of rice, as partial war indemnity; but the agreement proved unenforceable, and to prevent the diversion of rice to illicit trade channels a tripartite agreement was concluded among the United Kingdom, the United States and Thailand on May 6, 1946, as a substitute for the Anglo-Thai Treaty. Under this arrangement, export of rice by Thailand was to be made only in accordance with allocations recommended by the Combined Food Board. This resulted in better feeling all around, though it did not altogether end the smuggling. Official international allotment of rice was discontinued at the end of 1949, though most of the world's export rice continues to be allo-

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cated by contracts between governments. Burma nationalized her rice trade in 1946.

Representatives of countries where there are shortages now negotiate with Thai officials in Bangkok and with Burma officials in Rangoon for allocations based on current crop estimates, at prices set about six months in advance of delivery. Since world prices are continually increasing, the buyers may get delivery at prices 25 percent below prevailing market prices. This means, in effect, a type of subsidization of neighboring economies by Thailand, and it also tempts these countries to sell part of their allocation. While the Thai and Burmans attempt to get higher prices for their only significant export crop, the receiving governments exercise pressure to keep prices down, appealing on humanitarian grounds and sometimes threatening economic reprisals.

In view of the fact that there has been a seller's market since 1946, Thai policy has been moderate and restrained. Malayan tin and rubber, Ceylonese rubber, Indian hemp, textiles and iron, and Indonesian oil and rubber are not being sold at prices fixed in advance in a rising market. There are, however, powerful interest groups in the rice supplying countries which profit from the system. About one-third of Thai's rice surplus is sold on the open market by private concerns. Export licenses officially cost $5.00 per ton of rice, but private traders may have to pay as much as $65.00 per ton for them.

Japan's changing position greatly affects the whole situation. From 1946 through much of 1952 the United States made up the Japanese food deficits. Now that the Japanese Peace Treaty is in effect, and with such prewar sources of rice as Korea and Formosa closed to her, Japan naturally has had to buy on the world market. Her desperate need makes her willing to offer top prices and attractive trade concessions; and in order to pay for these purchases she must export textiles, electrical and industrial goods. Thus Japan enters into marketing competition with both Britain and India and with the United States. In hope of "getting Japan off the American taxpayer's back" the United States Government has helped Japan rebuild her industry and reëstablish her export trade, especially in the Far East. And, cut off from trade with China, Japan must somehow not only regain her prewar export trade levels in south and southeast Asia, but must surpass them. Although the potential market of this area is

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great, present ability to absorb import goods there is limited. United States policy is directed toward helping both Great Britain and Japan reëstablish their economic stability, and our dilemma in this area where the export products of those two countries come into competition is further complicated by the fact that United States export business interests have greatly increased there in the postwar period.

III

What of substitutes for rice? At the present time there is a world shortage of rice and a world surplus of wheat, and wheat has been brought into Japan, India and other Far Eastern countries with the idea of partially substituting it for rice in the Asian diet. This may be possible on a small scale, but Asian agricultural holdings, farming methods and climates are not suitable to mass production of wheat, and reliance on imported wheat to make up Asian food deficits would raise serious political and economic problems. The United States, Canada and the Soviet Union are the major producers of wheat. It is true that at the end of 1949 Australian wheat cost 44 percent less than an equal amount of Burman rice in India. But such figures are misleading. Although wheat grain may undersell rice in Asia, wheat must pass through several expensive processes before it is ready for consumption. The finished wheat product on the dinner table is not cheaper than rice.

A more practical course is to seek to expand Asian rice production to meet the needs of the region. Studies made by the Food and Agriculture Organization indicate that output could be greatly increased, on land now under cultivation, by improvement in seed, plant breeding, irrigation and use of fertilizers, and by better methods of milling, storage and transport. Also, the nutritive properties of rice could be greatly increased—and better nutrition is, after all, the objective of the whole effort—by consumption of less highly polished rice. Milling interests would oppose such a change to brown rice, and it would require some adjustment by the Asian people.

In any event, a long road stretches between scientific investigation and the lessons of experimental farms, and the practices of the rice farmer. The farmers are not now increasing production significantly, and feel no inducement to do so. The cash incentive to higher production has little meaning to many Asian rice

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farmers, who have little capacity for intelligent saving and no picture of the use of cash surplus. Especially if consumer goods were not available, increased cash income per ton of paddy would, most likely, cause them to cut production, for they would merely conclude that they could maintain the current level of subsistence with less work. Economic and sociological changes are the precondition for greater production, and they cannot be achieved quickly by non-totalitarian methods.

But the Asian people know that they want more food, and the people as a whole know that they want better standards of living. The Communists are well aware of the significance of increased production, and as noted above they are holding up "New China" to south and southeast Asia to demonstrate the superiority of the Communist system. The peoples of the region know nothing about conditions in China except what they are told by Communist Party propaganda, and they are comparing the conditions under which they live with the myth of a prosperous and well fed China. When they are told that the United States far out-produces the Soviet Union, and that American farmers and factory workers live in luxury compared with the conditions of Russian and Chinese people, they grant it readily enough—but it does not seem to them to bear on their own situation. What the people in southeast Asia are interested in is how conditions in their own countries relate to what they think is the progress made in China.

Totalitarian methods sometimes bring impressive short-term results. A Communist does not concern himself with how to induce a rice farmer to adopt new varieties of seed, or to use different methods of production, milling, storage and transport. Under a Communist régime individual preferences make little or no difference. The individual does what he is ordered to do. Refugees making their way out of China bring constant reports that experimental farms established and financed by the United Nations and the United States have been taken over by Communists, the fruits of their experiments accepted, and their teachings forced upon Chinese farmers.

The claim of the Communists that China has ceased to be an area where rice is scarce, and that it now has enough for export, has impressed the people of south and southeast Asia. The details of the shipments of 300,000 tons to India and Ceylon in 1952 were left vague by the party-line press throughout Asia, but an

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effective propaganda campaign portrayed the shipments as great humanitarian gestures by "New China" toward her Asian brothers in their hour of need, and also as testimonials to Chinese prosperity and plenty.

The China–Ceylon rice deal was, in fact, a barter agreement in which China traded rice for Ceylon's strategic rubber. Exact prices paid for the rubber and for the rice have not been published, but students of the trade in the Far East believe that both products changed hands at prices slightly above world market quotations; but, in an even-barter exchange, price means little. The arrangement between India and China was not based on a trade agreement, but was an outright purchase by India, which the Communists nonetheless tried to disguise as charity. China had offered to sell India 50,000 tons of rice at a time when southern states of India were faced with a period of acute shortage due to a crop failure; and after protracted negotiation India agreed to buy the rice at a price above world market rates. However, when delivery date neared, the Chinese Government demanded, as a condition to the delivery, that the rice be distributed through an Indian Communist relief organization. The Indian Government flatly refused, and exposed the Chinese political objective. Finally, the Chinese Government dropped the condition and delivered the rice, preserving what face it could. But though this part of the propaganda offensive fizzled, the myth of plenty and prosperity inside "New China" remains in the minds of many Asians.

Has production actually increased in China to the point where she has an export surplus of rice? According to Peking figures,[1] 1951 production almost (99.4 percent) reached the figure for 1936, China's peak production year of that decade. In 1936, China had a net import deficit of 246,000 tons, her lowest import figure for the decade. (In 1938, her rice imports were 380,000 tons.) No one has ever suggested that there was enough rice for everyone in China in 1936, even with the 246,000 tons imported. The Peking figures indicate that there is less rice available in China today than in 1936, and there has been a tremendous population increase since that year. But China is now exporting rice! And the government has contracted to export 254,000 tons of rice per year to Ceylon for a five-year period beginning in 1953. The only possible conclusion is that the rice is being squeezed out

[1] *China Reconstructs,* May–June, 1952, page 4.

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of the already underfed Chinese people for purposes of international politics.

The game is not a new one for the Communists. Stalin played it with the wheat farmers of the Ukraine in the 1920's. His objectives were to gain foreign exchange, and to eliminate, by forced starvation, an unwanted "kulak" class. Peking has two additional objectives—to press its political offensive in south and southeast Asia, and to obtain supplies of strategic rubber.

But we cannot defeat this game merely by exposing it. The only effective checkmates to Communist efforts are increased production and better standards of living for the Malayans, the Burmans, the Indians, the Ceylonese, Indonesians and the other people of Asia—standards raised by their own efforts in their own lands. According to recent studies by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the minimum needs of south and southeast Asia could be met by a 10 percent increase in rice production in 1953, and some experts are convinced that a 50 percent increase in rice production is possible on land now under cultivation in Asia.

The difficulty is how to achieve the increased production which is technically possible, as well as how to increase the international shipments of rice—which are now only 55 percent of prewar. The gap between the possible and the actual can be bridged only by putting into practice the countless long-range plans now languishing in countless desk drawers. The fruits of experimental research must be passed on quickly to the man who ultimately implements the plans and programs—the rice farmer. An F.A.O. International Rice Conference held early this year in Bangkok wrestled with this problem, but international conferences can do no more than point up the needs and suggest methods for putting plans into action. United States and United Nations agencies functioning through foreign aid and technical assistance programs in south and southeast Asia point out these same needs, and can provide equipment, supplies and guidance. But direct action rests with the governments of the countries concerned, many of which are new and insecure. They deserve sympathetic understanding and every reasonable type of aid and assistance from the West. But in order to survive as members of the free world they themselves must quickly get on with their task, work out their own solutions, and put plans into practice.

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BEHIND THE OIL DISPUTE IN IRAN

A British View

By Sir Reader Bullard

THE outburst of feeling in Iran calls for serious examination. Was it simple in origin, just the inability of negotiators to come to an agreement about oil royalties, or were there deeper causes? Is the outburst a symptom of a social renaissance, of a determination to throw off the sloth of centuries? Such a renaissance would be particularly welcome to the British, who are by no means interested only in oil but regard the prosperity and contentment of the Iranian people as of high importance if only as the best barrier against Communist propaganda.

In the course of the oil crisis the Iranians, who when Riza Shah abdicated swore that they would never again submit to a despotism, submitted to the dictatorship of two men: Ayatullah Kashani and Dr. Mossadegh. It was Dr. Mossadegh who received full powers from the *Majlis* for six months, and who issued decrees having the force of law; but he shared authority with Ayatullah Kashani, in theory merely the Speaker of the *Majlis*, but also the religious leader of the Fadayan-i-Islam. It was this organization which furnished the men who assassinated the Prime Minister, Razmara, and his Minister of Education, and thereby, to judge from the chronology of events, hastened remarkably the passage of the oil nationalization bill into law. Kashani is one of those *mujtahids* (religious pundits) who hated the modernization of the realm effected by Riza Shah but were unable to resist a ruler strong and ruthless enough to use troops in the mosque at Meshed to quell religious disorders and to beat a mullah for denouncing the queen for appearing in public without a veil. The social changes, in particular the unveiling of women, were unpopular with all the *mujtahids;* so was the introduction of European codes of law, which restricted their field of work and carried Iran farther from their ideal of government, in which religious and secular powers are in the same hands.

Ayatullah Kashani has reason to be hostile to the British in particular, because he was one of the Iranians interned during the Second World War under Anglo-Iranian supervision for danger-

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ous intrigues against the Allies. Fortunately there is no question of a miscarriage of justice, for not only did he freely admit at the time that he had worked for the Germans, but recent articles in the Iranian press lauding his patriotism boast that he did his best to help Rashid Ali Gailani, whose coup d'état in Iraq nearly handed that country over to the Axis, and the Mufti of Jerusalem, one of the most determined opponents of the Allied cause. Kashani likes to refer to the former glories of Islam, ranging "from China to Poitiers," and to the dissatisfaction which must arise in the breasts of all Moslems when they see that whereas "yesterday a few Moslems ruled over many non-Moslems," today "many Moslems are governed by a few non-Moslems."

The reversal of fortune which Kashani laments resulted partly from the decay of Turkey, Iran and Egypt, partly from the increasing strength of England, France and other Western countries. The superior power of the West was able to employ as an instrument a system of privileges, known as the Capitulations, which in their origin were sensible enough, as tending to keep apart two different social and legal conceptions which might otherwise clash, but which eventually developed to the point where the European (and the American) were better off in regard to taxation and in judicial matters in Turkey and Iran than Ottoman and Iranian nationals. During this period the West carried out and operated in those countries enterprises for which it alone had the capital and the technical ability. The railways in Asia Minor, the Suez Canal and the oil industry in Iran were all created by foreign money and skill, and they tended to be regarded as symbols of the vanishing domination of the West. The better run they were, the more criticism they tended to incur, as the scapegoats for the frustration felt by people whose miseries were due in the main to the neglect, corruption and incompetence of their own rulers.

A desire to establish complete equality with the West forms the background of the oil dispute. Dr. Mossadegh, however, has another important motive in the desire for what he calls neutrality, a desire reinforced by the course of events since 1944. In that year three foreign companies—two American, the third the Royal Dutch Shell—applied for oil concessions in Iran, in territory formerly included in the Anglo-Iranian concession but abandoned in 1933 as part of the new agreement. Negotiations were proceeding normally, with the interests of the Iranian Government being defended by a distinguished firm of American oil en-

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gineering consultants, when the Soviet Government sent to Teheran a high official who demanded with insistence an oil concession in northern Iran. Filled with apprehension, the Iranian Government decided to postpone all oil talks until after the war, that is, until all foreign troops, whether British or American or Russian, should have been withdrawn. The American and Shell representatives withdrew, regretting the decision but naturally accepting it as within the competence of a sovereign state; but the overbearing tone of the Soviet envoy's complaints and the fury of the Soviet press and radio were such that Dr. Mossadegh, to forestall any possible surrender to Soviet pressure, persuaded the *Majlis* to rush through a bill which in effect ruled out the grant of any foreign oil concession in future. It was in violation of this law that Qavam al Saltana, after withdrawing Iran's complaint against the U.S.S.R. from the Security Council, got rid of the Soviet troops which had stayed on in Iran after the Treaty date for withdrawal, by undertaking to bring in a bill providing for the formation of a Russo-Iranian company to prospect for and exploit oil in northern Iran. When eventually brought in, this bill was rejected by the *Majlis* with only two dissentient votes. The Russians attacked the decision furiously, alleging unfair discrimination, on the ground that since the British had an oil concession in the south, Russia had a right to an oil concession in the north. Dr. Mossadegh accepted the charge of inequality of treatment but decided to redress the balance, not by admitting into Iran a company which would set to work to sovietize it, but by ejecting the British firm, regardless of its legal rights.

The British have been reproached for treating the oil question as a material problem, but the tone was set by Dr. Mossadegh, who might have built his case in the first place on his desire for independence and "neutrality," but preferred to launch against the oil company an attack based on facts and figures often distorted or misunderstood. The securing of the concession in 1901 is sometimes regarded by critics as itself reprehensible, though to be just to the Iranians they do not use this argument. It was in fact proof of remarkable enterprise, for the prospects were poor. It took seven years and the expenditure of large sums of money before oil was found in commercial quantities and another five years to get the refinery working; and it was some 18 years in all before the infant company established itself among the older oil concerns. A common charge, that the Anglo-Iranian

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Oil Company was less generous than other companies operating in the Middle East, ignores the fact that a 50–50 arrangement (equal division of the net profits) was discussed in the negotiations of 1948–49,[1] but fell to the ground because the Iranian negotiators demanded half the profits on all the activities of the A.I.O.C., whether in or outside Iran. The negotiators then drew up the Supplemental Agreement of 1949, which was accepted by the Iranian Government but refused ratification by the *Majlis*. The oil company then reverted, in February 1951, to the proposal to share profits equally, but on Iranian oil alone. This offer, which was accepted, would have seemed a victory for Prime Minister Razmara, had he revealed it; but he insisted on its being kept secret until some suitable moment, and it was still unknown to the public when he was murdered a month later. Dr. Mossadegh was not really interested in royalties, and never considered seriously any of the offers subsequently made—from that of the directors of the company (which the United States Ambassador thought satisfactory to Iran) to the recent proposal recommended by Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchill. The difference between the two parties is still considerable. The British Government and the oil company accept nationalization of the oil industry, provided that the whole question of compensation is submitted to arbitration under the International Court. Dr. Mossadegh accepts arbitration in principle, but wishes to limit it to the physical assets in Iran, and before resuming negotiations he demands payment of a sum of £49,000,000 which would have been payable if the 1933 Agreement had been allowed to stand and the Supplemental Agreement had been ratified. This money, which had been placed in reserve, was of course spent when the export of oil from Abadan was stopped by the Iranian Government.

It is often suggested that since the British Government had nationalized certain industries in the United Kingdom its attitude towards the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry was unreasonable. This argument overlooks the fact that in the 1933 Agreement the Iranian Government undertook not to cancel or modify the concession unilaterally and to submit disputes to arbitration. It is relevant to point out that in the matter of arbitration with smaller states the British Government has a good record. Since the war it has twice submitted such disputes to the International Court: the fisheries dispute with Norway and

[1] *Cf.* "Crisis of Confidence in Iran," by E. A. Bayne, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1951.

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the dispute with Albania over the mining of two British naval vessels and the death of nearly 150 seamen. The first case was lost; the second was won, and damages were awarded. No damages have in fact been paid, but the British Government has vindicated the right of ships to pass in safety through a channel which a Russian satellite government had tried to close.

The extract given from Kashani's appeal hardly suggests a moral renaissance in Iran, since it throws upon the West all the responsibility for the present state of the Moslem world. To try to evade moral responsibility is a common human failing, but in the Iranian character this is carried to unusual lengths. Britain has been a convenient scapegoat for Iran since the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Throughout the nineteenth century the independence of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan was defeated by Britain as strenuously as it was assailed by Russia. In that period, the Crimean War, the Berlin Congress and the Afghan frontier dispute of 1885 were merely the most intense moments of a struggle which hardly ever ceased; and if it is suggested that the aims of Britain and Russia were equally selfish, it cannot be denied that British policy was a support to the Middle East, Russian a menace. Early in the twentieth century Russian pressure on Iran was particularly severe, but Britain was no longer in a position to use force or a threat of force to defend Iran, since the danger of war with Germany was already great, and Britain could not afford to quarrel with Russia and Germany at the same time. The 1907 Agreement at least confined Russian pressure to the north of Iran, but it was attacked by the Iranians in that it fell short of that armed resistance to Russian pressure to which British policy had accustomed them for nearly a century. From that moment the Iranians have attributed to Britain all the ills from which they have suffered. Thus when Riza Shah became unpopular through greed and tyranny, his people, who had rejoiced in his rule when it established order and got rid of the Capitulations, invented the theory that he was irremovable because he enjoyed the support of the British. Acting on this theory, Dr. Mossadegh in a recent document repudiated the 1933 oil agreement on the ground that Riza Shah had been a British puppet. In other words, the Iranians wish to repudiate this one action of the former Shah while continuing to enjoy such benefits as the restoration of their ancient monuments, the modernization of their country, and the abolition of the Capitulations. To finish

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with this aspect of the Iranian case, we must add that the *Majlis,* which nationalized the oil industry at Dr. Mossadegh's instigation, had lately passed a resolution that Riza Shah, this "stooge of the British," should be referred to officially as "The Great."

Dr. Mossadegh profited by the oil dispute to request the removal of all British consular officers from Iran, for alleged interference in the internal affairs of the country. This measure will probably have been widely approved, since many Iranians claim, without any evidence, that all tribal disturbances were the result of British intrigues. Large areas of Iran are inhabited by tribes, often non-Iranian: Kurdish, Turkish or Arab. In the days before Riza Shah, when the Teheran Government had little influence in the provinces, the tribal leaders formed an element of authority which residents and travellers had to take into account. When the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company began operations in southwest Persia, Teheran could afford no protection, and nothing could have been accomplished without the coöperation of the Shaikh of Mohammerah, whose tribal area included Abadan, and of the chiefs of the Bakhtiari tribe, in whose territory the first productive oil wells were found. When Riza Shah established order throughout his realm he brought the tribal chiefs under control, but he set up instead an authority which, if maintained, is far better: that of a strong central government.

The rôle of the tribes in the economy of Iran was no more understood by Riza Shah than it is today by the educated resident of Teheran, who looks upon them as savages to be kept down. He regarded the tribes as he regarded camels, as out of date, and unsuited to a world in which Teheran was to have an opera house (with no opera), a bourse (with no shares to buy and sell), and an iron and steel foundry hundreds of miles from the sea, for which there is no iron ore in Iran. Regarding the settled tribes as at least one step farther towards civilization, he prevented the migratory tribes from moving between their summer and winter pastures, without, however, helping them to change over from a pastoral to an agricultural mode of life. He thereby caused the almost complete disappearance of the herds of horses the tribes used to rear, and reduced seriously the numbers of their sheep and goats.

When British and Russian troops entered Iran in 1941 it seemed probable that at least some of the tribes who had suffered from Riza Shah would seek to establish some degree of independ-

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ence, and would be wanting to know the attitude of the British authorities. The case against encouraging any such hopes was overwhelming. It would have run counter to Britain's traditional desire for a strong and prosperous Iran and would have added unreasonably to the burden of the Iranian Government, weakened by the foreign invasion and by the abdication of Riza Shah, who for 20 years had been the mainspring of everything. Moreover, listening to tribal complaints would soon involve the listener in internal rivalries for the leadership of the tribes. Finally, anyone who hoped that the tribes could be induced to resist the Germans if they should invade Iran would be building on sand—an opinion which hardly needed the confirmation of experience in the First World War, when the German Assistant Military Attaché poured out gold to encourage the tribes to resist the Russians and, on seeing them vanish with their subsidies as soon as the Russians appeared, committed suicide.

The unanswerable case against giving any encouragement to the tribes against their own Government, which rests on an enlightened view of British interests, was fully approved by the British Government and strictly followed. The theory that the tribes would never have given trouble but for the British has nevertheless been used by scores of Iranian journalists who would never leave the comforts of the capital and make a serious study of the tribal question by (for instance) spending a few months with a migratory tribe, studying its place in the country's economy. Iranian esteem is better satisfied by attributing tribal unrest to British intrigue than to bad government by Teheran. This is also enervating to Iran, however, since abuses which are attributed to British machinations will be left for others to remedy instead of being attacked by the Iranians themselves.

An alternative excuse for inaction is lack of revenue, an excuse which ignores on the one hand the recalcitrance of the rich Iranians to payment of income tax, and on the other hand the unpaid work which is done in other countries by such bodies as the Women's Voluntary Services in Britain. Dr. Mossadegh fell into this error when he attributed the slums of Teheran to the oil company. The Directors of the company, present on the spot, naturally offered to show Dr. Mossadegh, who had never seen them, the houses built by the company for its employees. Perhaps a better answer would be to remind Dr. Mossadegh that the first thought for the welfare of the slum-dwellers of Teheran,

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which resulted in the opening of a clinic, came not from wealthy Iranians like Dr. Mossadegh himself, but from Mrs. Dreyfus, wife of the United States envoy to Iran. The Iranian would probably believe that, given enough money, he could solve the housing situation by just erecting houses. Those who have had to do with housing projects in England, however, know that when the houses are up, the hardest task still remains: to select the tenants from applicants perhaps ten times as numerous as the houses available. If a committee did not spend hours of careful labor, seeing the applicants and trying to balance such factors as war service, sickness, the number in the family, and difference of sex requiring separate bedrooms for growing children, the houses might as well not have been built. No Iranian asked about this question has ventured to deny that such houses if erected in Teheran would tend to be filled with the relatives, friends and protégés of the persons in power at the time.

Iran might perhaps urge in self-defense that she did not grow but was formed artificially. Between 1905 and 1907 the country passed from a personal autocracy to a form of government based on the Belgian. Apart from some weak municipalities, often headed by a paid official from Teheran, there are no organs of popular government except the Parliament, where the deputies spend most of their time in political manœuvre and pay little attention to the far more difficult task of reform. The government is over-centralized and burdened with a mass of officials, two-thirds of whom are superfluous if not actually prejudicial to the public welfare. The need for decentralization was foreseen by the first Iranian Parliament in 1907, when it passed a law providing for the creation of provincial councils. This law has never been applied. During the war it was brought to the notice of Iranian statesmen as a possible means of forestalling wider demands from such elements as the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds, but in vain. Local pride and patriotism are common in Iran, and members of a provincial council might well have found satisfaction in providing their province with schools and roads and bridges, and in trying to make it as healthy as the oil region, where the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had stamped out malaria and had almost mastered that terrible eye disease, trachoma.

To show his dissatisfaction with the British policy Dr. Mossadegh broke off diplomatic relations. This should not be taken too seriously: Riza Shah severed diplomatic relations with the

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United States, and later with France, on pretexts which were generally regarded as frivolous. What is more serious is the campaign, official and unofficial, designed to persuade the people of Iran that Britain is their enemy—one might say their only enemy. The persecution mania of which this is a symptom and a continuing cause is to be met with everywhere in Iran. A foreign traveller visiting a remote corner of the country in 1952 found that the peasants, though they had never seen an Englishman, were convinced that "British spies" had bored holes in the roofs of their houses to make them leak. Such pointless accusations are by no means new. During the war, at the height of the shipping shortage, British and other Allied vessels carried 70,000 tons of wheat to Iran to relieve a shortage which was due partly to hoarding but largely to the action of the Russians in keeping back Azerbaijan wheat from its normal market in Teheran. Yet a rumor was spread, both orally and in the press, that the British were burning Iranian wheat in order to starve the population. This kind of accusation is of course useful to the Iranian landlord who hoards wheat in time of scarcity and whose peasants would be able to mend the roofs of their houses more effectually if they received a larger share of the product of their labor. It is also of the greatest use to Russia, who is able to continue her work of undermining the Iranian state behind this barricade of anti-British propaganda. That the Russian aims have not changed is clear from the behavior of the Russians in northern Persia during the years 1941 to 1947 and in Eastern Europe ever since the end of the war. Besides, we have their own admission in the course of the Russo-German negotiations before Hitler attacked Russia as revealed in the record of these negotiations from the German archives, since published by the United States. Invited to join the Axis, the Russians laid down certain conditions, one of which was that the German Government should recognize as "the center of Soviet aspirations" a band of territory stretching from the Caucasus in the general direction of the Persian Gulf.

For two years Iranian statesmen have been declaring that unless their demands are conceded in full their country will fall a prey to Communism. It seems probable that Razmara, and since his murder, Dr. Mossadegh, would not have encouraged Tudeh agitation as a weapon against the British if they had feared the strength of Communism, and that Dr. Mossadegh would not have refused four offers, all recognizing the nationalization of

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the oil industry, if he had regarded the risk of being ousted by a Tudeh government as serious. Meanwhile Iran is receiving not only military aid from the United States, but assistance under Point Four to improve social and economic conditions. To what extent Point Four and similar aid will be successful in erecting a barrier against revolution will depend mainly on how far down the aid filters and on whether the Iranians will have learned to help themselves when it ceases. It was a success when the American example in planting a suitable type of tree set the local people planting trees for themselves; it would be a failure if a newly irrigated area prepared by foreign aid were to be handed over to absentee landlords chosen by nepotism and political influence.

Dr. Mossadegh has shown signs of realizing that Iran has two great needs—land reform and local government. But the hastily-drafted decrees which he has issued in virtue of the full powers conferred upon him for six months give little ground for confidence in their success. The landlords are ordered to give up part of their share of the crops grown on their land, but they were ordered to do this under a law of 1947 and nothing happened. Then of the various councils which the decrees are to call into existence the higher ones are to be overweighted with officials—a prospect which induces profound skepticism; while at the lower end the village council will be to all intents the landlord, since it is to consist of the landlord and four persons who will be under his thumb, *i.e.* the village headman and three peasants. The provisions for financing these various bodies are vague and unlikely to ensure a regular, still less an adequate, income. Finally, this inexperienced village council is to be loaded with duties which seem to be rather more important, except for the omission of secondary education, than are performed by the London County Council. It is unfortunate that decrees on matters of such importance should have been issued without any attempt to discover how similar problems have been dealt with in other countries. The East is naturally sensitive; but perhaps those who are benefiting Iran under Point Four could suggest to the Iranian Government that there exists abroad an immense mass of experience in dealing with land and local government questions, and that in the end much time might be saved by a study of that experience. Iranian investigators would be well advised to study the highly successful Gezira scheme, in the Sudan, where an immense area of newly irrigated land was developed between 1926

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and 1950 by a foreign company which was required to encourage the growing of cotton and other suitable crops and in return was allowed to take 20 percent of the net profit, the remaining 80 percent being divided equally between the Sudan Government and the cultivators. In 1950 the company retired and the Sudan Government took over its functions and the 20 percent profit which it had been drawing. The cultivators, who had been protected by fixed rents against exploitation by the landlords, have become very prosperous: indeed it is claimed that their annual income is greater than that of any other agricultural population, even that of the United States. However, such schemes require security for foreign investment and management.

Hopes for the future of Iran, which must in any case be restrained by reason of the known difficulties in the way, are still further limited by the discovery that of the many hundreds of Iranian students now in the United States the great majority do not wish to return to Iran but intend to stay in the United States if they can manage to secure permission to do so. Thus while American and British missionaries are providing excellent medical services for poor Iranians (and would be providing excellent education too but for Riza Shah's excessive nationalism, which closed their schools in 1940), and while America is providing money and advice and help to improve social and economic conditions in Iran, the young men who might have been expected to return to give their country the benefit of their foreign education and experience are as a class showing only a verbal interest in its fate.

Is this, however, a total loss to Iran, or does she not rather benefit by the defection of the fainthearted? The peasant remains as an element of stability where the better-educated professional and political classes seem often volatile and irresponsible. He is usually described as inert, but he has a momentum of his own as steady as the seasons which his work has to follow. The Communists would find in him a recalcitrant subject for propaganda, and in Iran that propaganda lacks in any case the best instrument of revolution, a strong urban proletariat. Nevertheless, the peasant is grossly oppressed by a feudalistic land system, and it is to be hoped that some remedy that does not involve violence can be found for this abuse.

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THE SCIENCE OF SOVIET POLITICS

"Pravda" on Hitler in 1933

By Gordon W. Millikan

As Stalin recently reminded the Nineteenth Party Congress, Communists believe that Marxism is based on scientific laws "occurring independently of people's will." Thus, in Soviet doctrine, the revolutionary apocalypse described by Marx will come, not primarily because people want it or do not want it, but because its arrival is certified by law. And because the Party of Marx, Lenin and Stalin reads the law aright, Soviet political analysis is a science: given the correct theory, exact results are predictable.

However, the application of Soviet political science to the situation in Germany in February and March 1933, when Hitler was in the process of turning an electoral victory into a Nazi dictatorship, is no longer offered by Communists as an illustration of the beauties of this science, and for a very good reason: it led the Kremlin into what was probably the most costly political blunder of our era. The blunder was the decision to fight the German Social Democrats at this crucial hour, and thus to consolidate Hitler's power.

Pravda is the weathervane of Soviet policy, and the leaders of the Russian Communist Party, speaking through the pages of *Pravda* in these critical months, indicated the line which the leaders of the German Communist Party followed. The dire events taking place in Germany were totally misunderstood. As a result, the German Communist Party was utterly smashed and the revolutionary potential of the German working class was destroyed. A year or two later the implications of the Nazi dictatorship became clear to the men in the Kremlin. Then, taking the cue from the new type of anti-Fascist struggle which occurred in Paris and Vienna during 1934, they began backing the united front policy for the first time, with the idea of preserving bourgeois governments against Fascist dictatorship. No inkling of such a development, however, appeared in *Pravda* in the months of February and March 1933. With happy eyes it saw in Hitler's emergence a rising tide of revolution to which it supposed the Kremlin held the copyright, along with new opportunities for leadership by the

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German Communist Party and the eventual triumph of Communism in Germany. The laboratory notebooks of this remarkable demonstration of Marxist infallibility as printed in *Pravda* provide a relevant footnote to the record of Stalin's political sagacity.

II

To *Pravda* in February and March 1933 Germany looked like a ripe plum about to fall into Communist hands. The world economic depression which started in the fall of 1929 provided the backdrop for the events of the German crisis. It marked the end of the period of "relative" stabilization, predicted at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928, and the onset of a revolutionary situation. "Does not the advent of Hitler to power in Germany end the revolutionary upsurge?" asked Dimitri Manuilsky rhetorically in *Pravda* on March 16, 1933. And he answered with crushing confidence:

> This is stupidity! German Fascism came to power not at the beginning of the capitalist stabilization and not in a moment of extreme world crisis the end of which is not seen, but in a moment of revolutionary upsurge in all capitalist lands and first of all in Germany. German Fascism means not the "stabilization" of German Fascism, but, on the contrary, it signalizes the deepening and spread of the elements of revolutionary crisis in Germany.

Manuilsky, a Russian representative of the Comintern, was delivering the main programmatic address on a grand occasion —the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. Before him was an audience composed of leading members of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., including the Central Committee, the Central Executive Committee and Sovnarkom of the U.S.S.R. and the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He continued:

> We are not able to give the exact period of Fascism's tenure of power but we firmly know that the hysterical speeches of the political epileptic [in Berlin] will not prevent the collapse of capitalism. Fascism also teaches the rules of civil war and revolution to the masses as the imperialist war in its time trained them. Political terror will not save classes which are doomed by history.

An editorial in *Pravda* (February 3) had earlier explained that the economic crisis was a foreseen and necessary development which set the stage for proletarian revolution. Caught in the grip of inexorable historical laws, the Soviet theorists insisted,

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political forces would have to play themselves out. Fascism was the final phase, its leaders the kindlers of civil war. The desperation and weakness of the ruling classes was evidenced when the Fascist leaders launched a Four Year Plan of recovery, they said. The Plan was merely a subterfuge to deliver the Hitler Government from the "indignation of the masses." "Whence," asked *Pravda,* "does the German Government think it will find the gigantic resources necessary to carry out this plan of struggle against the threat of proletarian revolution . . . ?" Propounding its catechism, it said that the Hitler Government would probably resort to inflation, and this would bring in its train a contraction of foreign markets, intensifying the contradictions between the European states. But with inflation or without it, the German Government could find no way out of the crisis, "just as previous governments have been unable to find a way out." Events in the United States proved that "once again all artificial measures for the stimulation of capitalist society unavoidably end as traps." A state policy of subsidies to industry, as in the United States, meant the further impoverishment of farmers, the liquidation of unemployment by the introduction of compulsory labor service on the land, special barracks and military discipline. Even the hopes of big German industrialists for deliverance from Hitler's "political-economic nonsense" through an economic revival were specious because the capitalists lacked the knowledge through which such matters could be "known exactly."

In Marxist parlance, "objective" factors which produce revolution are supplemented by "subjective" factors—the conscious organization of Communist forces which give revolution a push. Along with the report of what it considered to be the objective aspects of the German situation in February and March 1933, *Pravda* gave its readers much information about the activities and prospects of the German Communists. What it seemed to see was a battle in which the terrorist Fascist offensive beat ineffectually against an invincible German proletariat unifying itself under the banner of the German Communist Party. *Pravda*'s treatment of the German Communists was stereotyped, apparently as a matter of policy. In the introductory address at the Marx anniversary commemoration, Kaganovich, a member of the Politbureau, referred specifically to the German Party:

> Our brother Communist parties organize the working masses under the

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leadership of the Comintern, rallying them . . . to new battles. Our brother parties, in particular our magnificent, militant brother Communist Party of Germany, face to face with the Fascist debauchery of the bourgeoisie, summons the proletariat to revolutionary struggle. The Fascists terrorize and wish to destroy our brother party in Germany, but all who attempt to do this place themselves in a ridiculous position. Russian Tsarism wished to destroy the party of the Bolsheviks and itself disintegrated under the blows of the revolution. It is impossible to destroy the party of the class to whom the future belongs. It is impossible to destroy Marxism, as it is impossible to destroy the laws of history which lead to the inevitable ruin of capitalism and the victory of Socialism.

The very woodenness of this declamation makes it significant. The rationalists in the Kremlin are constantly put to the task of bridging the gap between the requirements of their logic and the contrarities of actuality. In their efforts to mold the present into the future, the stubborn facts of political life must somehow be grafted onto the prescribed course of events. Facts that don't fit are made to fit; the real situation is what theory says it must be.

On February 16, *Pravda* carried a joint statement by the German, French and Polish Communist Parties (taken, oddly enough, from the French Party organ, *Humanité*) which arrayed "proletarian internationalism against the chauvinistic campaign of the bourgeoisie." *Humanité* declared that the sole way out of the crisis, and the only path to the removal of the threat of war, was the establishment of the worker's Socialist power. But calling for the establishment of the worker's Socialist power was one thing: achieving it something else again. While the German Communist Party turned energetically to the electoral struggle on March 5, the Nazis prepared to crush it with a few swift strokes.

Thus while the "vanguard party" moved to place itself at the head of the proletariat in the election struggle, the Fascist Government picked it off from the flank. Liebknecht House—party headquarters—was padlocked on the evening of February 24. At a rally at the Berlin Sports Palace on February 25, William Pieck scoffed at the Nazis. The "main problems" that lay ahead were, he explained, "the impending broad attacks by employers on wages," which had begun in the Ruhr. "Each day brings new prohibitions of workers' meetings, demonstrations. . . . The atmosphere is so charged that the press of the center and the Social Democrats . . . write that the government measures pro-

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voke civil war." However, he pointed out that there was little doubt that the Fascists would fail:

> Comrade Pieck revealed the program of the Communist Party and spoke about "what the Communists would do when they [took] power." Each point was met by thunderous applause from the audience. (*Pravda,* February 25.)

A police officer declared the meeting closed. This was the last public meeting of the German Communist Party. The Reichstag building was burned on the night of the 27th, and a systematic roundup of Party leaders began. On this fateful day *Pravda*'s correspondent, Lorentz, stated in his dispatch: "The present régime represents the maximum concentration of Fascist strength." The next day its information bureau sent excerpts from an address by the novelist Thomas Mann, undelivered because "police surrounded the square." His message was encouraging:

> I think [the] resistance [to Fascism] is far more extensive in Germany and has far greater and stronger roots than it perhaps seems. The forces which belong to the past, forces of the counterrevolution, would have disappeared long ago and would not again have raised their heads if the German revolution was not distinguished by its purely German good-naturedness. I am deeply convinced that a social and democratic Germany may hope that the prevailing conditions are temporary and that the future belongs to it.

The Central Committee of the German Communist Party had issued a declaration exposing the "provocative communications of the press" and warning that the Reichstag was burned so that it "would never again be convened." An order for the arrest of the Committee came out on March 1. For *Pravda,* however, the Reichstag fire meant much more than an assault against the working class or a device to turn the masses against the Communist Party in the election. It represented the dawn of victory. "The fire in the German Reichstag has a deep symbolic significance," *Pravda* wrote on March 1. "The burned building in the center of Europe no sooner represented the successful blooming of German bourgeois democracy than it became the stable of Fascism. In the center of Europe incendiaries scour about with lighted torches. This says everything."

Toward the end of February *Pravda* had begun to document its *a priori* conclusions on Germany's economic collapse in a dispatch from its Berlin correspondent (February 27). Unemployment had increased 33,000 in two weeks. New layoffs were hitting workers in the largest plants; wage reductions impended. Indeed,

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wrote *Pravda* on March 4, the first month of Hitler's rule had positively helped the revolution since the Nazis had "so well succeeded in acquainting the working masses with the basic contours of the Fascist four year plan of hunger, exploitation and pogroms." The Fascist substitution of demagoguery for a positive program, this editorial continued, nourished Nazi forebodings of the future, and simultaneously stimulated plans for a "march of storm units on Berlin" to knock out the Communist Party before the elections.

Pravda notified its readers (February 28) that the rank and file were fighting back on the streets of Berlin with "election posters, leaflets and banners," that a great anti-Fascist demonstration had been held in Breslau, and that in Hamburg Communists who were attracted to a Social-Democratic meeting had been dispersed with clubs upon the order of the Social-Democratic police president. On the day before, a National Socialist demonstration had not been "especially well attended."

On the day before the elections (March 4) *Pravda* blustered that: "It was possible to arrest a few thousand Communists and revolutionary workers," but, that in such a country as Germany, it was impossible to "destroy the advance units of the working class; to destroy the party for which 6,000,000 workers voted (November 1932) in conditions of savage terror."

It turned out that the election of March 5 was anything but a reverse for the Fascist régime, but *Pravda*'s rosy blinkers were not damaged. More important was the "music which accompanies the 'victorious march' of German reaction," the collapse of the dollar—a "financial catastrophe exceptional in its extent, in the force of its consequences for all the world." The vote had no significance. By losing an election campaign and most of the party apparatus to the Nazis, the German Communist Party had won a great triumph. *Pravda*'s editorial on the election (March 7) was entitled, "Huge Political Victory of the German Communist Party." Actually, its figures on the election, published in the issue of March 6, had shown that the Communist vote fell by nearly 1,250,000.

An infusion of metaphysics was evident in the reasoning by which the Soviet political scientists harmonized this discrepancy: the Nazis had won their votes by deception and by terror, and this was a step toward their defeat, for they had exposed their true nature to those they had deceived and frightened. The

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March 5 elections were hailed on March 7 as the opening of a "new epoch in the class struggle of the German proletariat." The German Communist Party had "raised millions of the masses in the struggle with Fascism," had "broken the attack of Fascism and maintained its position . . ."

The echo of Lenin's stubborn beliefs in the prowess of German revolutionary workers reverberated strongly in *Pravda*'s issue of March 16. Germany possessed, it said:

> the best proletariat of the capitalist countries, which had created the most powerful Communist Party after the Russian Communist Party. Those who wish to break it will break their own teeth first. Five million votes which have been gathered by the Communist Party amid orgies of Fascist terror are the best proof of the strength of the resistance of the German proletariat.

Four days later *Pravda* again claimed that the German Communist Party had "broken the frontal attack of Fascism . . . and led its forces out from under the blows, preserved its cadres, and continued the struggle under new conditions." Within a few days, however, more sober estimates began to appear. The fact of defeat had to be acknowledged, and Piatnitskii, the Secretary of the Comintern, who was later purged, did so in an article on March 25 called "Achievements, Shortcomings and Tasks of the Communist Parties." He was rather indignant that the Fascists had not behaved as expected:

> The Communist Party of Germany . . . had expected suppression. Long ago it has gone half underground. But many of the responsible workers of the Communist Party did not expect that the destruction would immediately take such scope . . . activities of the Fascists went so far in pursuit of responsible workers of the Communist Party that they encircled whole workers' districts . . . From house to house they ransacked all apartments in search of Communist workmen. Each who was not inscribed on the book was given over to the police. Fascists broke into apartments of Communists and revolutionary workers and shot them. They shot arrested Communists, occupied party and trade union quarters. They burned books . . . For such unheard-of mass repressions the majority of the members of the Communist Party of Germany were unprepared.

Even this acknowledgment of damage to the party forces led only to the conclusion that "new conditions" had been created in Germany demanding new methods of work. Now, Piatnitskii said, the German Party must transfer its efforts to the factories, where its work would have special significance and where the united front of workers of all shades of political outlook could be more easily established. Oral agitation was especially neces-

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sary because German workers would be forced to read the Social-Democratic and left-bourgeois press in the absence of Communist newspapers. Party work among the unemployed had to be strengthened to protect their social insurance and thus preserve wage standards, and for the added reason that "a certain part of the unemployed believed Fascist promises and voted for them." The party organization must be quickly rebuilt on an illegal basis.

When *Pravda* directed its inverted view toward the Fascist enemy, it could see nothing but weaknesses and the approaching collapse of Hitler. By March 20 it had discovered that by "unveiling before the masses all the mechanism of Fascist rule," the Nazis had "pushed millions of fighters into the camp of revolution." The burning of the Reichstag, the shooting of workers, higher customs duties in the interests of landowners, new armaments—all, in *Pravda*'s view, showed that the new government was precarious, unstable and about to be swept away by a growing revolution. The magic word "contradictions" would bring it down.

On March 24 *Pravda* printed a declaration of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, addressed to all members of the Party, which said:

> In numerous cities workers' demonstrations have occurred . . . If Hitler's Fascism also succeeded in strengthening the nationalist movement and in using the 14-year-old Social-Democratic policy to save capitalist rule, then the civil war of the Hitler Government against the toiling masses is testimony of the weakness of the government. The bourgeoisie can no longer guarantee, by the old means of state power, the interests and profits of finance capital and the landlords. The Hitler Government is not able to give people bread or work.

Toward the end of March, *Pravda* thought itself abundantly confirmed in its point of view, as a result of the mounting tension between the Hugenberg and Hitler factions in the German Government. On the occasion of the suppression of the *Stahlhelm* and its affiliated organizations in the province of Braunschweig by the provincial Minister of the Interior, *Pravda* commented editorially on March 29:

> The dissolution of the organization and the arrest of members of the *Stahlhelm* in Braunschweig testifies that the efforts of the National Socialists to preserve a monopoly of power acquires a more pronounced character.

Pointing out that the *Stahlhelm* was a political as well as military organization of nationalists which competed with the Na-

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tional Socialists for places in the government and contested the rôle of the storm troopers as the "armed guard of the Fascist régime," *Pravda* concluded:

> It is not subject to doubt that the events in Braunschweig are a signal. The National Socialists aim to forestall the danger presented by other military organizations of nationalists. But this leads to an extreme deepening and aggravation of the contradictions within the Fascist dictatorship.

From London the *Pravda* correspondent telephoned on March 29 that press comment "assumed that events in Braunschweig have great political significance, appearing as a sign of an immediate split between National Socialists and Nationalists." Such reports were true enough, for Germany was being rent with conflict and Hitler was lashing out in every direction in his effort to consolidate his dictatorship. But *Pravda* was sure that the attempts of the "devil-possessed" ruling classes to hide their weaknesses, and the "stupidity of the contradictions which tore them apart," were merely opening the way for the Communists to place themselves at the head of gathering revolutionary forces.

By defining Fascism as a last-ditch stand of large-scale capital against the German proletariat, the Communists found a ready answer to an infinitely complex social-political phenomenon—an answer which woefully underestimated the power and danger of Fascism. It correspondingly exaggerated the strength and position of the German working class and the rôle of Communists as self-appointed leaders of this class.

III

A major cause of the misappraisal of the situation was the deeply-rooted hatred of the Social Democrats. Although *Pravda* granted that the German Communist Party had suffered a setback, the dialectic to which Soviet writers were committed forced them, as we have seen, to hail the struggle between the Party and the Hitler régime as a tremendous advance for the revolution. In this view Hitler performed a service to the proletarian revolution in Germany when he destroyed the Weimar Republic: democracy and Fascism were the two wings of bourgeoisie rule, both necessary to its continued existence. The attacks of the Fascists against the Social Democrats were therefore viewed joyfully as a form of political canabalism in which the bourgeoisie destroyed themselves.

The corollary to this was that the German Communist Party

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could afford to take losses in a struggle that eliminated its greatest enemy, the Social-Democratic Party. As early as February 14, *Pravda* had noted with pleasure that Social Democracy had been torn asunder by "contradictions between the masses who wish and who demand an active struggle with Fascism and the rapid Fascization of the Social-Democratic leadership." The disintegration of Social Democracy was a condition of victory over Fascism: "The proletarian revolution is able to liquidate the Fascist dictatorship only over the corpse of Social Democracy."

Communist efforts among the German peasants from 1918 on had, in fact, formed a monotonous record of failure, yet in the strategy of proletarian revolution there had to be a rural class struggle to back up the city proletariat. On February 22, *Pravda* dazzled itself with the moth-eaten legend of impoverished peasants clamoring for Socialism:

> Officials more and more fear that the peasant masses will turn to Communism. Of course, for the majority of these officials, faithful servants of capital, this means the failure, the ruin of the village economy. They are not able to hide the fact that the impoverished peasants think quite otherwise, that the eyes of the laboring peasants more and more turn to the social revolution with hopes and passion for struggle.

Doctrine also made it impossible for the Russians to believe that there could be any real opposition to Fascism save under Communist leadership. The formation of a united front interested them only to the degree that it led to the conquest of the German working class by the German Communist Party. They never for a moment entertained the idea of a pooling of interests and resources by the prospective victims of Fascism. The struggle against Fascism was carried on for the purpose of defending and advancing exclusive working class interests in a struggle for proletarian revolution; neither national interests nor the interests of other groups within Germany had the slightest validity for the Soviet strategists.

Pravda assailed the German Social-Democratic leaders remorselessly. They had, it said, attempted to merge openly with the Fascist Government, and also secretly by "left manœuvres concerning the creation of a united front on the basis of a pact of nonaggression" with the Communists. Such leaders "wanted a 'united front' without action" in order to "give Fascism the possibility of strengthening itself." (*Pravda,* February 27.)

The establishment of the Fascist dictatorship and the "open

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turning of whole groups from the Social-Democratic leadership to Fascism" had led to the crisis of Social Democracy—"the crisis at the top," *Pravda* explained on March 1. And it concluded that the process of Social-Democratic disintegration had been completed by the events of the revolutionary crisis, plus the work of the Communist Party and the growing desire of the masses for a united front with the Communists.

Social-Democratic leaders could not possibly be given credit for honorable motives, even if *Pravda* was forced (March 6) to impeach its own estimate of the German working class in order to make the point. If Social-Democratic leaders made overtures to the Communists with proposals for "pacts of nonaggression" in order to oppose Fascism, they were merely making hypocritical gestures under pressure from the broad masses of the working class. By these declarations favoring a united front, wrote *Pravda,* "the Social Democrats, who conducted and who now conduct a policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie and who did not want and do not want to carry through a struggle against the attacks of capital, Fascism and war, attempt again to deceive the working masses and to hold them under their influence."

According to Communist reasoning, two opposite influences had operated in Germany to stabilize the Weimar Republic and make it acceptable to the working class: fear of the October Revolution in Russia, and the strong revolutionary ardor of the German working class. The Weimar Republic had won the support of the broad mass of the toilers by making such concessions as the eight-hour day, factory committees, social legislation, collective agreements and so on, but the truce had been unstable, and the bankruptcy of Democratic Socialism had been shown by the cowardly capitulation of the Social Democrats to Hitler: "The defeat of the German Social Democrats is a defeat of world historic significance. It has its influence on the laboring masses of all countries, raises them with new strength in the struggle against Fascism for the dictatorship of the proletariat."

In *Pravda*'s view little doubt remained about the ability of the working class to cope with its enemies once it was freed from the paralysis engendered by class collaboration, pacifist doctrines and reliance on legal methods. At one point, however, it was felt necessary to note that Communist attacks against the Social Democrats might backfire. On March 6 *Pravda* announced that ". . . in time of joint revolutionary activities, but only in this

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time, the Communists will refrain from 'attacks' on Social Democratic organizations." The occasion for this concession was the answer of the E.C.C.I. of the Comintern to a circular of the Second International which had suggested a joint declaration against Hitler. *Pravda,* echoing the Comintern, replied that no joint declaration was necessary, but added that "Communists are not at all against agreements if those agreements are directed against the bourgeoisie in the interests of the working class." The reply to the invitation was a restatement of the Communist Party's intention to destroy the Soviet Democrats:

> In particular the German Social Democrats must choose whether they will come to an agreement with the National Socialists and by such a course destroy the possibility of the free existence of their organizations, or whether they will immediately fall in behind the Communists in struggle against the Fascist dictatorship . . . if the Social Democrats do not accept the proposals of the Communists, all of the working class, even its most backward strata, will know that only the Social Democrats prevent the repulsion of Fascism and the defense of the working class.

The Communists, in other words, were willing to countenance the defeat of the German proletariat if the responsibility could be pinned on the Social Democrats.

During most of March *Pravda* conveyed the impression that the German Communist Party was rallying from defeat and rebuilding the party. On March 24, however, the Soviet newspaper threw a revealing light on the actual revolutionary capabilities of the German Party by "summoning" it to obey party decisions and instructions. A long editorial, appearing in three daily instalments, observed that the trade unions supplied the mass basis of the Social-Democratic Parties of Germany, England and other countries, and complained that "sectarian theories" caused Communists to stay out of them; moreover, such Communists as had joined the trade unions made "opportunist" mistakes. "These Communists do not distinguish themselves in their work from reformists. They bring great damage to the Communist Party because the workers take them for actual representatives of the Communist Party."

> It is characteristic that all of the Congresses of the Communist International, plenums of the E.C.C.I. and manifold decisions of the Central Committees of the sections themselves of the Comintern demanded and [now] demand work within the reformist trade unions.

Thus *Pravda* blandly urged the Communists to use the trade

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unions as arenas for attacks upon the Social Democrats at a time when the German Communist Party, the German Social-Democratic Party and the German trade unions were all being smashed to bits.

Throughout all of the articles on the German situation during these two months, *Pravda* insisted that although the Communist Party was making every effort to achieve unity, any real coöperation with the Social Democrats was "impossible." It wrote, for example, on March 25:

> The proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany and revolutionary trade unions of the opposition concerning joint struggle against Fascism which was made on January 30 and March 1, 1933, to the Social-Democratic Party and to the central union of the All-German trade unions, just as the proposals which were made by the Central Committee of the German Communist Party on July 20 concerning the declaration of a general political strike, were rejected.

In Communist eyes, the National Socialists were a "party of powerful capitalists" which "directed the dissatisfaction of the petty bourgeois mass in the first place against the Communist Party" (*Pravda,* March 25). Not a word in any of the statements on the united front showed an awareness that there were other groups in the community with a stake in the fight against Fascism. It was exclusively a working-class affair. The day before (March 24), *Pravda* had printed the declaration of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party which stated that the "leadership of the Social-Democratic Party and the administration of the reformist all-German united trade unions declined the proposal concerning a united front." Again, the Soviet leaders seized an occasion to point out that a fight against Fascism could be carried on only under Communist leadership. The appeal stated:

> The creation of a fighting united front of workers is the demand of the moment and the vital question of the German working class. Therefore organize everywhere meetings of the factory workers and unemployed for the discussion with members of trade unions and Social-Democratic workers of joint measures of struggle for the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann and all arrested workers, for the abolition of exceptional laws, of prohibitions against meetings, newspapers, demonstrations, for the liquidation of the auxiliary police.

The liberation of the Communist Thaelmann was the first and, of course the symbolic, objective.

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In *Pravda*'s articles sharp lines mark off economic classes, and these classes are supposed to respond to economic forces like automatons, driven by mutually exclusive, totally antagonistic economic interests. All social action is assumed to lead logically to proletarian revolution, and Communists are instructed to oppose bitterly any that does not do so—in other words, any that Moscow does not control. Events are set into formulas that bear little relationship to reality. At the same time that *Pravda* pursued the mirage of an impending proletarian revolution in the towns, it also saw signs of a nonexistent social revolution in the countryside. But it could not imagine that any men and women who were neither "proletarians" nor "peasants" could have an interest in opposing Fascism.

Everything the Communists did during these two months, as described by *Pravda,* tended to strengthen the onslaught of German Fascism against the German nation. Fascist blows fell from the right; the Communists hit from the left. No effort was spared to advance the supposed interests of the Communist Party—and every consideration was subordinated to that. No lesson was drawn from any defeat. In fact, it appears not to have dawned on such a responsible voice as *Pravda* either that a defeat had occurred, or that it was impending. The only defeat recognized was the defeat of the Social Democrats—and this was greeted with enthusiasm. In effect, the rulers in the Kremlin joined hands with Hitler's storm troopers in destroying the middle ground of German political life. Marxist-Leninist doctrine taught that this was the way to safeguard and promote Soviet interests. Some 12,000,000 Russians presently paid for the error with their lives.

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AFGHANISTAN, INDEPENDENT AND ENCIRCLED

By Donald N. Wilber

AFGHANISTAN is a land-locked and mountain-studded land the size of Texas, with a population estimated perhaps at 12,000,000. The vast majority of its fervent Moslems are primitive farmers or nomads, pursuing ancient patterns of life. The country is bounded on the west by Iran, on the south and east by Pakistan, and on the north by a 900-mile frontier with the U.S.S.R. At the extreme northeastern corner a needle-like corridor stretches as far as Red China, marked out long ago by the British to keep the Russian Empire from direct contact with India.

Down this corridor march the Pamirs, lofty outshoots of the Himalayas, to spread out and traverse the central spine of the country as the massive Hindu Kush range. To the south of the Hindu Kush a boundless plateau slopes toward the Indian Ocean, while to the north are desolate steppes extending to the Oxus River, which forms the Soviet frontier. Rainfall is scanty, so that in most parts of the country crops can be grown only by irrigation from streams flowing out of the snow-crowned Hindu Kush and these facilities are so restricted that less than 5 percent of the land is now cultivated.

A Western visitor is likely to enter Afghanistan through the Khyber pass, leaving behind the Pakistan town of Peshawar with its asphalted, tree-lined avenues to emerge into a region of fantastic and rugged beauty where the turbaned, baggy-trousered men carry guns and the women are heavily veiled. A narrow shelf carries the rough road above a boiling river, and then the route winds steeply over a high pass before the final descent to Kabul. The traveler may continue along the "great circle" route which joins Kabul with the rest of the country, and will then pass through such historically famous towns as Mazar-i-Sharif, Balkh, Herat, Kandahar and Ghazni—towns that were seen by Alexander the Great, Genghiz Khan and Tamerlane. Kabul, the capital city of more than 200,000 people, is hemmed in by mountains and penetrated by rocky ledges which are still crowned by ancient walls. Wide new avenues have been laid through the crowded older quarters south of the Kabul River and suburbs are pushing out in every direction. The city has an air of activity and enterprise.

II

The Afghans gained internal independence in the eighteenth century, but the territory was soon subjected to pressure by Tsarist Russia, pushing relentlessly down from the north, and by the British moving toward Afghanistan from the east across India. Committed to the protection of India, Britain was determined to halt Tsarist expansion at the Oxus River, and her concern over the course of events in Afghanistan brought on the Afghan-British wars of 1839–42 and 1879–81. After the second conflict the Afghans agreed to conduct relations with foreign states in accord with British advice.

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A new period in Afghanistan's affairs began in 1907 when Russia and Britain settled their rivalry for the time being, and agreed upon spheres of influence in northern and southern Persia respectively. As part of the Convention of 1907, the Tsarist Government stated that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of influence, and the British pledged that they would neither occupy nor annex any part of the country. But the animosity created in Afghanistan by the unilateral methods by which the country was proclaimed a buffer state still lingers, although grants of money and arms by Great Britain enabled the Afghan kings to establish control over their feudal lords. For a long time the Afghan Government suspected and mistrusted the outer world, and deliberately isolated itself. Local self-esteem was cultivated to such an



extent that in 1919 the Afghans provoked a third, and brief, Afghan-British war. The resulting treaty of 1921 recognized Afghanistan's complete independence in the field of foreign relations. In this same year the Afghans signed an elaborate Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Government.

In the period between the two world wars, the Afghan rulers gradually abandoned their policy of isolation and sought the material progress which Afghans who had traveled in Europe had observed. After 1929 notable advances were made under Nadir Shah, and since 1933 by his son, Muhammad Zahir Shah. This ruler was educated in France, speaks French fluently, and is now learning English. He came to the throne at the age of 19, and the early years of his reign were dominated by the authority of his three uncles. More

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recently he has come into his own. He is sincere and well informed, and recognizes that Afghanistan faces the two major problems common to all Asiatic countries: the need for more abundant food and for social evolution. He has declared that Afghanistan can solve her problems only if she enjoys good relations with all her neighbors.

The wise initial step toward the solution of domestic problems was the decision to seek increased agricultural production rather than to impose an industrial structure upon a primitive society. Motor roads, begun in the 1920's, are designed to distribute the harvest of more fertile northern regions to areas of scarcity, and efforts are being made to expand the area of cultivable land in both the north and south. In the north, irrigation canals are being dug by hand over the fertile flood plains of the rivers which rush north from the Hindu Kush into the Oxus. In the south, the Government boldly decided to execute large-scale, long-range projects without prior application for foreign loans or grants. In 1946 preliminary discussions with an American engineering firm culminated in the signature of a contract with a created subsidiary, Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, and the Government appropriated $17,000,000 from the country's limited dollar funds to get the projects started. In 1949, a loan of $21,000,000 was obtained from the Export-Import Bank. Of three major projects, one, the Boghra canal, drawing water from the Helmand River and running for 55 miles, has been completed and is in operation. Moreover, two massive earth dams, one on the Helmand and one on the Arghandab River, are nearing completion. The dams and canals will irrigate at least 345,000 acres and, when demand arises, can generate some 65,000 kilowatts. Collaboration between Afghans and Americans has been successful; less than 100 American specialists have trained 4,000 Afghans to handle the heavy machinery brought 12,000 miles from the United States.

As thousands of farmers are settled on the newly fertile lands, wheat, rice and special income-producing crops will be grown in increasing quantities. Sugar beets are now processed in a modern plant, for home consumption of sugar. Cotton is baled, spun and woven in the north to supply a considerable percentage of the piece-goods needs, and the government hopes to expand export sales of cotton to obtain vitally needed foreign exchange. For the first time in history, the Afghan farmer can feel that the government is concerned with his well-being.

A primitive type of democracy is traditional among the Afghan tribes, but government has always been autocratic. King Zahir informed the writer that his officials are anxious to extend democratic rights and institutions; but the process is bound to take time. The promotion of national, or patriotic, sentiment is hampered by the existence of several ethnic stocks, sporting a variety of languages and customs. Such elements at the Pashtuns, or Pakhtuns—who are the so-called "true Afghans"—the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks, the Turkoman, the Khirghiz and the Nuris stem from Aryan, Turki, Mongol and other stocks. For centuries Afghanistan labored under the rule of large landowners whose subjects were by turn farmers and soldiers. Feudal warfare was constant and central authority scarcely a concept. However, at the end of the nineteenth century the Amir Abdur Rahman used the strong forces at his disposal to enforce excessive taxation and so break up the vast landholdings.

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As a result the cultivated areas were divided into smaller holdings long before such action appeared necessary or desirable in other lands of the Middle East.

While short on ethnic solidarity, Afghanistan is favored by religious unity. Certainly the country is more orthodox in carrying out the rites and precepts of the Moslem religion than the Islamic states to the west. Some of these prescriptions, such as social equality, frequent prayer, and abstinence from alcohol and habit-forming drugs, are considered virtues in any country, while others, such as the veiling of women and the existence of a legal code based on religious interpretation, are bound to be altered. Today, religion is vitally important to the Afghans in insulating them from the pervasive influence of foreign ideologies and manners which might destroy established moral standards without substituting anything of equal worth.

At the present day, the central government can maintain internal security and stability as long as it has the support of the true Afghan tribes resident in the east and the south of the country. King Amanollah lost this support because of his over-hasty steps toward "modern" reforms, and was driven from the country in 1929. Nadir Shah, who reëstablished law and order, promulgated the present constitution. While this document provides for an upper and lower house of elected and appointed representatives, authority remains concentrated in the hands of the royal family. The Prime Minister is named by the ruler and is responsible to him rather than to the Parliament. As a result, cabinets are far more stable than throughout the rest of the Middle East. Relatives of the king normally hold several of the ministerial posts.

Afghanistan has no political parties, no labor unions and few coöperative organizations. The family, ruled by its patriarch, remains the most important social unit. Abdul Hadi Davi, then President of Parliament, told the writer that the recent elections for that body drew a much larger popular vote than had been expected and that the Parliament might prepare an amendment to the constitution providing for the formation of political parties. But though a press law does provide for the publication of independent papers, most of the printing and press outlets in the country are under governmental control. Several independent papers have appeared at Kabul, the most influential of which was the weekly *Vatan*, printed in 1951 and 1952. This organ, backed by a member of the Parliament, campaigned for complete freedom of the press, assembly and speech, as well as for the withdrawal of the royal family from politics. While this paper supported the Government's foreign policy and its general program of reform, its tone became so critical that the authorities suspended its publication and took action against its directing group.

The Government will probably continue to react against citizens who advocate forms of European and American social and political life which are considered as still too foreign and too modern for public acceptance. But the unusual aspect of the situation is that the royal family seems more willing to delegate authority than the governed are to take up unfamiliar responsibilities. There is strong opposition among the Moslem clergy and the tribes to change of any kind. The first step in decentralization will probably take

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the form of instituting elections for some provincial offices now filled by appointment from Kabul.

III

Afghanistan's relations with foreign Powers have changed considerably since 1921. With the signing of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty in that year, Afghanistan became one of the first nations to recognize the Soviet régime. At that time the Bolsheviks were anxious to stabilize the situation along their frontiers so that they could concentrate on establishing internal security, and friendly approaches were made both to Iran and Afghanistan. While the Afghans did not believe that a mere change of régime meant the end of the Russian policy of expansion in Asia, they did welcome the agreement as a potential counterbalance to possible British interference. This treaty placed the U.S.S.R. under specific obligations, a number of which were never fulfilled. The Soviets guaranteed the independence of the Bokhara region just north of Afghanistan—whose ruler had already sought refuge with the Afghans—but by 1923 the U.S.S.R. had absorbed Bokhara completely. In addition, the Russians failed to return to Afghan sovereignty the Panjdeh district, near the western end of the northern frontier, and discontinued payments of a subsidy provided for by the treaty. Instead, the Soviets swung toward a policy of active penetration such as they had previously condemned as "imperialistic." In 1929, a time of internal upheaval in Afghanistan, the U.S.S.R. gave material support to one of the contesting parties, and in June 1930 an official Soviet force crossed the Oxus and penetrated some distance into Afghanistan in search of a Russian outlaw leader.[1] However, Nadir Shah, who came to the throne late in 1929, was able to reduce Soviet influence and interference to a marked degree.

During the first decade after the end of World War I the Afghans looked for a third Power—neither Russia nor Britain—which had no prior political interests in the area and which would assist in planned development. Germany was selected, and throughout the 1930's German advisers had posts with the government, German engineers erected dams and public buildings, a German airline connected Berlin and Kabul, and a barter agreement facilitated the exchange of Afghan raw materials for manufactured goods. At the outset of World War II, Afghanistan asserted her neutrality and maintained it, although the government yielded to a demand by the British and Soviet Governments to expel Axis nationals from the country. Now Germans and Austrians are again in evidence at Kabul.

Afghanistan's relations with the U.S.S.R. are at present relatively placid. Every few months a Soviet station airs a brief blast against the country with the nonsensical charge that military airfields are being built in Afghanistan under the direction of American engineers. And as recently as September 1952 the Soviet Union informed the Afghan Government that American and United Nations technical advisers must be kept out of the northern provinces of the country—a warning which Afghanistan rejected. But for the most part official Russian behavior is correct. For the present, at any rate, the Kremlin appears to believe that blandishments rather than threats will best

[1] *Cf.* "Soviet Imperialism in Afghanistan," by Joseph Castagné. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1935.

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advance its interests in Afghanistan. The trade office maintained in Kabul under the auspices of *Vostorgintorg* was enlarged in 1951, and trade between the two countries is increasing. An original barter agreement of 1936 was replaced by a new series of agreements beginning in 1947, and on July 17, 1950, a four-year agreement was concluded between the two countries. In the main, the trade consists of the exchange of Afghan wool, cotton and dried fruits for Soviet gasoline, cement, steel products and cloth. The 1950 agreement will be due for renewal next year. It will be interesting to see whether the Soviet Union advances proposals for the introduction of Russian "technical experts."

In 1948 the Soviet Union and Afghanistan ratified an agreement which precisely defined their common boundary line. (It should be noted that Iran has been trying for years to get the Russians to agree to delineate sections of the Irano-Soviet frontier). Relations other than official are discouraged by the Afghan Government in its desire to prevent the possible infiltration of Soviet agents and Soviet propaganda. Communist literature in Persian or Pashtu, the principal languages of the country, is not allowed to circulate in Afghanistan. Stories are current at Kabul to the effect that Soviet agents, in the guise of Moslem clerics, cross the Oxus and attempt to promote dissatisfaction in northern Afghanistan, and Afghans say that there is a constant seepage into the country of people escaping from Soviet rule, who bring stories of the unsatisfactory conditions among the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkoman across the border.

Several theories are put forward to explain the absence of a more positive Soviet line toward a neighbor which, though not hostile, does not fit the familiar Communist specifications of a "friendly" government. One is that the U.S.S.R. does not feel that Afghanistan represents any real barrier across the way to India, and that should military movement be required, Afghan resistance could be quickly brushed aside. Another is that the Russians are glad to have the raw materials they are now obtaining, and hence wish to avoid giving offense to the stubbornly proud Afghans. Those who hold to this theory add that should the Afghan Government decide to proceed with the exploitation of the oil which probably lies beneath the ground in northwestern Afghanistan, the Russians would immediately become more active. A final theory is that the Russians realize that the adoption of a harsh policy toward Afghanistan would throw the country into the arms of the Western Powers, and at the same time alert Pakistan and India to the encroaching menace of Communism. According to this theory the Russians wish to avoid any unnecessary activity which would bring their ideological opponents up to the frontier and in touch with Moslem-populated areas of the U.S.S.R. which have always been restless and discontented under Communist rule. In short, the Kremlin prefers to wait.

Afghanistan's relations with her neighbor on the south and east—Pakistan—are openly strained over the question of the Pakhtun (or Pashtun) tribes. These tribesmen inhabited an area which the British began to take over early in the nineteenth century, consolidating their hold in the second Anglo-Afghan war. In 1893, the British dictated Afghan acceptance of the Durand Line between Afghanistan and India, and this boundary now separates Af-

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ghanistan and Pakistan. As this line was traced across the map it split asunder tribal groups of Pakhtuns; groups on both sides of it were numbered among the "true Afghan" tribes. British occupation was followed by the establishment of administrative divisions—the North West Frontier Province for the settled lands nearer the Indus, and the Tribal Territory for the inhospitable, mountainous region between the settled lands and the Durand Line. Years of British military effort failed to pacify or to subdue the Tribal Territory, for if pressure became too great tribal groups could always find temporary refuge across the Afghan frontier.

Within the Tribal Territory and the North West Frontier Province independence movements waxed and waned, and the demand for separation did not gain real strength until 1929 when the party calling itself the Khodai Khedmatgar, or Servants of God, allied itself with the Congress Party of India. Considerably before the withdrawal of the British from India in 1947 the Afghan Government asked that special provisions be made for the future of these two areas, and rather indefinite assurances were given. In June 1947, the Congress Party of the North West Frontier Province, stiffened by the support of the Khodai Khedmatgar, voted for union with India. This apparently illogical desire of Moslems to merge with Hindus was actually a protest against the attachment of the area to Pakistan. Pakistan reacted by holding a referendum on whether the area should join with India or with Pakistan. Since the Congress Party wanted neither of these alternatives, but only independence or autonomy, it ordered a boycott of the referendum. As a result only 51 percent of the population of the contested area went to the polls, but as Moslems they voted in favor of joining the Moslem state of Pakistan.

In the months which followed the referendum, the Pakistan authorities resorted to numerous arrests and restricted military action to suppress latent or active opposition. However, as early as 1947 tribal leaders meeting in Tirah, not far from Peshawar, the major town of the North West Frontier Province, declared the independence of Pakhtunistan (or Pashtunistan). Since that date several regional headquarters of this "free" government are said to have been set up at points within Pakistan, one in caves at Gruwik, a village a score of miles from the Afghan frontier. The dour Faqir of Ipi has headed the movement in the Waziristan section of the Tribal Territory. There is skirmishing between the Pakhtunistan supporters and Pakistan forces, though the reports of severe clashes which reach the West are highly undependable.

The Afghanistan Government maintains that the livelihood of as many as 5,000,000 nomadic tribesmen, who for centuries have moved seasonally between the high mountains of Afghanistan and the plains of the Indus, has been endangered by an artificial barrier that divides and restricts them. Muhammad Zahir Shah told the writer that Afghanistan feels an obligation to the tribes for the frequent help they have given his country in its struggle for freedom, and that Afghanistan's aim is to see that the Pakhtuns achieve autonomy. Efforts to focus world attention on the issue have been seconded by India which, given the intensity of the dispute over Kashmir, is delighted to find grounds for criticizing actions by Pakistan. Heartened by this encouragement, spokesmen for Pakhtunistan who publish periodicals at Bom-

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bay and Delhi have made extravagant demands, claiming not only the Tribal Territory with 2,460,000 tribesmen and the North West Frontier Province with 3,239,000 people, but Baluchistan with its seacoast and thus a total population of 7,000,000. This amounts to asking for more than half the total area of Pakistan.

Pakistan's answer to the tribal issue is simply that there is no such issue, since the inhabitants of these areas voted freely for union with Pakistan. The Government has issued numerous statements protesting against what it terms provocation and interference in internal affairs by Afghanistan and India. Since the bulk of Afghanistan's foreign trade moves over the railways of Pakistan and in and out of the port of Karachi, Pakistan has been able to retaliate against Afghanistan. Shipments of gasoline have been embargoed, the transit of goods delayed and obstacles placed in the way of shipments of quantities of Afghan fruit to India.

Underneath all of this there probably lies the Afghan fear that as a landlocked state the national future is insecure; Afghans feel that an autonomous Pakhtunistan, in which Baluchistan was included, would give their country a friendly outlet to the sea. An intensification of Afghanistan's transit difficulties with Pakistan might force the Afghans into closer economic and political ties with the U.S.S.R. The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that the common Moslem heritage of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the need which each has for the products of the other, ought to impel these neighbors toward an increasingly closer association. The United States has made overtures designed to bring the two countries together for a friendly discussion of the issue, but such efforts have been fruitless. About the only prediction that can be made concerning this dispute is that it will continue to drag on and that in time Pakistan may grant a broader and more representative type of local government to the Tribal Territory and to the North West Frontier Province.

IV

The United States appeared on the scene in Afghanistan only recently. Formal diplomatic relations were established during the last war, and in the war years New York took the place of Berlin and London as the principal market for karakul lambskins, some 2,000,000 of which, exported annually, supply Afghanistan with her major source of foreign exchange. Then, at the end of the war, Afghanistan turned to the United States for needed capital and consumer goods. In the last few years a number of Americans have gone out to teach in Afghan trade and high schools, with remarkable success. Almost every Afghan has a least a hazy concept of the United States, and it seems usually to be a favorable one; this remote country exhibits that currently rare phenomenon—a reservoir of friendly feeling toward the United States. A number of high officials, including cabinet ministers, completed their studies in the fields of medicine, education and engineering in America; one of these former students has written an article of nearly 100 pages on the United States for the official Afghan encyclopedia. Some 60 Afghan students are now in this country and the Prime Minister himself has twice visited here, the last time in the summer of 1951. American movies comprise

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the bulk of the programs in the two cinemas at Kabul, and American magazines are distributed in increasing numbers. This rather general impression of what the United States can do will take more definite form when the huge dams built by the American engineering firm are completed and seen by thousands of Afghans. Continuity of technical guidance and training will come from Point Four, through its Technical Coöperation Administration. Already T.C.A. has appropriated nearly $1,000,000 to train Afghans in the technical direction of the country's development program.

The United States has, in fact, taken over the rôle that Germany played in Afghanistan in the 1930's, and there is reason to believe that American participation in the economic evolution of the country will increase. As current projects are finished there should be a fresh market for vehicles and machinery of many kinds. The Afghan Government is also considering opening sectors of its development program to foreign capital: the terms of the loan by the Export-Import Bank allow private groups to take over portions of the total amount. Reserves of friendship, and the experience of useful work accomplished together, will be welcome assets for both countries when the Soviets decide to play their hand in this area, as in due course they surely will.

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INDIA AND THE TIBETAN TRAGEDY

By C. H. Alexandrowicz

AN apparently insignificant announcement concerning Indo-Tibetan relations was made to the press on September 16, 1952, by the Indian Ministry of External Relations. It stated that the 16-year-old Indian Mission in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, would be wound up and replaced by a Consulate-General; but that whereas the Mission maintained direct relations between India and Tibet, the new Consulate-General would be accredited to China. In other words, Indian recognition seemed to be entirely withdrawn from Tibet and thus the period of coöperation between the two countries on a basis of equality came to an end. As the initiation of this cooperation was one of the cornerstones of Indian foreign policy under British rule its termination must be the expression of some basic change in policy; and there is no better way of understanding this change than by recalling briefly the history of Indo-Tibetan relations.

Tibet is bordered by Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia in the north; by China in the east; by Burma, India, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal in the South; and by India (Punjab and Kashmir) in the west. Bhutan and Sikkim were formerly part of Tibet but are now separate states under Indian suzerainty. Both Tibet and Nepal were under Chinese suzerainty, but whereas the Nepalese threw off Chinese domination, Tibetan efforts to terminate dependence were never completely successful. However, the term Chinese domination calls for explanation. Chinese suzerainty meant at first the overlordship of the Manchu Emperors. With their downfall, Chinese Republican influence in Tibet decreased rapidly and Chinese Communist influence was considered a menace in Lhasa long before the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek.

After the establishment of Buddhism and of the Church of the Lamas, Tibet, once a warring nation, became peace-loving and determined to fend off both Western influence and militarism as a means of avoiding international disputes. There is no other example in history of a nation dominated by a religious creed and priestly organization which was so firm in its policy of avoiding the drawbacks of modern civilization, even if this meant foregoing its benefits. Lacking significant armed forces, Tibet had to safeguard her independence by peaceful means; and this in recent centuries the Lamas succeeded in doing with admirable skill and wisdom. Her neighbors had considerable appetites and tried to find their way to Lhasa. Besides China there was Tsarist Russia, who after having established a hold over Buddhist Mongolia thought of further expanding her influence into Tibet. Russia renounced these intentions in 1907, by a treaty concluded with Great Britain. One of the basic difficulties of all intruders was the complete devotion and allegiance of Tibetans as well as of other Buddhists in that part of the world to the Dalai Lama who combined temporal jurisdiction with spiritual power. None of Tibet's neighbors who had political ambitions was able to overcome the formidable barrier of seclusion, more impenetrable than iron curtains stretched between the pillars of brutal physical force and hostile isolationism.

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India's attitude towards Tibet was different from that of any other country. Gotama the Buddha was of Indian origin and the famous Bodhi tree near Gaya in Bihar, beneath which he sat in contemplation, is still today the sacred meeting place of all Buddhists of the world, whether from Tibet, Burma, Ceylon or Japan. All these countries adopted the great faith of the Enlightened, whereas India, his home country, finally rejected him for the Brahmanical religion.[1] India is still to a great extent Brahmanical, and has not much sympathy or understanding for the Buddhist way of life. In shaping their own ideas about Tibet, Indian politicians could not find much enthusiasm in their hearts, political considerations apart, for "heretic" Tibet,



for which so many British explorers, traders and travellers developed understanding and even admiration. When British rule established itself in India in the nineteenth century, a number of treaties ensured the settlement of all controversial relations on the northeastern frontier. In a treaty between Great Britain and China, concluded in 1890, the former secured recognition of her protectorate over Sikkim. In 1904, Great Britain concluded a treaty with Tibet securing an open trade route frome Kalimpong in India, to Lhasa. Though direct relations were established between the two countries, Great Britain recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in 1906. In 1910 a British Protectorate over Bhutan was established. Thus India, under British rule, had produced a system of security by which her northeastern frontier could be considered more or less immune against the turmoil of Chinese politics.

[1] "The Religion of Tibet," by Sir Charles Bell. New York: Oxford, 1931, p. 21.

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As shown above, the main elements of this security system were British India's suzerainty over Bhutan and Sikkim, the free trade route between Kalimpong and Lhasa opened after Colonel Francis Younghusband's expedition to Lhasa in 1904, and friendly relations with Nepal which ceased to be a vassal state in relation to China. Security on her northeastern frontier allowed British India to concentrate on the more difficult problem of her northwestern frontier bordering on Afghanistan.

In view of the constant Chinese infiltration into Tibet, British India had to consider how to maintain a balance of power there. Any sharp increase of Chinese penetration in Tibet was obviously a threat to British India's security; while the elimination of Chinese influence from Tibet would obviously have caused a deterioration of Anglo-Chinese relations, provoked again the danger of Russian infiltration, and increased unnecessarily the responsibility of British India in relation to Tibet. Thus the balance was determined by a policy of keeping Chinese influence in check without eliminating it entirely. It was successful for years in keeping the famous Russian agent, Mr. Dorjeff, at a fair distance from the hearts of the Lamas. The policy was not formally laid down, but it found visible expression in the provisions of the Simla Conference in 1914, where representatives of British India, China and Tibet initialed a Convention of which the chief provisions were the following:

1. Tibet was to be divided into two parts: Outer Tibet, adjoining India and including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo; and Inner Tibet, including the provinces near China and part of Eastern Tibet.

2. The principle of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was recognized, but China was to observe strictly her limited position as a suzerain. Suzerainty implies that internal sovereignty is vested in the vassal state; in other words China could not, according to the Convention, infringe upon the internal jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama's Government. On the other hand, suzerainty means no external sovereignty in the vassal state. Thus the Convention implied the right of China to conduct Tibet's foreign affairs, with the exception of British India's direct rights in Tibet, essential to the mutual balance in the Indian-Chinese-Tibetan triangle.

3. Great Britain declared that it had no other aspirations in Tibet, and in particular none for territorial expansion or aggrandizement.

4. The division of Tibet into Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet implied the predominant interest of British India in the former and of China in the latter. India always enjoyed the natural security afforded by the Himalayas. The passes leading from the Tibetan plateau into Sikkim and India are important trade routes. Noninterference of China in Outer Tibet best secured freedom of movement on these routes. Thousands of Tibetan traders used to arrive in India yearly over these passes to sell wool, hides and medicinal herbs in exchange for other goods. Thus the firm establishment of the Dalai Lama's jurisdiction in this part of Tibet served the twofold purpose of promoting Indo-Tibetan trade and security of the northeastern frontier of India. British India was allowed to have her trade agents in Outer Tibet and later also established a Mission in Lhasa.

5. In Inner Tibet the Chinese were to keep certain internal rights, including responsibility for the maintenance of order.

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6. Finally, the Chinese were to maintain a representative, called Amban, in Lhasa. As mentioned above, the Amban was later matched by the presence of the British Indian Mission to the Dalai Lama.

One of the tasks of the Simla Conference was also to define the northeastern frontier of India, particularly between Tibet and Bhutan, the vassal of British India where Chinese penetration remained a continuous threat.

Two days after the Convention was initialed, the Chinese Government refused to sign it. The British then informed China that they considered the Convention as in force between themselves and Tibet. A few weeks later the First World War broke out and Tibetan affairs were duly shelved. But the principles of the Simla Conference remained a reliable guide to British Indian policy in Tibet, based as it was on genuine friendship and on a mutually respected balance of power by which no more would be given to or withdrawn from either China or Tibet than was inherent in the balance itself.

Tibet was obviously to serve as a buffer state without giving up its autonomy in its own internal affairs. It was also obvious that British India's action was dictated not only by British Commonwealth interests but by the natural requirements of any future Indian policy, whether connected with British rule or not. Problems of security and trade aside, there was also an increased need after the First World War for vigilance against the Bolshevist penetration which Chinese soldiers tended to import into Tibet. Communism was always less popular in Tibet than in India and Nepal, the reason being that the Dalai Lama's Government was, and still is, primarily spiritual, abhorring physical force as a means of leading people to happiness and salvation.

II

The need for India to play an active part in protecting her security and interests in the northeast is all the greater today because of the strongly imperialist policies adopted by Communist China and the U.S.S.R. The ostensible objective of the Chinese invasion of Tibet is the "liberation" of the Tibetan people. But in fact Mao Tse-tung has assumed the expansionist rôle formerly played by the Manchu Emperors. In other words, Tibet in Chinese eyes is once again a province of China, composed of the present Tibetan territory plus all the areas which originally were Tibetan and later were lost to India or Nepal. Years ago, Tibet owned all of Sikkim down to Siliguri in India, including Darjeeling; it also owned Bhutan, now an Indian vassal state, and had Nepal as a protectorate. Nepal discontinued her quinquennial missions to Peking only about 40 years ago, and shook off Chinese suzerainty.

Thirty years ago, Sir Charles Bell, one of the greatest experts on Tibet, made clear in his work, "Tibet, Past and Present,"[2] that if the Chinese should disturb the Tibetan balance of power as laid down in the Simla Convention, both Nepal and India would be threatened. He also expressed grave concern about the future of the system of security initiated by the British in the event that India were to become independent. He foresaw that with a transfer of power from the British to an independent India the Simla policy would automatically break down, since, he thought, independent India whether through lack of interest or lack of firmness would not support Tibet against

[2] New York: Oxford, 1925, p. 241.

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Chinese imperialism (yellow or red). In such circumstances Tibet would have to break away from the Indian environment, and Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim would find it difficult to continue in friendly partnership with India; for when the inhabitants of these countries saw that India had abandoned the effort to maintain a balance of power in Tibet, and had assumed a passive attitude there, they would be tempted to turn to China of their own accord. One of Sir Charles Bell's practical recommendations for delaying Chinese penetration in Tibet was to prevent Chinese agents from entering that country through India. He also noted that the lines of communication direct from Peking to Lhasa are highly inadequate and emphasized that if ever Chinese troops and officials succeeded in seizing Tibet the export of rice or other food grains and supplies to them through India should be prevented. It is significant that at the present time all Chinese missions enter Tibet via Calcutta and Kalimpong, and that Tibetan missions to China do not travel from Lhasa direct to Peking but take the same roundabout route by way of Kalimpong and Calcutta.

Let us now look at events in the last two years in the light of the above warnings and recommendations.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet started at the end of 1950. It embraced at first only part of what the Simla Convention had designated as Inner Tibet. At the end of December in that year the young Dalai Lama left Lhasa and moved to Yatung in the Chumbi valley, only 15 miles from the border of India, thereby making clear that he was ready to become an exile in India, as his predecessor had done 30 years before. As soon as this happened the Chinese invasion stopped and Lhasa remained temporarily free. The next development was that a delegation of the Tibetan Government was invited to Peking. On arriving there they were told that Chinese military headquarters would be set up in Lhasa, and when they protested they were informed that Tibet had become a province of China and that they would do well to recognize the fact. Then a treaty was submitted to them for signature. They first said they would take it to Yatung and ask the Dalai Lama for instructions, but under pressure they were forced to sign immediately. One is reminded of the procedure applied by Hitler in 1938 to the unfortunate President of Czechoslovakia, and later to other victims.

After signing the treaty the Tibetan delegation left Peking and travelled back to Lhasa via Calcutta and Yatung. Meanwhile the Chinese had captured the Dalai Lama, with the help of a few bribed lamas, and brought him to Lhasa. For some time the Chinese generals in Tibet worked under the cloak of the Dalai Lama's authority; but having consolidated their power in the first half of 1952 they forced the Dalai Lama to dismiss all his supporters in the government and remain completely isolated. Furthermore, the Panchen Lama, next in importance to the Dalai Lama, was brought to Lhasa as his rival. When the two became friends they were again separated. Finally the Chinese Government invited India to withdraw her Mission from Lhasa in order to destroy the last trace of Tibetan independence.

The Indian Government has now complied with Chinese wishes and sent a Consul General to Lhasa who is accredited to China and not to Tibet. Thus with a stroke of the pen India relinquished the old policy of security in the

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northeast, worked out during years of effort and negotiation. Indian public opinion is as yet unaware of the historical consequences of this move.

The Chinese penetration of all the previous dependencies of the Chinese Emperors is likely to increase. The exact sequence of events cannot be foreseen, but it seems that Nepal is already involved in serious internal troubles (not without Communist participation) and that Communist pressure in Sikkim, Bhutan and Darjeeling is increasing.

India, whatever her motives in abandoning a genuine Indian policy as initiated under British rule, has to wake up to the reality on her northeastern frontiers and to events which are likely to follow. Tibet is now definitely behind the Iron Curtain and news as to what is going on beyond the Himalayan passes is scanty. It is, however, certain that the Chinese are building a strategic road from Lhasa to the frontier of India and Sikkim. This is the same track along which Colonel Francis Younghusband's army pushed in more primitive conditions in 1904 from India to Lhasa, and there is no reason why it could not be used for aggressive purposes in the other direction. Accounts of Younghusband's expedition mention the significant fort of Phari on the track below the peak of Chomo Lhari. The Chinese are reported to be building near the old fort a modern fort located in Galingk'a. They are also reported to be building, with the help of Soviet experts, several air bases all over Tibet, one at Lhasa and one on the plain between Lake Manasarowar and Lake Rukas, which is only 300 miles from New Delhi. It has been officially admitted by Indian politicians that there are Chinese military detachments stationed all along the Indian frontier. There are also rumors of atomic experts conducting investigations in uranium deposits in southern Tibet. The Chinese have printed a geographical map of China in which Bhutan and Sikkim are shown as part of China or Tibet. The matter has been recently discussed in the Indian Parliament and is, in spite of Chinese denials, a serious cause for anxiety. It is difficult at the moment to separate reliable evidence from hearsay. However, one thing certain is that the previous intercourse between India and Tibet has come to an end and that India has found herself close up against the Iron Curtain.[3] In case of armed conflict, a southward Communist thrust might take place in the first instance from China and Tibet into Burma. Even so, considerable Indian armed forces would be immobilized on the Himalayan passes and south of them. If these passes and the adjoining strategic areas are not adequately defended, another Communist thrust could, in case of war, follow from the north and east directly into the plains of India.

Whatever the future, the period of balance of power by political manœuvring is over; and if physical force is behind the unbalance it can be opposed only by physical force. A former Congress President emphasized in a speech in the Indian Constituent Assembly that compulsory military service would be one of the best safeguards of independence. Its purpose, in the first instance, would be the creation of a strong and efficient army and, moreover, the strengthening of national discipline essential to face hard facts.

[3] When Tibetan children and students who were studying in Indian schools and colleges went home for their holidays in Tibet, they were unable to return to India.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MAN. By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. New York: Knopf, 1952, 494 p. $5.00.

In this inquiry into present international politics, Professor Schuman asserts that world government, to him the only feasible escape from the present situation, can be attained, if at all, through a "voluntary extension of the principles of federalism to the whole society of nations," and not through the "functionalist" approach or by the way of collective security. His tendency to see the activities of the world's policy makers as "an adventure in a nightmare or in the strange land described by Lewis Carroll" lends an air of unreality to his own argument.

THE ZONE OF INDIFFERENCE. By ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ. New York: Putnam, 1952, 312 p. $3.75.

Behind a somewhat cryptic title Mr. Strausz-Hupé has written a thoughtful commentary, neither cheerful nor morbid, on the contemporary crisis of the Western Community. Seeing the West as heir of four legacies—Greece, Rome, Christianity and the liability to constant pressure from Asia—he believes that the critical question is whether Western Europe and the United States, parts of the same culture, can avoid becoming alienated one from the other in face of external military threat and internal spiritual crisis.

THE "ETERNAL QUESTION." By H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE. Copenhagen: Rosenkilde, 1952, 138 p.

In Prince Peter's view the "eternal question" is the conflict between East and West, the culture of the Eurasian steppe and the culture of the Mediterranean.

MEETING OF MINDS. By ELMORE JACKSON. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952, 200 p. $3.50.

Mr. Jackson, representative at the U.N. of the American Friends Service Committee, reviews with the assistance of some distinguished contributors the history of mediation in labor disputes in the United States, Sweden and Great Britain in an effort to extend to international issues this technique of settling differences.

ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952, 172 p. $1.25.

A study-group report on the formation, development and present rôle of NATO. A valuable sequel to a similar group report, "Defence in the Cold War" (noted here July 1951), it, too, has been ably drafted by Donald McLachlan.

CITIZENS OF THE WORLD. By STRINGFELLOW BARR. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 285 p. $3.00.

Mr. Barr makes the valid point that the majority of the human race are neither Russians nor Americans, live in poverty, need our enlightened assistance, and have

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mixed feelings about the cold war. But by taking, and exaggerating, some of the more erratic characteristics of the American scene as his point of departure for a sharp criticism of recent American foreign policy, he becomes involved in mock battles which do not adequately display the difficult alternatives confronting our policy makers.

AMERICAN RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1781–1947. By William Appleman Williams. New York: Rinehart, 1952, 367 p. $5.00.

The greater part of this book is concerned with the years between 1917 and 1939. The author has done much research, in the National Archives and elsewhere, to emerge with the conclusion that the responsibility for recent unhappy American-Russian relations rests mainly with the United States. While the extensive documentation he provides for the American half of the story warrants attention, if not acceptance, Mr. Williams' treatment of the aims and methods of Soviet foreign policy avoids the essential question.

WE CAN BE FRIENDS. By Carl Marzani. New York: Topical Books Publishers, 1952, 380 p. $3.50.

Mr. Marzani, who began this book while serving a prison sentence for perjury concerning his affiliation with the Communist Party, insists that the cold war was instigated by the Truman Administration.

UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD COMMUNITY. By A. H. Feller. Boston: Little, Brown, 1952, 153 p. $2.50.

A survey of the first six years of the United Nations by its late general counsel. Emphasis is placed on the shift from the Security Council to the General Assembly—now the real heart of the organization.

THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Hossein Fakher. New York: Staples, 1952, 200 p. $3.50.

A study by an Iranian scholar of the relationships as set down in the U.N. Charter and as subsequently developed in practice.

MAKE THE UN EFFECTIVE FOR PEACE. By John Bauer. New York: R. R. Smith, 1952, 160 p. $2.50.

A specialist in public utility regulation ventures some proposals for modifications in the U.N. Charter, chief among them being a prohibition of aggression and national armaments.

FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL APPRAISAL. Edited by Lyman Bryson and Others. New York: Harper (for the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life), 1952, 498 p. $4.00.

A symposium of papers directed toward the definition of the social and political conditions that must underlie the creation of any effective world government.

LA FACE DE MÉDUSE DU COMMUNISME. By Thierry Maulnier. Paris: Gallimard, 1951, 236 p. Fr. 480.

An essay on the terror generated by the "collectivist revolution" with its implacable insistence that there must be a final and bloody settling of accounts.

OHNE MICH! . . . OHNE UNS? By Werner Schöllgen. Graz (Austria): Pustet, 1951, 201 p. Schillings 32.70.

A professor of moral theology searches for the means of overcoming war without falling into the isolation of radical pacifism or the helplessness of defeatism.

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FAITH IS A WEAPON. By Thomas B. Morgan. New York: Putnam, 1952, 278 p. $3.75.

The Catholic Church's resistance to Communism, principally in Western Europe and behind the Iron Curtain.

DESTINÉE DU NATIONALISME. By Horia Sima. Paris: Bonne, 1951, 227 p. Fr. 550.

A prominent figure in the European Fascist movement of the 1930's—he was a leader of the Rumanian Iron Guard—reflects on the late defeat and proposes an alliance with democracy.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON: A STUDY OF BOLSHEVIK STRATEGY AND TACTICS. By Philip Selznick. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952, 350 p. $5.00.

The author creates an abstract "interpretive model" to expose a pattern of Communist motivation and action. His aim, for which the method seems hardly adequate, is to increase our ability to predict or control Bolshevik tactics.

AUF DEM KRIEGSPFAD. By Richard Squires. Berlin: Rütten, 1951, 246 p.

Pro-Soviet propaganda by a British army deserter. Of interest only as the book which presented the purported excerpts from General Grow's diary.

LA DÉFENSE ACCUSE. By Marcel Willard. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1951, 315 p. Fr. 450.

A gallery of Communist heroes, some of whom—Marty and Pauker—must be expunged from the next edition.

THE ROAD TO SAFETY. By Arthur Willert. London: Verschoyle, 1952, 184 p. 15/.

Reminiscences of the London *Times* correspondent in Washington during the First World War. Particular attention is given to the rôle of Sir William Wiseman.

OFF THE RECORD. Edited by Dickson Hartwell and Andrew A. Rooney. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 324 p. $3.95.

A collection of stories and anecdotes which, for one reason or another, foreign correspondents were unable to file. No great revelations.

AMBASSADOR'S WIFE. By Elisabetta Cerruti. New York: Macmillan, 1953, 255 p. $3.00.

Earlier editions of these memoirs of the wife of an Italian ambassador to China, Russia, Germany and France in the 1920's and 1930's were published in France and Italy in 1950 and 1951, and were mentioned here in January 1952.

GESCHICHTE UNSERER ZEIT, 1870–1950. By Emil Franzel. Munich (U. S. Zone): Oldenbourg, 1952, 496 p.

A broad survey of world history since 1870.

MONARCHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Sir Charles Petrie. London: Dakers, 1952, 223 p. 16/6. (New York: Macmillan, $3.50.)

Half of this volume by an eminent British historian is devoted to the British monarchy since the death of Queen Victoria. Other chapters deal with the Spanish, Italian, Greek and Central European monarchies.

VÖLKERRECHT BEGINNT BEI DIR. Edited by Hans K. E. L. Keller. Munich (U. S. Zone): Grotius, 1952, 110 p.

A series of brief talks on international law given in 1951 at a meeting to commemorate the death of Grotius.

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THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION. By George Arthur Codding, Jr. Leyden: Brill, 1952, 505 p. (New York: Heinman, $10.00.)

A detailed and, it would appear, exhaustive monograph on the history of international coöperation for the regulation and control of telecommunications.

LE DROIT SUR LES NOUVELLES. By G.-M. Razl. Paris: Sirey, 1952, 200 p. Fr. 900.

A monograph in comparative law on the protection of property in news.

THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. By M. W. Mouton. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952, 367 p. Guilders 24.

The continental shelf—that part of the sea bottom and subsoil covered by shallow water to a depth of 100 fathoms—has become of increasing concern to international law because of the recent discoveries and exploitation in it of mineral resources, above all oil.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1953. Edited by Walter H. Mallory and Joseph Barber. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1953, 233 p. $3.75.

The new edition of this standard reference book takes account of the many political changes in governments throughout the world during 1952, notably in Iron Curtain countries. The section on the United States has been completely revised to cover the change of Administration. Members of all governments are listed, party programs summarized and newspapers identified.

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1952. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1952, 378 p. $7.50.

This Year Book is now to fill the place of the quarterly journal *World Affairs* (London Institute of World Affairs) which has suspended publication. The volume includes articles on the peace treaty with Japan, Chinese representation in the U.N., the Anglo-Iranian dispute, the Council of Europe and the Moroccan problem.

LA POLITIQUE DES ÉTATS ET LEUR GÉOGRAPHIE. By Jean Gottmann. Paris: Colin, 1952, 228 p. Fr. 670.

Some stimulating reflections on the relation of geography to politics and historical change. The author's starting point is that the earth is a "closed" area, but not a uniform or homogeneous one.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE STERLING AREA: AN AMERICAN ANALYSIS. Washington: G.P.O., 1952, 672 p. $3.00.

THE STERLING AREA. By A. R. Conan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1952, 192 p. $3.25.

BRITAIN, THE STERLING AREA AND EUROPE. By F. V. Meyer. Cambridge (Eng.): Bowes, 1952, 150 p. 21/.

All three of these books contribute substantially to an understanding of the sterling area and its functions, matters of considerable importance for future policy in a number of countries. The first, an E.C.A. study, is largely a description of the economies of countries in the sterling area and of production and trade in commodities especially important to the area. Nearly 400 tables and 250 colored maps and charts help make this a major reference work, especially for the period 1945–50. Mr. Conan, in much smaller space, describes the working of the sterling area mechanism and analyzes the balances of payments of major members. The result is to challenge

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a number of widely accepted beliefs, particularly about the balance of payments of the United Kingdom, and to emphasize the shift in the center of gravity of the sterling area toward its overseas members. Mr. Meyer provides a detailed statistical analysis of some of the postwar operations of the sterling area which throws light on a number of issues. This study is rather loosely linked with a study of Britain's relation to a potential European customs union and the European Payments Union and with an introductory essay that touches on a variety of current problems.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Jacob Viner. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1952, 154 p. $2.75.

In these lectures, delivered at the National University of Brazil in 1950, Professor Viner examines critically current theoretical thinking about international trade, with special concern for the difficulties of using theory as a guide to policy. Much of his final lecture is given to exposing the inadequacies of most recent writing about economic development.

INTERNATIONAL CARTELS. By Kenneth L. Mayall. Rutland (Vt.): Tuttle, 1951, 173 p. $2.75.

A former SCAP official argues that the appearance and persistence of cartels in most major countries indicate that it would be futile to try to eliminate them. Instead, he favors international control of cartels and commodity agreements as a major means of "rationalized international economic planning." The author's style is heavily marked by his years in government and business, and somewhat scarred by his contact with the writings of economists.

ECONOMIC STABILITY IN A CHANGING WORLD. By John H. Williams. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 284 p. $5.00.

Six articles on European recovery, originally appearing in *Foreign Affairs*, provide the core of this interesting and authoritative book. Other essays discuss the relation of economic theory to public policy and assess the views and influence of J. M. Keynes. Some of the essays were included in Professor Williams' earlier book, "Postwar Monetary Plans and Other Essays" (reviewed here April 1949).

WAR AND DEFENSE ECONOMICS. By Jules Backman and Others. New York: Rinehart, 1952, 458 p. $4.50.

Five authors, using largely the American experience, discuss competently the problems of production in an armament economy and the accompanying problem of inflation control.

INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. By Walter R. Sharp. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952, 146 p. $2.50.

A survey of the organization of recent governmental and international programs for technical assistance and of the administrative difficulties encountered. Some tentative suggestions are offered for improving the operation of such programs.

THE PROGRESS OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS. Edited by Bert F. Hoselitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 296 p. $4.75.

A symposium of lectures relating to the problems involved in governmentally sponsored economic growth.

ANATOMY OF PUBLIC OPINION. By Norman John Powell. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951, 619 p. $7.35.

A general introduction to the nature and measurement of public opinion and to the means of influencing it.

HOW TO UNDERSTAND PROPAGANDA. By Alfred McClung Lee. New York: Rinehart, 1952, 281 p. $4.00.

A brief, popular guide to the methods and techniques of propaganda.

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WORLD POPULATION AND FUTURE RESOURCES. Edited by Paul K. Hatt. New York: American Book, 1952, 262 p. $3.50.

The proceedings of the Second Centennial Academic Conference of Northwestern University, dealing with the interrelation of population growth, resources and advancing technology.

APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS OF HIGH FERTILITY IN AGRARIAN SOCIETIES. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1952, 171 p. $1.00.

Papers on the problem of high fertility in preindustrial societies.

PORTS AND HARBOURS. By F. W. Morgan. London: Hutchinson, 1952, 176 p. 8/6. (New York: Longmans, $2.25.)

A concise discussion of the nature and location of ports and their relation with the trade of the hinterland which feeds them.

The Second World War

DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG, 1939–1945. By Walter Görlitz. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Steingrüben, 1951–52, 2 v.

An extensive but readable history, based largely on secondary sources and information gained from Wehrmacht officers. Primarily concerned with Germany's military fortunes, it only touches on the Pacific War.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THREE BATTLES: ARNAVILLE, ALTUZZO, AND SCHMIDT. By Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952, 443 p. $4.00.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. PICTORIAL RECORD: THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952, 471 p. $3.50.

Two further volumes in the history of the United States Army in World War II. The book by MacDonald and Mathews is devoted to the exploits of small units in battle—the battalions, the platoons and the individual soldiers. The actions described are the crossing of the Moselle River at Dornot and Arnaville, the penetration of the Gothic Line at Monte Altuzzo, and the battle for Schmidt, Germany, in November 1944. The pictorial record continues the series, in which similar volumes on the Mediterranean and European theaters have already appeared.

CRISIS IN THE DESERT: MAY–JULY 1942. By J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton and L. C. F. Turner. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 368 p. $9.00.

This volume, prepared by the Union War Histories Section of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, deals in detail with the dark days of the campaign in the Western Desert just before the battle of El Alamein.

LA QUERELLE DES GÉNÉRAUX. By Chamine. Paris: Michel, 1952, 587 p. Fr. 900.

This second volume on the wartime struggle for control of French North Africa (Suite Française, Volume I, "La Conjuration d'Alger," appeared in 1946) begins with the Allied invasion and carries the story, in considerable detail, to the assassination of Admiral Darlan. In places the author is unduly speculative.

LA BATAILLE DE CASABLANCA. By Jacques Mordal. Paris: Plon, 1952, 311 p. Fr. 690.

A detailed account of the assault on Casablanca in November 1942.

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PRIMAVERA A TRIESTE. By P. A. Quarantotti Gambini. Milan: Mondadori, 1951, 320 p. L. 900.

An account, in the form of a diary, of events in Venezia Giulia in the confused weeks from April 29 to June 12, 1945. The author, an *Istriano,* was director of the Biblioteca Civica of Trieste at the time.

ON M'APPELAIT RÉMY. By Rémy. Paris: Plon, 1951, 645 p. Fr. 990.

The author of "Mémoires d'un agent secret" (volumes of which were noted here in July 1946, January 1949, April 1950 and January 1952) deals in this book rather more personally with his own activities in the Resistance.

GEKÄMPFT GESIEGT GESCHLAGEN. By Lothar Rendulic. Heidelberg (U. S. Zone): Welsermühl, 1952, 306 p.

The reminiscences of Dietl's successor in northern Finland, who describes his activities in Lapland and Norway in a more palatable manner than historical facts would seem to warrant.

The United States

FLEET ADMIRAL KING. By Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill. New York: Norton, 1952, 674 p. $6.75.

Although written by Commander Whitehill, this record of Fleet Admiral King's naval career is essentially autobiographical. The latter half of the lengthy and restrained and rather austere narrative deals with the Second World War and is naturally of the greatest interest. It authoritatively presents the Navy's position on a number of strategic controversies, and adds to our factual knowledge of certain key events, such as the Casablanca, Yalta, Quebec and Potsdam conferences.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: ITS ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP FOR THE WOODROW WILSON FOUNDATION. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, 288 p. $3.75.

Although having at times the flavor of a committee report, this group study dealing with the problem "how the structure and practices of our government might be improved to permit the full and effective discharge of American responsibilities and obligations in interrelated domestic and international affairs" is a substantial and thoughtful analysis and prescription. The members of the group were William Yandell Elliott, McGeorge Bundy, Harry D. Gideonse, George F. Kennan, Don K. Price and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

AMERICA IN CRISIS. Edited by Daniel Aaron. New York: Knopf, 1952, 363 p. $4.00.

Fourteen essays, running from the Great Awakening in 1740 to the disillusionment of the American Left in 1939, in pursuit of the rather elusive theme of the American response to social and spiritual crises in the national history.

THE BIG CHANGE. By Frederick Lewis Allen. New York: Harper, 1952, 308 p. $3.50.

Eminently readable observations on the changes that have taken place in American life since 1900. Mr. Allen is most rewarding in his ability to bring to life past moods and scenes, perhaps less so when he analyzes what these changes add up to.

ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT. By Paul H. Douglas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 114 p. $2.25.

MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By George A. Graham. New York: Random House, 1952, 337 p. $3.50.

Both these books derive, in part at least, from the "ethics subcommittee" of the

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Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, of which Senator Douglas was chairman and Professor Graham a consultant. Senator Douglas' common sense observations were first delivered as the Godkin Lectures at Harvard. Professor Graham's more extensive study attempts, with a good deal of penetration, to relate the problem of ethical conditions in politics and government to the underlying standards of the nation as a whole.

THE CIO AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. By Fay Calkins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 162 p. $4.00.

Five case studies of the activities and effectiveness of local CIO Political Action Committee groups in the 1950 elections.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE APPRENTICESHIP. By Frank Freidel. Boston: Little, Brown, 1952, 456 p. $6.00.

In this first of a projected six-volume biography, Professor Freidel carries the narrative only through the late President's youth, early years in New York State politics and his work as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Clearly intended as a definitive study, this volume is the product of extensive and sedulous scholarship; the future lines of Roosevelt's development are by no means clearly laid out, however, by the time of the 1918 Armistice.

McCARTHY: THE MAN, THE SENATOR, THE "ISM." By Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952, 431 p. $3.75.

A critical examination of the Senator's career.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES. By William Z. Foster. New York: International Publishers, 1952, 600 p. $6.00.

To the limited extent it is possible for an American Communist to write an authoritative history of his party, this volume by the national chairman of the CPUSA may be considered, for the time being, the official interpretation.

Western Europe

LE PLAN SCHUMAN. By J. F. Kövér. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1952, 232 p. Fr. 690.

In a rather optimistic mood, M. Kövér discusses many of the main aspects of the Schuman Plan, such as its implications for national sovereignty, European federation, labor standards, and the forms of industrial organization. An appendix gives a most useful analytical outline of the coal and steel treaty and the convention on transitional application.

DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMANPLAN. By Robert Krawielicki. Tübingen (French Zone): Mohr, 1952, 122 p.

A practical handbook on the terms of the Schuman Plan relating to cartels and their relation to German cartel laws.

LES CONSTITUTIONS EUROPÉENNES. By Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1951, 2 v. Fr. 3000.

A collection, alphabetically by country, of contemporary European constitutions, with introductory essays on European parliamentarism, the People's Democracies, and human rights.

TRAVELS IN JEWRY. By Israel Cohen. London: Goldston, 1952, 372 p. 25/.

Sketches of some 30 Jewish communities in different parts of Europe which the author, as a Zionist official, visited between the two world wars. As the author points out a number of these communities have since been obliterated.

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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN ITALY AND FRANCE. By Mario Einaudi and François Goguel. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952, 229 p. $4.00.

An excellent survey, by two able authors, of *Democrazia Cristiana* in Italy and the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* in France. An additional section comparing the two movements would have been welcome.

L'ANGLETERRE EN MÉDITERRANÉE. By Captain Jean Tonnelé (ret.). Paris: Lavauzelle, 1952, 223 p. Fr. 800.

A French author sets out to discover just how England contrived to become a Mediterranean Power.

FORCES DE LA FRANCE. By General Weygand. Paris: Boivin, 1951, 186 p. Fr. 780.

A call to France to remember her vocation and her historic rôle in the defense of Western civilization.

PRINCIPES NOUVEAUX D'ÉCONOMIE COLONIALE. By René Moreux. Paris: Moreux, 1951, 174 p. Fr. 500.

Proposals for the improvement of French colonial economic policy with the aim of creating a true solidarity of interests in the *Union française*.

LES CAHIERS DU BOLCHEVISME PENDANT LA CAMPAGNE 1939–1940. Paris: Wapler, 1952, 160 p.

A reproduction, with pungent commentary by A. Rossi, of the sole issue (January 1940) of the French Communist Party organ to be published during the period of the "phony war."

THE POPULATION OF SWITZERLAND. By Kurt B. Mayer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, 336 p. $5.00.

A detailed examination of the structure and changes of the Swiss population, with their influence on economic and social institutions.

HITLER: A STUDY IN TYRANNY. By Alan Bullock. New York: Harper, 1953, 776 p. $6.00.

While it is perhaps impossible for a sane man ever to plumb the full depths of the Hitlerian personality, this scholarly and balanced biography is certainly the best single book on the Führer. Covering the whole of Hitler's life, and making extensive use of the abundant sources—especially the Nuremberg trials—Mr. Bullock, Censor of St. Catherine's, Oxford, has contributed most valuably to our picture of the Nazi era.

SWORD AND SWASTIKA. By Telford Taylor. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952, 431 p. $5.00.

The American chief of counsel for the prosecution of war criminals at Nuremberg has written a useful study of the relationship between the German officer class and the Nazis through 1939. In the broad picture the generals are seen to be less the instigators than the executors, some willing, many reluctant, of German policy. Certainly, as the author says, the old *esprit de corps* had atrophied.

GERMANY IN POWER AND ECLIPSE. By James K. Pollock and Homer Thomas. New York: Van Nostrand, 1952, 661 p. $10.00.

A survey, based on research undertaken for army use during the war. Since about two-thirds of the book is devoted to a region-by-region description its value is largely as work of reference.

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GERMAN NATIONALISM: THE TRAGEDY OF A PEOPLE. By Louis L. Snyder. Harrisburg (Pa.): Stackpole, 1952, 321 p. $3.75.

A study, in intellectual history, of "extremist thinking" in the development of German nationalism since *Turnvater* Jahn. Many of the criticisms, while appropriate, are reasonably familiar.

VOM WESEN DES KRIEGES UND VOM KRIEGSWESEN DER DEUTSCHEN. By Werner Picht. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Vorwerk, 1952, 267 p.

A learned, sometimes labored, but often rewarding philosophical and historical inquiry into the nature of war and its bearing on German society.

THE DEVIL'S CHEMISTS. By Josiah E. DuBois, Jr. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952, 374 p. $3.75.

I. G. Farben's complicity in Nazi Germany's aggression is here reviewed by the prosecutor in the Nuremberg trial of 24 leading officials of that organization. It is the author's opinion that the court in this instance was more than lenient.

M-AA 509. By Karl Vogel. Memmingen/Allgäu (U. S. Zone): The Author, 1951, 257 p.

The diary of a German officer who was commander of an internment camp established by the American army at Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

EUROPA UND DIE DEUTSCHEN FLÜCHTLINGE. By Gabriele Wülker and Others. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1952, 141 p.

Essays on political, economic and psychological aspects of the German refugee problem and the international responsibility for dealing with it.

UNSER SCHICKSAL: DIE DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIE. By Heinrich Hauser. Munich (U. S. Zone): Steinebach, 1952, 201 p.

An enthusiastic display of Germany's industrial recovery since 1945.

THE REBEL PRINCE: MEMOIRS OF PRINCE LOUIS FERDINAND OF PRUSSIA. Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 356 p. $3.95.

An unpretentious autobiography by the titular head of the Hohenzollerns.

DIE ÖSTERREICHISCHEN GEWERKSCHAFTEN. By Fritz Klenner. Vienna: Verlag des Österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1951, 741 p. Schillings 54.

This first volume of an extensive history of the Austrian trade union movement carries the story up to 1928.

MUSSOLINI E LO STATO MAGGIORE. By Francesco Rossi. Rome: Tipografia Regionale, 1951, 191 p. L. 600.

General Rossi discusses the responsibility of the Italian General Staff for Italy's ill-fated entry into war in 1940 and for the campaigns of that year.

OVRA: FASCISMO-ANTIFASCISMO. By Guido Leto. Bologna: Cappelli, 1952, 262 p. L. 950.

A substantial and unsensational history of the development and function of Mussolini's secret police agency during the Fascist era. The author was for many years an official in the political police.

SPRING IN SPAIN. By MacKinley Helm. New York: Harcourt, 1952, 315 p. $5.00.

An informal tour of Spain, fresh in its impressions, with particular love for the Spanish baroque.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VACANCES AVEC SALAZAR. By Christine Garnier. Paris: Grasset, 1952, 244 p. Fr. 630.

A French journalist's record of a number of informal interviews and conversations with the Portuguese premier.

Eastern Europe

CHALLENGE TO THE KREMLIN. By Harry Hodgkinson. New York: Praeger, 1953, 190 p. $2.75.

Taking the Tito-Stalin dispute as a point of departure, the author examines the strains and contradictions he sees appearing in world Communism and the Soviet Union. The book contains some stimulating, if currently unverifiable, hypotheses about the mainsprings of Soviet foreign policy.

BOLSHEVISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET COMMUNISM. By Waldemar Gurian. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952, 189 p. $3.25.

A concise and critical exposition of Bolshevism as a secular religion and its development as a political reality in Russia and beyond. The author is professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame.

J'AI VU TOMBER LE RIDEAU DE FER. By General Catroux. Paris: Hachette, 1952, 317 p. Fr. 650.

A report on three years of frustration and disappointment by the French Ambassador in Moscow from 1945 to 1948. The book concludes with an appeal for the creation of a counterforce to check the expansive drive of the Soviet Union.

MY UNCLE JOSEPH STALIN. By Budu Svanidze. New York: Putnam, 1953, 235 p. $3.00.

Nephew Budu, who left Russia in 1945 for matrimonial rather than political reasons, holds his uncle in naive affection and respect as an amiable Georgian family man. It is impossible to check the reliability of many of his recollections.

THE NEW MAN IN SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY. By Raymond A. Bauer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 229 p. $4.00.

A cool and careful study of the evolution of Soviet psychological theory—especially in its interpretation of human nature—under the changing circumstances of Soviet society from the revolution to the present.

MINERALS: A KEY TO SOVIET POWER. By Demitri B. Shimkin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 452 p. $8.00.

This book, a product of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, is based on the premise that the study of mineral economics provides an exceptionally useful guide to the total economy, to the technology, and to the broad policies of modern nations, especially the Soviet Union.

L'OUZBÉKISTAN. By General Tubert. Paris: Éditions du Pavillon, 1951, 153 p. Fr. 300.

A report on the Soviet republic by the former mayor of Algiers who accompanied a delegation of North African Moslems.

SOVIET. By Vittorio G. Rossi. Milan: Garzanti, 1951, 328 p. L. 1000.

A report on a two months' visit to the Soviet Union by the only Italian journalist, not a Communist or fellow-traveller, to be admitted in the years since the war.

HARASCIÒ: RUSSIA NON INVENTATA. By Stefano Rudie. Bari: Laterza, 1951, 294 p. L. 1200.

Wartime Russia as seen by a sensitive and highly literate Italian observer.

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RUSSIA AND HER COLONIES. By Walter Kolarz. New York: Praeger, 1953, 334 p. $6.00.

The term "colonies" may be somewhat misleading; the book is rather a study of Soviet policy toward the non-Russian peoples within the U.S.S.R.

SIBIRIEN. By Oswin Cornelius Pfeiffer. Berlin: Safari, 1952, 247 p.

A résumé of information on resources and industrial development in Siberia.

DAS GENOSSENSCHAFTSWESEN IN OSTEUROPA. By Peter-Heinz Seraphim. Neuwied am Rhein (French Zone): Raiffeisen, 1951, 176 p.

A survey of the vicissitudes of the coöperative movement in Eastern Europe before and after the Second World War.

I KRIGÅRENS LOVLIGA AVSIKT. By K. A. Bratt. Stockholm: Hökerbergs, 1952, 300 p.

These memoirs of a well-known Swedish military expert shed new light on Finnish-Swedish relations during 1939–40.

ANATOMY OF A SATELLITE. By Dana Adams Schmidt. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1952, 512 p. $5.00.

A conscientious report, by the *New York Times* correspondent in Prague in 1949–50, of developments in Czechoslovakia, chiefly after the Communists took power in 1948. The story is very unpleasant but is told soberly.

TITO. By Vladimir Dedijer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953, 443 p. $5.00.

It is to be expected that an approved biography of Marshal Tito, written by a close associate, formerly the director of the Communist journal *Borba*, should leave a number of questions unanswered. But the figure which is presented has life and personality, and the book contains a great deal of illuminating information, notably, of course, on the rather long background of Stalin-Tito friction and on the strange workings of the Kremlin mind during and after the war. An important source on Jugoslav, Balkan and diplomatic events and personalities.

PEASANT RENAISSANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1900–1950. By Ruth Trouton. London: Routledge, 1952, 344 p. 28/.

A study of a peasant society in contact with the forces of industrialization and urbanization, with special reference to the rôle of education.

THE YUGOSLAVS. By Z. Kostelski. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 498 p. $4.75.

In praise of the South Slavs, including the Bulgarians; practically nothing on the period after the First World War.

BULGARIEN BLICKT WESTWÄRTS! By D. N. Popoff. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Deutsch-Bulgarischen Gesellschaft, 1951, 160 p.

A former Bulgarian vice-consul in Frankfurt contends that Bulgaria really belongs to the West.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY. By Elaine Windrich. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 268 p. $5.00.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT, 1945–1951. By M. A. Fitzsimons. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953, 182 p. $3.25.

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The theme of Dr. Windrich's study is the specific continuity of British Labor's international outlook over the past half-century, which in turn implies a negation of traditional continuity in governmental foreign policy regardless of party. Mr. Fitzsimons, dealing only with the period 1945–51, reaches the opposite conclusion —that the Labor Government followed the course marked out by its predecessor and thus maintained the essential continuity of British foreign policy.

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1951. By D. E. Butler. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1952, 289 p. $4.25.

This is a third in a series of studies of British general elections. The method followed is similar to that developed for the 1945 and 1950 elections: a discussion of party organization, the course of the campaign and its issues, followed by a more detailed analysis of six individual contests in the constituencies.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN BRITAIN: A SYMPOSIUM. Edited by Sydney D. Bailey. New York: Praeger, 1952, 211 p. $3.50.

A symposium of essays by a number of well-known British writers on the evolution of the party system, the principles of the three main parties, and some of the problems to which the system gives rise.

THE HISTORY OF THE TIMES: THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY AND BEYOND, 1912–1948. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 2 pts. $14.00.

The last volume, in two parts, of an official history of one of the world's leading newspapers. Of particular interest is the account of the rôle played by *The Times* in the domestic and foreign crises confronting Britain in the 1930's. The years 1939 to 1948 are treated briefly in a concluding chapter.

THE BRITISH WORKER. By Ferdynand Zweig. Baltimore: Penguin, 1952, 243 p. 65 cents.

A fresh and illuminating perspective on the British worker from the point of view of a former professor of political economy at the University of Cracow who came to Britain in 1940.

PARLIAMENT: A SURVEY. By Lord Campion and Others. London: Allen and Unwin, 1952, 296 p. 22/6. (New York: Macmillan, $5.25.)

A number of able parliamentarians, lawyers, historians and civil servants contribute to this symposium on the working of the British system in the world today.

THE PASSING OF PARLIAMENT. By G. W. Keeton. London: Benn, 1952, 208 p. 21/. (New York: De Graff, $4.50.)

An indictment of the trend toward the increasing power of the executive, a power gained under the authority and with the acquiescence of Parliament.

SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF EXTERNAL POLICY, 1931–1939. By Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 481 p. $8.00.

Professor Mansergh has ably carried on the series begun by Professor W. H. Hancock. The principal theme in this volume, of course, is the strains met by the Commonwealth and its members in the years that preceded the Commonwealth's entry into war. The chapters on the "twilight" of dominion status in Ireland, Canada's search for unity, and tensions in South Africa are particularly noteworthy.

BRITAIN AND THE DOMINIONS. By W. R. Brock. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952, 521 p. $2.50.

This first volume of a projected five-volume British Commonwealth series is

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a popular history of the development of the British Empire and the evolution of Dominion status.

THE AUSTRALIAN PARTY SYSTEM. By Louise Overacker. New Haven: Yale University Press (for Wellesley College), 1952, 373 p. $5.00.

A welcome monograph on the development, operations and effect of a party system characterized, unlike that of the United States, by tight party discipline. Special attention is paid to the Australian Labor Party, which is even older than the British Labor Party. The author teaches political science at Wellesley College.

FROM BLACK TO WHITE IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA. By Ronald and Catherine Berndt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 313 p. $5.00.

Two social anthropologists examine the transition of the Aborigines in the state of South Australia from one cultural pattern to another.

AUSTRALIA. By R. M. Crawford. London: Hutchinson, 1952, 203 p. 8/6. (New York: Longmans, $2.25.)

A concise and stimulating social history.

PETER FRASER. By James Thorn. London: Odhams, 1952, 288 p. 18/.

A biography of New Zealand's wartime Prime Minister by his former parliamentary undersecretary.

The Middle East

THE ARABS AND THE WEST. By Clare Hollingworth. London: Methuen, 1952, 285 p. 21/.

A gloomy survey of developments in the Middle East since 1945: the quagmire of Western policy, the unresolved animosity between Israel and her neighbors, the bitterness pervading the Arab states, and the twofold danger of unbridled nationalism and Communism.

BACKGROUND OF THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Ernest Jackh. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 236 p. $3.50.

Chapters by various specialists, most of them dealing with the earlier history of the Middle East, but some with current problems.

L'ÉCONOMIE DU MOYEN-ORIENT. By Jacqueline Beaujeu-Garnier. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1951, 126 p. Fr. 150.

A sketchy survey by countries.

ARABIA REBORN. By George Kheirallah. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1952, 307 p. $4.50.

Much of this book is devoted to the battles and triumphs of Ibn Sa'ud in creating his kingdom. Comparatively little information on the Arab world as a whole or relations with Western Powers and business.

ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION. By Kemal A. Faruki. Karachi: Khokhropar Gateway Publications, 1952, 146 p. Rs. 4/8.

An attempt, at times a bit cloudy, to express the "constitutional meaning of Islam for our age and environment."

THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM. By Joseph B. Schechtman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 137 p. $3.00.

Mr. Schechtman supports the Israeli thesis that the problem of the Arab refugees is a result of Western fumbling and Arab intransigence. He does not regard repatriation as the solution.

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THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL. By Gerald de Gaury. New York: Praeger, 1952, 259 p. $3.95.

A useful collection of factual information about the constitutional, political, social and economic situation in Israel.

DEUX ANNÉES AU LEVANT. By Gabriel Puaux. Paris: Hachette, 1952, 248 p. Fr. 600.

Diplomatic memoirs of the French high commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon in the years 1939–1940.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIA AFLAME. By Ebed Van der Vlugt. New York: Devin-Adair, 1953, 294 p. $6.00.

A Dutch barrister, who has spent many years in Indonesia, surveys—rather unevenly—Communist activities in Asia. He is definitely not a Europe-firster.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By D. T. Lakdawala. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 191 p. $2.50.

A study of India's need for foreign capital to achieve an increased rate of economic development.

L'INDE. By Alexandra David-Neel. Paris: Plon, 1951, 311 p. Fr. 495.

This French traveler and student of Indian philosophy is trying to grasp the "eternal India" and has relatively little to say about contemporary problems.

FREE INDIA IN ASIA. By Werner Levi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952, 161 p. $2.75.

Eight brief studies on various aspects of Indian foreign policy.

THE DOMINION OF CEYLON. By Sir Ivor Jennings and H. W. Tambiah. London: Stevens, 1952, 319 p. 55/.

An effort to give a systematic survey of Ceylonese law, which is an intermingling of five systems—Roman-Dutch, English, Hindu, Kandyan and Islamic.

CEYLON. By Sydney D. Bailey. London: Hutchinson, 1952, 168 p. 8/6. (New York: Longmans, $2.25.)

A short history from the arrival of the Sinhalese to the present.

LA RÉVOLTE DE L'ASIE. By Tibor Mende. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1951, 127 p. Fr. 150.

A brief, pessimistic survey.

HISTOIRE DU VIÊT-NAM DE 1940 À 1952. By Philippe Devillers. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1952, 471 p. Fr. 900.

An extensive analysis of relations between France and Viet-Nam since 1940. The author is critical of past French policy, which he regards as the root of the recent troubles, and cites with approval Malraux's remark of 1933 that it was difficult to conceive of a courageous Annamite being anything but a revolutionary.

VIÊT-NAM, SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE. By Paul Mus. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1952, 373 p. Fr. 900.

The author of this informative study of the sociological problems involved in the Viet-Nam conflict was political adviser to General Leclerc in 1945–1947 and director of the École Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer. A worthy companion volume to that of Devillers.

MES AVENTURES EN INDONÉSIE. By R. Westerling. Paris: Hachette, 1952, 254 p. Fr. 500.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The curious story of a Dutch freebooter, strongly opposed to the Sukarno régime, who attempted to carve out an empire in Indonesia.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

A FORGOTTEN JOURNEY. By Peter Fleming. London: Hart-Davis, 1952, 189 p. 10/6.

The diary kept by the author of "News from Tartary" during his overland journey in 1935 through Central Asia, a vast region now completely cut off to Western travelers.

SECRET TIBET. By Fosco Maraini. New York: Viking, 1952, 306 p. $6.50.

An appreciative account of a visit to Tibet, well written and illustrated.

FORMOSA: A PROBLEM FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. By Joseph W. Ballantine. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1952, 218 p. $2.75.

A book designed for the general reader, giving the background of Formosan history, developments since the Second World War and an exposition of unresolved questions relating to the future of the island. The author was formerly Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State.

A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM. By Conrad Brandt and Others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 552 p. $7.50.

A well-edited collection, with commentary, of some 40 formal statements by the Chinese Communist Party over the years since 1921. A useful source book.

THE DRAGON SHEDS ITS SCALES. By C. K. Cheng. New York: New Voices, 1952, 192 p. $3.75.

Dr. Cheng, now a sociologist at the University of Hawaii, discusses China's vicissitudes in recent decades. The overthrow of the Mao Tse-tung régime is held to be a necessary condition for the continuing security of the rest of Asia.

NO SECRET IS SAFE. By Father Mark Tennien. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1952, 270 p. $3.50.

The diary of a Catholic missionary priest in China in 1949–1951.

NELLA TERRA DI MAO-TSE-TUNG. By P. Carlo Suigo. Rome: Edizioni l'Arnia, 1951, 574 p. L. 1500.

The experiences of an Italian Catholic missionary, who went to China in 1938 and was for a time a prisoner of the Chinese Red Army in 1945–1946.

THE YEARS THAT WERE FAT. By George N. Kates. New York: Harper, 1952, 268 p. $3.75.

Reminiscences of seven leisurely years in Peking in the 1930's.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG. By Sir Charles Collins. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs (in coöperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1952, 189 p. $3.00.

A history of public administration in Hong Kong from 1840 to the present.

CONQUERED PRESS. By William J. Coughlin. Palo Alto (Cal.): Pacific Books, 1952, 165 p. $3.00.

A history of the handling of the Japanese press and of American correspondents by the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers. The author is a correspondent for United Press.

LAND AND PEASANT IN JAPAN. By Andrew J. Grad. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952, 262 p. $3.50.

An interim but extensive survey of Japanese agriculture, primarily after 1945.

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THE NEW BREED: THE STORY OF THE U. S. MARINES IN KOREA. By Andrew Geer. New York: Harper, 1952, 395 p. $3.50.

A well-written account of the Marine Corps in Korea, through December 1951.

GEOGRAPHY OF KOREA. By V. T. Zaichikov. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952, 141 p. $1.75.

A translation of a Soviet study, published in 1947. Mimeographed.

Latin America and The West Indies

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA. By Helen L. Clagett. New York: Oceana Publications, 1952, 160 p. $5.00.

A brief but pioneering effort to give a general and comparative picture of the judicial systems in Latin America.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1949. Edited by Francisco Aguilera. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1952, 289 p. $7.00.

The latest volume of this useful annual selection of published materials on Latin America.

MEXICAN REVOLUTION. By Charles Curtis Cumberland. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952, 298 p. $5.00.

A scholarly history, the first volume of a projected series of three on the Mexican Revolution—dealing with the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz, the brief Madero administration, and the Huerta coup d'état.

THE PATTERN OF A DEPENDENT ECONOMY. By N. S. Carey Jones. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953, 162 p. $4.00.

A study of the national income of British Honduras, based largely on figures for 1946.

THE JUNGLE AND THE DAMNED. By Hassoldt Davis. New York: Duell, and Boston: Little, Brown, 1952, 306 p. $4.50.

The account of an exploration of the interior of French Guiana.

BOLIVIA. By Olen E. Leonard. Washington: Scarecrow Press, 1952, 297 p. $6.00.

An informative description of the demographic structure, social and economic institutions, and politics of Bolivia.

L'URUGUAY, PAYS HEUREUX. By Albert Gilles. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1952, 382 p. Fr. 1350.

A descriptive and rather choppy survey of the social, intellectual and economic structure of Uruguay.

THE CARIBBEAN: PEOPLES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS. Edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1952, 240 p. $4.50.

Papers delivered at the Second Annual Conference on the Caribbean at the University of Florida. The general topics covered are health, land, trade, culture and diplomacy.

THE NETHERLANDS WEST INDIES. By Willem Van de Poll. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1951, 192 p. Fl. 10.90.

SURINAM. By Willem Van de Poll. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1951, 168 p. Fl. 10.90.

Handsome photographic descriptions of the Dutch possessions.

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HAITI: HIGHROAD TO ADVENTURE. By Hugh B. Cave. New York: Holt, 1952, 306 p. $5.00.

The journal of a family jeep-ride through the island.

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. By Hewan Craig. London: Faber, 1952, 195 p. 25/.

An able history by a resident of Trinidad; Volume Six in the series "Studies in Colonial Legislatures," edited by Margery Perham.

Africa

AFRIKA. By Anton Zischka. Graz (Austria): Stocker, 1951, 354 p. Schillings 79.

Asserting the "natural unity of Eurafrica," the author examines the economic potentialities to Europe of the African continent.

LE TRAVAIL EN AFRIQUE NOIRE. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1952, 427 p. Fr. 900.

Essays of varying merit on labor problems in Africa south of the Sahara.

AFRICAN HERITAGE. By Emory Ross. New York: Friendship Press, 1952, 145 p. $2.00.

An American missionary, with 40 years' experience, discusses the three forces competing for the minds of men in Africa—"animist communalism, Stalinist communism and the Christian community."

LE CONTINENT AFRICAIN AU MILIEU DU SIÈCLE. By René Laure. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1952, 433 p. Fr. 1500.

A general survey by a French infantry officer of Africa's economic development and potential.

THE NILE. By H. E. Hurst. London: Constable, 1952, 326 p. 30/. (New York: Macmillan, $6.00.)

Dr. Hurst, Scientific Consultant to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, is primarily concerned in this book with the vital problem of the utilization and control of Nile waters.

INDUSTRIALISATION DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD. By Ch. Celier and Others. Paris: Colin, 1952, 320 p. Fr. 1100.

The views of some 16 specialists on the problems and prospects of the industrialization of North Africa.

L'AFRIQUE DU NORD EN MARCHE. By Ch.-André Julien. Paris: Julliard, 1952, 416 p. Fr. 900.

An extended discussion of the growing tension between Moslem nationalism in Tunis, Morocco, and Algiers and the French effort to retain sovereignty.

LA TUNISIE. By Paul Sebag. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1951, 237 p. Fr. 360.

Largely a Leninist monograph on economic conditions, containing a good deal of information but cast to demonstrate the "contradictions of imperialism" in a colonial country.

L'AVENIR DE LA GUINÉE FRANÇAISE. By Roland Pré. Conakry (French Guinea): Éditions Guinéennes, 1951, 280 p.

The Governor of French Guinea presents a variety of projects for the economic development of this colony.

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AUX HEURES TROUBLÉES DE L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE 1939–1943. By Armand Annet. Paris: Éditions du Conquistador, 1952, 251 p. Fr. 600.

The French Governor General of Madagascar from April 1941 until the British occupation of the island in the autumn of 1942 defends his policy during that period. A useful addition to the relatively sparse literature on this subject.

INTRODUCING EAST AFRICA. By Mona Macmillan. London: Faber, 1952, 312 p. 21/.

A serious and informed description of two tours of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in 1949 and 1950.

THE GAMBIA. By Lady Southorn. London: Allen and Unwin, 1952, 283 p. 21/. (New York: Macmillan, $4.75.)

A historical and descriptive survey of the Protectorate, by the wife of the former governor of this British colony. Less substantial than J. M. Gray's earlier history.

THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE. By A. Sillery. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 236 p. $6.50.

The Resident Commissioner from 1946 to 1950 summarizes the history and present circumstances of the Protectorate.

REPORT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Basil Davidson. London: Cape, 1952, 285 p. 16/. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.50.)

Mr. Davidson is an able journalist and has covered much ground to prepare this unfavorable report on southern Africa. One feels, however, that the general pattern of his conclusions was established before he started his inquiries.

RACIAL SEPARATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Eugene P. Dvorin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 256 p. $4.50.

An objective but critical analysis of the theory and practice of *apartheid* in the Union of South Africa.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Service, 80 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1825 Jefferson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

I. DOCUMENTS

Africa

THE AFRICAN in Southern Rhodesia. London, Office of the High Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia, 1952.

5. Industry. 24 p. *6.* Housing and welfare. 16 p. *7.* Administration. 20 p. *8.* Place in community. 16 p.

DIVISIONS territoriales de la Colonie et liste des localités du Congo Belge. . . . Brussels, Marcel Hayez, 1951. 36 p.

LOI sur le gouvernement du Congo Belge et loi sur le gouvernement du Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels, Clarence Denis, 1951. 40 p.

LIBYA. London, 1952. 37 p. (Overseas Economic Surveys.) 1s. 9d.

LIBYA; the road to independence through United Nations. New York, 1952. 20 p. (1952. I. 16.) 15¢.

DISSERTATION on Morocco of 1951, by Pierre Parent. New York, Moroccan Office of Information and Documentation, 1951. 28 p.

Agriculture

FERTILIZERS; a world report on production and consumption. Rome, FAO, 1952. 46 p. 25¢.

China

NEW China Forges Ahead; important documents of the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1952. 78 p.

ON Contradiction, by Mao Tse-tung. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1952. 71 p.

SELECTED speeches and messages of President Chiang Kai-shek, 1949–52. Taipei, Office of the Government Spokesman, 1952. 104 p.

SELECTED speeches on religion by President and Madame Chiang Kai-shek. Taipei, Office of the Government Spokesman, 1952. 38 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

BONITO, canned in oil; and tuna and bonito canned, not in oil. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1952. 35 p.

FLAXSEED and linseed oil; a summary of information on uses, production, trade and supply. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1952. 99 p. (Industrial Materials Series Report M-7.)

TOGETHER we are strong. Washington, 1952. 39 p. (Dept. of State. Commercial Policy Series 144.) 20¢.

European Federation

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